Rhonda Pittman v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. , 694 F. App'x 520 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 18 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RHONDA PITTMAN,                                 No. 16-56017
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:16-cv-00348-GW-JEM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Successor
    by merger with Wachovia Mortgage FSB
    formerly known as World Savings Bank
    FSB its Successors and/or Assigns; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 11, 2017**
    Before:      CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
    Rhonda Pittman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    her action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Hunt v. Imperial
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Merchant Servs., Inc., 
    560 F.3d 1137
    , 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction); Doe v.
    Abbott Labs., 
    571 F.3d 930
    , 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissal under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
    The district court properly dismissed Pittman’s TILA claim for damages
    because Pittman failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Wells Fargo violated
    TILA or that Pittman’s claim was not time-barred. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 1640
    (e) (an
    action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the
    alleged violation).
    To the extent Pittman seeks injunctive relief related to the nonjudicial
    foreclosure sale, this court cannot grant that relief because the sale of the property
    has already been completed. See Vegas Diamond Props., LLC v. FDIC, 
    669 F.3d 933
    , 936 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he sale of the real properties prevents this Court from
    granting the requested relief and accordingly renders this appeal moot.”); Am. Cas.
    Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Baker, 
    22 F.3d 880
    , 896 (9th Cir. 1994) (a case is moot
    when there is no longer a present controversy as to which effective relief can be
    granted).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    2                                      16-56017
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
    3                               16-56017