United States v. Florence White Eagle ( 2013 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,                       No. 11-30352
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                          4:11-cr-00032-
    SEH-1
    FLORENCE A. WHITE EAGLE,
    Defendant-Appellant.                  OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    November 6, 2012—Portland, Oregon
    Filed July 5, 2013
    Before: Kenneth F. Ripple*, M. Margaret McKeown,
    and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge McKeown
    *
    The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2               UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    SUMMARY**
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part a criminal
    judgment in a case arising out of the involvement by the
    Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck
    Indian Reservation in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal
    credit program.
    Reversing convictions on counts charging conspiracy to
    convert tribal credit program proceeds (
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ) and
    theft and conversion from an Indian Tribal Organization (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1163
    , 2), the panel held that the government’s
    misapplication theory, predicated at best on an employer
    directive and a civil regulation, cannot support a conviction;
    and that the government’s embezzlement and conversion
    theories also fail because the defendant never controlled or
    had custody of the funds that she later borrowed.
    Affirming a bribery conviction (
    18 U.S.C. § 201
    (b)(2)),
    the panel held that a jury could easily infer a quid pro quo and
    had ample evidence to conclude that the defendant’s actions
    were “corrupt.”
    Because the government did not show that the defendant
    violated a specific duty to report credit program fraud, the
    panel reversed her conviction of concealment of public
    corruption (
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(1)).
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                   3
    The panel reversed a conviction for public acts affecting
    a personal financial interest (
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a)(1)) because
    the connection between the payment of a BIA Administrative
    Officer’s fraudulent nominee loans and the defendant’s
    alleged financial interest is remote and speculative.
    The panel held that there was sufficient evidence to
    support the defendant’s conviction of misprision of a felony
    (
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    ).
    The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that her
    convictions for public acts affecting a financial interest and
    misprision of a felony would violate her Fifth Amendment
    right to avoid self-incrimination because each charge relied
    on her duty to report criminal activity that would have
    exposed her to prosecution. The panel reasoned that the
    connection between the defendant’s loan modification and the
    BIA Administrative Officer’s use of nominee borrowers is
    too remote to implicate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
    rights.
    The panel held that the district court erred at sentencing
    in its application of U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2), when it appeared
    to value the loan modification using standard “loss”
    calculations instead of focusing on the “value of the benefit”
    the defendant received. The panel explained that any
    sentencing adjustment must be based on the value of the loan
    modification as a bribe, and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    4            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    COUNSEL
    Steven T. Potts (argued), Great Falls, Montana, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Carl E. Rostad (argued), United States Attorney’s Office for
    the District of Montana, Great Falls, Montana, J. Bishop
    Grewell, United States Attorney’s Office for the District of
    Montana, Billings, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
    Florence White Eagle appeals her conviction and sentence
    on six counts arising out of her involvement in a scheme to
    obtain money from a tribal credit program: (I) conspiracy to
    convert tribal credit program proceeds in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ; (II) theft and conversion from an Indian
    Tribal Organization in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1163
    , 2; (III)
    bribery in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 201
    (b)(2); (IV)
    concealment of public corruption in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(1); (V) public acts affecting a personal financial
    interest in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a); and (VI)
    misprision of a felony in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    . Without
    a doubt, White Eagle turned a blind eye to fraud and
    facilitated its cover up. The difficulty for the prosecution is
    that, in the main, the crimes charged did not fit the facts. We
    affirm White Eagle’s convictions on Counts III and VI
    (bribery and misprision of a felony), but reverse the
    convictions on Counts I, II, IV, and V, and remand for
    resentencing.
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                 5
    BACKGROUND
    White Eagle was the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
    Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. The BIA
    is the federal government’s trustee for lands on Fort Peck in
    northeastern Montana, which is home to the Assiniboine and
    Sioux Tribes. Until early 2008, the BIA oversaw the Fort
    Peck Credit Program (“Credit Program”), which provided a
    supplemental source of credit to tribal members and was
    intended to “rais[e] the economic status of members of the
    Tribes to a point where they can look to the same sources of
    financing as are looked to by other citizens.” One of White
    Eagle’s duties was to sign loan documents for Credit Program
    loans that pledged trust assets as collateral.
    The Credit Program was staffed with four tribal
    employees and two BIA employees—a loan specialist and a
    loan assistant. The four tribal employees were supervised by
    the two BIA employees, who, in turn, were supervised by
    Toni Greybull, the BIA Administrative Officer. White Eagle
    was Greybull’s immediate supervisor and the two women
    worked together at Fort Peck for many years.
