Jonathan Savas v. Cslea ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN SAVAS; et al., No. 20-56045
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
3:20-cv-00032-DMS-DEB
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE LAW MEMORANDUM*
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, a labor
organization; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2022
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** District Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jonathan Savas, et al. (the “Lifeguards”) appeal the
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
claims against Defendants-Appellees California Statewide Law Enforcement
Agency (“CSLEA” or “union”) and Betty Yee and Xavier Becerra in their official
capacities (the “State Defendants”). The Lifeguards are union members of
CSLEA. They allege that CSLEA and the State Defendants violated their First
Amendment rights by enforcing a maintenance of membership requirement that
limited the period within which the Lifeguards could resign their union
membership. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This Court’s decision in Belgau v. Inslee controls. 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.
2020). The Lifeguards, who agreed to become union members, argued that the
maintenance of membership requirement, located in the collective bargaining
agreement and incorporated into their membership applications, is unconstitutional
under Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
“Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted
from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a
payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2486. The Lifeguards do not argue that union membership was a requirement of
employment and agree that they voluntarily chose to join the union. The district
court correctly concluded that the holding in Janus applied to nonunion members
only and because the Lifeguards are union members, Janus is inapplicable here.
2
The Lifeguards cannot escape this conclusion by arguing they become
nonmembers once they make their resignation known to the union. A member of a
union continues to be bound by the requirements of their membership application,
including their duty to pay dues, even if they decide that they no longer want the
benefits of union membership. See N.L.R.B. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 827 F.2d 548,
554 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A party’s duty to perform . . . is not excused merely because
he decides that he no longer wants the consideration for which he has bargained.”).
The Lifeguards have made no serious argument that they were compelled to
join the union. Though the Lifeguards had to choose, at the time they joined,
between an agency fee and union membership, the Lifeguards still made the
affirmative choice to become members. Furthermore, any assertion of compulsion
is undermined by the fact that the Lifeguards had the opportunity to resign their
membership during the June 2019 opt-out window, after the decision in Janus had
rendered agency fees unconstitutional.
As the Court explained in Belgau, “[t]he First Amendment does not support
[a union member’s] right to renege on their promise to join and support the union.”
Belgau, 975 F.3d at 950. The Lifeguards entered into a contract with the union
through which they agreed to be bound by certain limitations on when they could
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resign that membership.1 The contractual term that bound the Lifeguards to the
maintenance of membership requirement was neither uncertain, indefinite, or
ambiguous. The fact that the maintenance of membership requirement appeared in
a separate document does not render the term unenforceable. Poublon v. C.H.
Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under California law, a
contract and a document incorporated by reference into the contract are read
together as a single document.”). When “legal obligations are self-imposed, state
law, not the First Amendment, normally governs.” Belgau, 975 F.3d at 950
(quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991)) (cleaned up).
Thus, a maintenance of membership requirement is not invalidated by the First
Amendment because the limitation stems from a private agreement.
Belgau requires this conclusion. There are no meaningful distinctions
between this case and Belgau that persuade us a different outcome is warranted.
The only potentially relevant difference is that the irrevocability period in Belgau
was one year whereas here it is four. But the Lifeguards have failed to present any
1
This conclusion presumes that there was a valid contract between the Lifeguards
and CSLEA. The district court held that a contract existed between the Lifeguards
and the CSLEA via the membership applications. We must accept this finding
unless we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Const. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). As the Lifeguards have not provided more than brief
allegations that the district court committed clear error, no mistake was committed.
Thus, there was a valid contract between the Lifeguards and CSLEA.
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plausible reason why an irrevocability period of one year is constitutionally
permissible, but four years would not be. Thus, we affirm the district court’s
holding that the Lifeguards have failed to state a plausible claim because the
maintenance of membership requirement does not implicate the First Amendment.2
AFFIRMED.
2
The claims against CSLEA also fail for lack of stat action under Belgau.
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