    Greybull was a central participant in a fraudulent scheme
    to advantage Credit Program employees. The setup was not
    particularly complicated—Credit Program employees
    obtained loans by filing applications in the names of
    “nominee,” or stand-in, relatives and then splitting the
    proceeds amongst themselves. To avoid the three-person
    Credit Committee tasked with application review and
    approval, Greybull approved many of the loans herself. This
    scheme was extensive: an Office of the Inspector General
    (“OIG”) audit revealed that of the approximately $1.6 million
    loaned by the Credit Program, around $1.2 million went to
    6            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    Credit Program employees and their stand-in family
    members.
    Greybull died in March 2008, leaving behind a number of
    unpaid loans in others’ names. In May 2008, Greybull’s
    sister Linda Christiansen approached White Eagle with
    documentation for nominee loans that Greybull had taken out
    in Christiansen’s name as well as in the name of Arthur
    Greybull, III (Toni Greybull’s son). Christiansen requested
    that the loans be repaid out of Greybull’s life insurance.
    Apparently worried that inquiries about the loans would lead
    to an audit that potentially would expose the fraud, White
    Eagle contacted Greybull’s husband Arthur Greybull Jr. and
    falsely informed him that Toni Greybull (not the nominee
    borrowers) had outstanding loans with the Credit Program.
    Greybull’s husband then paid the loans with money from
    Greybull’s life insurance.
    Greybull was not the only beneficiary of the loan
    program. White Eagle also obtained loans from the Credit
    Program, though not through the use of nominee borrowers.
    In 2002, she took out a short-term loan of $2,000, and in
    February 2007 she obtained a long-term loan for $5,050.
    White Eagle made payments as required under the terms of
    the loans. The long-term loan was modified twice to allow
    borrowing of additional funds: in January 2008 the loan was
    increased by $15,000, and in June 2009 it was increased by
    another $5,050. These modifications were approved by the
    Credit Program’s Credit Committee, not Greybull. Although
    the government does not allege the loans were fraudulently
    procured, White Eagle’s long-term loan modification was
    contrary to specific directives she had received. When the
    BIA regional director discovered in late 2007 that White
    Eagle had taken out loans, he told her to pay them off and
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                  7
    discontinue participation in the Credit Program due to the
    conflict of interest. The government argues that White
    Eagle’s Credit Program loans also violated the prohibition on
    holding financial interests that conflict with conscientious
    performance of duty. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
    (b)(2).
    At trial, the government argued that Greybull arranged the
    2008 loan modification as quid pro quo for White Eagle’s
    assistance in dealing with possible discovery of the nominee
    loan scheme triggered by Greybull’s mother Patricia Menz.
    In September 2007, Menz visited the Credit Program offices
    to pay off a loan she had personally taken out and discovered,
    to her surprise, that other loans had been taken out in her
    name and without her knowledge or consent. The Credit
    Program employee who assisted Menz had obtained
    fraudulent loans himself and knew that Greybull had obtained
    fraudulent loans. He directed Menz to speak to Greybull for
    answers to her questions. Instead, and without telling
    Greybull or others involved in the scheme, Menz contacted
    the OIG and reported the loan irregularities.
    Menz did not complain to the BIA or the Credit Program,
    and there was no official reason for White Eagle to address
    her concerns. Nonetheless, in December 2007, White Eagle
    sent Menz a letter on BIA letterhead falsely assuring her that
    she owed nothing because the loans had been erroneously
    listed in her name and had also been paid off. The day before
    White Eagle sent the letter, she had applied for the $15,000
    increase in her long-term loan. Although the loan was
    approved by the Credit Committee, the government presented
    evidence that Greybull fast-tracked its approval, even
    prevailing upon Credit Program staff to release a hold on
    White Eagle’s account. The government also argued that the
    loan issued on unusually favorable terms. Under its theory,
    8            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    the fast-tracked and favorable loan modification was a payoff
    for White Eagle’s assistance in the coverup.
    The fraudulent scheme was uncovered during a 2009
    audit conducted by the Fort Peck Tribes. The audit
    determined that fraud had been taking place since at least the
    early 1990s, with participation by six Credit Program
    employees. The investigation also identified Christiansen and
    Greybull III (the nominal recipients of the loans paid off by
    Greybull’s life insurance) as participants.
    White Eagle’s prosecution arose out of the audit. In
    March 2011, the government charged White Eagle with six
    counts stemming from her involvement in the fraudulent
    scheme and the loan modifications. The jury found her guilty
    on all counts. The district court imposed a sentence of 51
    months on Counts I through V, and 36 months for Count VI,
    to run concurrently. White Eagle appeals her convictions on
    all counts, as well as the district court’s application of the
    four-level sentencing enhancement based on the value of the
    bribe.
    ANALYSIS
    I. CONVICTIONS
    White Eagle preserved her claim of insufficient evidence
    by moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of
    evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. We therefore review de novo
    the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction.
    United States v. Tucker, 
    641 F.3d 1110
    , 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
    Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, when
    construed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “any
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                  9
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
    Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
    (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)
    (emphasis in original)).
    A. Counts I and II: Conspiracy, Theft and
    Conversion of Indian Tribal Organization
    Property
    In Counts I and II, the government alleged that White
    Eagle and Greybull conspired to embezzle or convert Credit
    Program funds. According to the government, the object of
    the conspiracy was White Eagle’s $15,000 loan modification.
    We note that these charges are narrowly targeted, particularly
    in comparison to the wide-ranging nominee borrower scheme.
    Counts I and II focus on Menz’s discovery of the loans in her
    name, White Eagle’s assistance in the attempted cover-up,
    and White Eagle’s receipt of a loan modification—events
    beginning in late 2007, long after Greybull’s nominee scheme
    occurred was implemented.
    The jury was properly instructed that conspiracy required
    “an agreement between two or more persons” and “a plan to
    commit at least one of the crimes alleged in the indictment as
    an object of the conspiracy.” Ninth Circuit Model Criminal
    Jury Instruction No. 8.20. The government argues that “[t]he
    jury could infer an agreement” from Greybull’s loans and
    White Eagle’s attempt to cover up the fraudulent activity.
    However, it does not argue that Greybull’s loans, which
    predated the alleged conspiracy, were its object. Instead,
    under each of the misappropriation theories, White Eagle’s
    loan modification is touted as the object of the conspiracy:
    “obtaining monies that her supervisor had prohibited”
    (misapplication) or using “her lawful authority over the funds
    10            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    to gain what was an otherwise unauthorized possession of the
    funds” (embezzlement and conversion). Hence, we analyze
    White Eagle’s loan modification, not Greybull’s fraudulent
    nominee loans, as the basis for the convictions on Counts I
    and II.
    The government presented no evidence that White Eagle
    defrauded the Credit Program or that the applications for her
    long-term loan and subsequent modifications were inaccurate
    or incomplete. See Carlos-Blaza v. Holder, 
    611 F.3d 583
    ,
    588 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing charge for misapplication of
    bank funds and holding that “a conviction for
    misapplication . . . necessarily involves intent to defraud”);
    United States v. Dreitzler, 
    577 F.2d 539
    , 546 (9th Cir. 1978)
    (to show misapplication, the government must prove that “the
    bank’s funds were disbursed under a false record”). Unlike
    core participants in the nominee borrower scheme, White
    Eagle did not use nominee borrowers to surreptitiously gain
    a personal benefit. Cf. 
    id. at 545
     (upholding misapplication
    conviction where defendant “set up bogus loan transactions,
    presented . . . forged documents to the bank, and received the
    proceeds of the ‘loans’ which he used for his [insurance]
    agency’s benefit”).       The posture of White Eagle’s
    participation forecloses a conviction under a traditional
    misapplication theory involving fraud or misrepresentation of
    some kind.
    The government instead tethers its theory to two
    restrictions affecting White Eagle’s participation in the Credit
    Program. The first restriction is that White Eagle’s
    supervisor in 2007 instructed her not to borrow from the
    Credit Program; the second, 
    5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
    (b)(2),
    prohibits holding financial interests that conflict with
    conscientious performance of duty. However, neither
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                   11
    violation of an employer’s instruction nor a civil rule by itself
    supports a conviction for conversion, theft, or misapplication
    of funds.
    This conclusion follows from analogous cases involving
    prosecutions for misapplication of bank funds under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 656
    . In United States v. Wolf, 
    820 F.2d 1499
    ,
    1505 (9th Cir. 1987), the defendant submitted fraudulent loan
    applications in the name of stand-in borrowers and
    additionally failed to make disclosures required by Federal
    Reserve Regulation O. Despite evidence that the loan
    applications were fraudulent, we reversed the misapplication
    conviction because of the “serious risk that the jury would
    find Wolf guilty of criminal misapplication . . . because he
    failed to comply with Regulation O,” a civil regulation. Id.;
    see also United States v. Christo, 
    614 F.2d 486
    , 492 (5th Cir.
    1980) (“A conviction, resulting from the government’s
    attempt to bootstrap a series of checking account overdrafts,
    a civil regulatory violation, into an equal amount of
    misapplication felonies, cannot be allowed to stand.”).
    “[U]nder the logic of Christo and Wolf, it is impermissible to
    use the violation of a civil statute to ipso facto ‘supply a
    crucial element’ of a criminal offense.” United States v.
    Eriksen, 
    639 F.3d 1138
    , 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). The
    government’s misapplication theory, predicated at best on an
    employer directive and a civil regulation, cannot support a
    conviction here.
    The government’s embezzlement and conversion theories
    also fail because White Eagle never controlled or had custody
    of the funds that she later borrowed. Even though she signed
    paperwork for loans involving the pledge of trust assets as
    collateral, the Credit Committee (of which White Eagle was
    not a member) approved loans before a check would issue.
    12           UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    See 
    id. at 1145
     (explaining that “[e]mbezzlement is the
    fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom
    such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has
    lawfully come”) (alteration in original; citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted); United States v. Andreen, 
    628 F.2d 1236
    , 1241 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[C]onversion encompasses the
    use of property, placed in one’s custody for a limited purpose,
    in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent.”).
    Nor does Greybull’s shepherding White Eagle’s loan
    modification through the approval process and signing
    paperwork constitute embezzlement.             In contrast to
    Greybull’s own nominee loans (which circumvented the
    Credit Committee), White Eagle’s loan modification was
    ultimately approved by the Credit Committee. Even in the
    light most favorable to the government, the evidence
    contradicts an embezzlement or conversion theory.
    Because the alleged object of the conspiracy—the loan
    modification—was not itself criminal, there can be no
    conspiracy. See United States v. Montgomery, 
    384 F.3d 1050
    , 1062 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that a conspiracy requires
    an agreement to engage in criminal conduct). The
    government cannot bootstrap itself to a criminal conviction
    simply because White Eagle disobeyed a supervisor’s order
    or contravened a general civil conflict of interest statute. We
    reverse White Eagle’s convictions on Counts I and II.
    B. Count III: Bribery
    The quid pro quo alleged here is simple. White Eagle, as
    BIA Superintendent, helped Greybull cover up her fraudulent
    scheme; in exchange Greybull helped her obtain a favorable
    loan modification. The government was required to prove
    that: (1) White Eagle “was a public official;” (2) she received
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                   13
    “[some]thing of value . . . in return for . . . being induced to
    do or omit to do an[] act in violation of [her] official duty;”
    and (3) she acted “corruptly”—that is, with the “intent to be
    influenced to perform an act” that violated her official duty.”
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 201
    (b)(2)(C); United States v. Leyva,
    
    282 F.3d 623
    , 625-626 (9th Cir. 2002).
    White Eagle does not challenge her status as a public
    official. Instead, she argues that she received nothing of
    value because Greybull’s assistance with the loan
    modification was unnecessary and that she did not act
    corruptly because her actions could not have affected the
    OIG’s investigation. White Eagle also challenges the
    sufficiency of the indictment, which alleges that agreement
    and payment took place after she sent the letter to Menz.
    The evidence is consistent with bribery, and surely
    sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia. 
    443 U.S. at 319
    (evidence is sufficient if “any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt”) (emphasis in original). Upon hearing of Menz’s
    concerns, White Eagle conducted almost no investigation into
    whether Menz’s loans were actually paid, and did not report
    the issue to her superior. Instead, on December 12, 2007, she
    wrote a letter to Menz on BIA letterhead falsely assuring her
    that the loans had been paid off and that they had only
    erroneously been listed under Menz’s name. Only one day
    earlier, White Eagle had applied for the $15,000 loan
    modification. The modification appears to have issued on
    irregular and favorable terms: it included improved
    repayment provisions, and the documentation did not include
    a pledge of trust assets as was normally required. Greybull,
    whose signature appeared on the application, fast-tracked the
    loan and prevailed upon the Credit Program to release a hold
    14            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    on White Eagle’s account that arose after a borrower for
    whom White Eagle had co-signed defaulted on a loan.
    A rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from
    these facts, concluding that White Eagle wrote Menz a letter
    to alleviate her concerns and turned a blind eye to the
    nominee borrower scheme in exchange for Greybull’s later
    assistance in securing a quick and favorable loan
    modification. Although the loan modification might well
    have issued without Greybull’s involvement, the jury was
    entitled to find that her assistance was “something of value,”
    particularly given the favorable terms.
    White Eagle also argues that she took no corrupt actions
    because her letter to Menz could not have affected the OIG’s
    response to Menz’s complaint. In doing so, she misconstrues
    the import of the letter—transmitting the letter was corrupt
    regardless of its impact, as success is not an element of the
    offense. Moreover, White Eagle failed to report the
    obviously illegal nominee borrower scheme. See United
    States v. Birdsall, 
    233 U.S. 223
    , 231 (1914) (adopting, for
    bribery purposes, a broad definition of official acts and noting
    that “[t]o constitute . . . official action, it was not necessary
    that [the conduct] be prescribed by statute”); O’Campo v.
    Hardisty, 
    262 F.2d 621
    , 624 (9th Cir. 1958) (same). The jury
    had ample evidence to conclude that White Eagle’s actions
    were “corrupt.”
    White Eagle argues that “[a] person cannot be bribed for
    a past act” and urges us to reject the indictment because it
    states that White Eagle agreed to the scheme and accepted the
    payment in January 2008, after she sent the letter to Menz.
    But the indictment sets no dates in stone. While Count III
    states that White Eagle agreed to the scheme and received the
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                 15
    loan modification “on or around” January 2, 2008, the
    evidence in the record is consistent with an agreement
    between White Eagle and Greybull that predated the
    December letter to Menz. Moreover, any challenge to the
    sufficiency of Count III of the indictment is misplaced
    regardless of any imprecision as to timing. The indictment
    tracks the language of the bribery statute, contains the
    elements of the offense, and specifies which of White Eagle’s
    actions violated the law, thus allowing her to avoid another
    prosecution on the same actions. See Hamling v. United
    States, 
    418 U.S. 87
    , 117 (1974); United States v.
    Milovanovic, 
    678 F.3d 713
    , 727 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm
    White Eagle’s conviction under Count III.
    C. Count IV: Falsification, Concealment, or Covering
    Up of a Material Fact
    The district court properly instructed the jury that a
    conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(1) requires that: (1) the
    defendant had a duty to disclose material information, (2) the
    defendant falsified, concealed, or covered up such a fact by
    trick, scheme, or fraud, (3) the falsified, concealed, or
    covered up fact was material, (4) the falsification and/or
    concealment was knowing and willful, and (5) the material
    fact was within the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch. See
    United States v. Varbel, 
    780 F.2d 758
    , 762 (9th Cir. 1986)
    (indictment alleging concealment in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
     failed where there was no duty to disclose); see also
    United States v. Moore, 
    446 F.3d 671
    , 677 (7th Cir. 2006).
    White Eagle challenges the legal sufficiency of her duty to
    report Greybull’s fraud and claims that she did report the
    fraud to Darryl LaCounte, the BIA Deputy Regional Director.
    16            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    White Eagle’s claim that she reported the fraudulent
    scheme does not withstand scrutiny. She argues only that she
    told LaCounte that Greybull’s husband had paid the balance
    of a loan for one of Greybull’s relatives. This hardly counts
    as an actual “report” alerting LaCounte to the fraudulent
    activity. LaCounte’s testimony also contradicts White
    Eagle’s claim that she reported the fraud. He recalled
    discussing Greybull’s husband’s payment with White Eagle,
    but did not remember hearing about Greybull’s fraud.
    LaCounte also testified that he would have reacted to any
    report regarding fraudulently obtained loans—but he did not
    investigate or take any actions. The jury was entitled to reject
    White Eagle’s account and credit LaCounte’s testimony. We
    cannot overturn its credibility determinations. See United
    States v. Yossunthorn, 
    167 F.3d 1267
    , 1270 (9th Cir. 1999)
    (noting that a jury’s credibility finding cannot be reviewed on
    appeal). We therefore focus our analysis on whether White
    Eagle’s failure to report Greybull’s fraud can support a
    conviction for concealment under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(1).
    White Eagle, like all government employees, had a duty
    to “disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate
    authorities,” codified in the Code of Federal Regulations as
    a “[b]asic obligation of public service.” See 
    5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
    (b)(11). It is not disputed that White Eagle
    violated this fundamental rule. However, she is not charged
    with breaching the public trust or failing to perform her duties
    as a public servant or government employee. Instead, she is
    charged with fraudulent concealment, a narrower offense
    under the umbrella of “Fraud and False Statements.”
    18 U.S.C. ch. 47. Because failing to report fraud in violation
    of generally applicable ethical principles is not equivalent to
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                         17
    a “false statement,” the facts do not support a conviction
    under § 1001(a)(1).1
    As other circuits have recognized, a conviction under
    § 1001(a)(1) is proper where a statute or government
    regulation requires the defendant to disclose specific
    information to a particular person or entity. See United States
    v. Tobon-Builes, 
    706 F.2d 1092
    , 1096 (11th Cir. 1983). So,
    for example, when a defendant submits a report that omits
    particular information that by law must appear in the report,
    a conviction for concealment is proper. See United States v.
    Muntain, 
    610 F.2d 964
    , 971–72 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The same
    holds true when a defendant responds to specific questions on
    a particular topic. See United States v. Stewart, 
    433 F.3d 273
    ,
    318 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that SEC investigator’s specific
    questions regarding another individual’s stock trades created
    a duty to disclose information about those trades).
    In these situations, the defendant’s silence is akin to an
    affirmative misrepresentation, and therefore logically falls
    within the scope of § 1001’s prohibition on false and
    fraudulent statements. See United States v. Mubayyid,
    
    658 F.3d 35
    , 70-71 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[B]y filing the false
    Form 990s, which he signed under penalty of perjury,
    Mubayyid did not passively fail to disclose material facts; he
    engaged in an affirmative act of concealment. . . . His
    conduct is therefore sufficient grounds for a conviction under
    § 1001(a)(1).”) (citation omitted). Similarly, if a financial
    institution fails to report particular transactions as required by
    law, its silence is effectively a statement that no such
    transactions took place. Cf. United States v. Puerto, 
    730 F.2d 1
    W hite Eagle’s failure to report Greybull’s felony was charged in Count
    VI (misprision of a felony) and was not a part of this Count.
    18            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    627, 633 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a defendant is guilty
    of concealment of a material fact when he causes either an
    inaccurate currency transaction report or no currency
    transaction report to be sent to the Internal Revenue Service).
    We can identify no analogous “silent statement” by White
    Eagle. It is true that White Eagle concealed Greybull’s loans
    by writing a false letter to Menz claiming that the loans had
    been paid off and by inducing Greybull’s husband to pay the
    loan balances with life insurance proceeds. However, neither
    act involved an affirmative false or misleading statement to
    the government. The government argues that White Eagle
    further concealed the fraud by informing LaCounte that
    Greybull’s nominee loans had been paid off, but not telling
    him that they had been fraudulently obtained in the first
    place. But that incomplete report—while misleading—did
    not contravene a specific reporting duty. White Eagle’s
    partial disclosure made no representation, explicit or implicit,
    as to the existence of fraud in the Credit Program. Her acts
    may be improper and unethical, but they are not sufficient for
    a concealment conviction under § 1001(a)(1).
    The D.C. Circuit’s treatment of an analogous issue in
    United States v. Safavian, 
    528 F.3d 957
     (D.C. Cir. 2008), is
    instructive. The court overturned a conviction under
    § 1001(a)(1) that, like here, arose out of an alleged violation
    of 
    5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
    (b)(11). 
    Id. at 959
    . The defendant, a
    GSA employee, sought ethical advice about participating in
    golf trip sponsored by Jack Abramoff, but did not disclose
    Abramoff’s business before the GSA in his request for the
    ethics opinion. 
    Id. at 960
    . The government argued that the
    defendant’s omission of this relevant detail breached his duty
    to disclose under the regulation and other ethical principles.
    
    Id. at 964
    . The court acknowledged the ethics rules required
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                    19
    disclosure relating to corruption, but found that the
    relationship between those requirements and the duty to
    report under § 1001(a)(1) was “tenuous at best.” Id. It noted
    that there was “no indication of the particular facts or
    information” that should be disclosed, and that the regulation
    contained no indication that it applied to the defendant’s
    conduct. Id. at 965. It reversed the conviction under
    § 1001(a)(1) because there was no duty to disclose. Id.
    The same reasoning applies here. Although the regulation
    discusses reporting “fraud” and “corruption,” 
    5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
    (b)(11), it does not provide specifics on what kind
    of information should be reported or to whom. Nor does it
    discuss criminal liability for failure to abide by its provisions.
    See Safavian, 
    528 F.3d at 964
     (Under the Fifth Amendment,
    “the defendant must have ‘fair notice . . . of what conduct is
    forbidden. . . . [T]his “fair warning” requirement prohibits
    application of a criminal statute to a defendant unless it was
    reasonably clear at the time of the alleged action that
    defendant[‘s] actions were criminal.’”) (first three alterations
    in original) (citation omitted). Nothing in § 1001(a)(1) or the
    regulation indicates that a failure to report could effectively
    be read as a statement that no fraud was taking place.
    Because the government did not show that White Eagle
    violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud, we
    reverse her conviction as to Count IV.
    20                UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    D. Count V: Public Acts Affecting a Personal
    Financial Interest
    White Eagle was also indicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a),
    the basic criminal conflict of interest statute,2 based on her
    alleged concealment of Greybull’s fraudulent scheme.
    According to the government, the concealment furthered
    White Eagle’s own interests because she wanted the loan
    program to continue so that she could obtain additional future
    loans and ensure that she kept her job; both would be in
    jeopardy if the scheme was discovered. Those interests are
    too remote from White Eagle’s acts to sustain a conviction.
    Section 208(a) regulates a limited set of “particular
    matters,” generally arising out of discrete matters with a
    direct impact on the government employee’s finances. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 2640.103
    (a)(1) (listing examples that involve the
    award and maintenance of government contracts, specific
    hiring decisions, and use of a particular business’s services).
    Illustrative cases under § 208(a) underscore the link between
    the conflict and a real, rather than speculative, interest in a
    particular matter. See, e.g., United States v. Selby, 
    557 F.3d 2
    Section 208(a) provides that
    [W ]hoever, being an officer or employee of the
    executive branch . . . participates personally and
    substantially as a Government officer or employee . . .
    in a judicial or other proceeding, application, request
    for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim,
    controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
    particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he . . . has
    a financial interest . . . [s]hall be subject to the penalties
    set forth in section 216 of this title.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a).
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                  21
    968, 975 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (employee whose
    husband earned commission from a software sale to the
    government had sufficient financial interest to sustain
    conviction under § 208(a) where she had actively lobbied for
    increased use of her husband’s software); United States v.
    Jewell, 
    827 F.2d 586
    , 587 (9th Cir. 1987) (financial interest
    requirement of § 208(a) was met where the government
    employee signed invoices authorizing payment to his own
    company); United States v. Smith, 
    267 F.3d 1154
    , 1156–57
    (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referral of patients to specific mental health
    clinic to which defendant had loaned money was sufficient
    under § 208(a)).
    The government argued that the “particular matter”
    underlying this Count was White Eagle’s request that
    Greybull’s husband pay off Greybull’s nominee loans with
    the proceeds of Greybull’s life insurance. While an employee
    need not personally stand on either side of an underlying
    transaction, the link between the employee’s interest and the
    public act must be direct and predictable. See United States
    v. Lund, 
    853 F.2d 242
    , 243 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying statute
    to federal employee’s involvement in hiring decision
    involving a relative). There was no such clear link here.
    The connection between the payment of Greybull’s
    fraudulent nominee loans and White Eagle’s alleged financial
    interest is remote and speculative. While White Eagle’s acts
    directly concealed Greybull’s fraud, her own interests were
    further downstream. To find an effect on White Eagle’s
    continued employment and/or her future ability to obtain
    Credit Program loans, we must assume that discovery of
    Greybull’s fraud would have led to a wide-scale
    investigation, and one of two outcomes: (1) a change in
    policy preventing loans to BIA employees that would not
    22            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    affect White Eagle unless and until she desired additional
    loans; or (2) the conclusion that White Eagle was at fault to
    a degree justifying her termination. This chain of events
    requires hypothesis heaped on hypothesis and is not the
    “close causal link” between the request to pay and the effect
    on the claimed financial interests. Selby, 557 F.3d at 975.
    Any proposed link is fraught with contingencies, particularly
    because Greybull’s underlying fraud was part of a
    longstanding scheme that long predated claimed complicity
    by White Eagle. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 2640.103
    (a)(3)(i) (“A
    particular matter will not have a direct effect on a financial
    interest, however, if the chain of causation is attenuated or is
    contingent upon the occurrence of events that are
    speculative.”). Accordingly, White Eagle’s financial interest
    in this matter was insufficient under 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a). We
    reverse her conviction on Count V.
    E. Count VI: Misprision of a Felony
    Misprision of a felony in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    requires the government to establish: (1) the commission and
    completion of a felony by a third party, (2) the defendant’s
    knowledge of the felony, (3) the defendant’s failure to notify
    the authorities, and (4) that the defendant took an affirmative
    step to conceal the crime. United States v. Ciambrone,
    
    750 F.2d 1416
    , 1417 (9th Cir. 1985).
    The crime here was Greybull’s fraudulent use of nominee
    borrowers. There was evidence, however, that White Eagle
    knew of the fraud: Christiansen told White Eagle that the
    loans in her name and Greybull’s son’s name actually
    belonged to Greybull, and that the loans needed to be paid out
    of Greybull’s life insurance policy. White Eagle never
    notified relevant authorities of Greybull’s use of nominee
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                  23
    borrowers, and concealed Greybull’s fraud by arranging for
    Greybull’s husband to pay off the long-term loans with life
    insurance proceeds to head off any investigation into the
    matter.
    As with the bribery charge, White Eagle argues that there
    was no concealment and claims that she reported the crime by
    notifying Darryl LaCounte, the relevant BIA official, that
    Greybull’s husband had paid the balance of a loan for one of
    Greybull’s relatives. This report was insufficient because the
    law requires the reporting of the “commission of a felony,”
    not just related acts. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
     (“Whoever, having
    knowledge of . . . a felony . . . does not as soon as possible
    make known the same” may be subject to penalties.)
    (emphasis added). LaCounte also testified to the contrary,
    and the jury was entitled to reject White Eagle’s story to the
    extent that it conflicted with LaCounte’s. See Yossunthorn,
    
    167 F.3d at 1270
     (a jury’s credibility finding cannot be
    reviewed on appeal).
    White Eagle additionally claims that she took no
    affirmative step to conceal the crime because the payment of
    Christiansen and Greybull III’s loans did not make it any
    harder for the government to uncover Greybull’s fraud.
    However, the jury heard testimony from the tribe’s chief
    financial officer that her audit focused primarily on loan
    payments, not their origination. Because this evidence
    showed that paid off loans were less likely to be investigated,
    the jury could conclude that payment of the loans made the
    discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that White
    Eagle took an affirmative step to conceal the felony.
    White Eagle finally argues that her conviction cannot
    stand because there was no underlying prosecution relating to
    24            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    the long-term loans that Greybull’s husband paid and that she
    allegedly concealed. We have never required evidence of a
    prosecution or conviction for the third party’s offense as a
    prerequisite for a misprision conviction—only the completion
    of the offense. See Ciambrone, 
    750 F.2d at 1417
     (listing
    commission and completion of a felony, but not conviction,
    as elements of the offense); United States v. King, 
    402 F.2d 694
    , 695 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding, without discussing
    prosecution or conviction of the principals, that sufficient
    evidence supported the jury’s finding that the principals
    committed a felony). Any other conclusion could bar
    prosecution in cases like this, where the third party dies or for
    other reasons is not charged and/or convicted before the
    defendant is tried. Reversal of Count VI on these grounds is
    not warranted, and we affirm White Eagle’s conviction on
    Count VI.
    F. White Eagle’s Fifth Amendment Defense
    White Eagle also argues that convictions for Counts V
    (public acts affecting a financial interest) and VI (misprision
    of a felony) would violate her Fifth Amendment right to
    avoid self-incrimination because each charge relied on her
    duty to report criminal activity that would have exposed her
    to prosecution. However, these convictions were based on
    White Eagle’s failure to report Greybull’s crimes, not her
    own alleged criminal activity. The connection between
    White Eagle’s loan modification and Greybull’s use of
    nominee borrowers is too remote to implicate White Eagle’s
    Fifth Amendment rights.
    White Eagle cites to persuasive authority that a misprision
    conviction cannot stand where the defendant’s duty to report
    would have furnished evidence against the defendant.
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                   25
    Notably, these cases arise where the defendants’ criminal
    activity arose out of the same transactions that constituted the
    felonies they were obligated to report. See King, 
    402 F.2d at 697
     (defendant who was present at meetings of conspirators
    before and after bank robbery, received some proceeds from
    it, and helped participants leave town could not be prosecuted
    for failure to report robbery); United States v. Kuh, 
    541 F.2d 672
    , 677 (7th Cir. 1976) (prosecution for misprision violated
    Fifth Amendment because the defendant’s duty to report
    armored car robbery would have revealed his receipt and
    possession of money stolen in that same crime). In contrast,
    White Eagle’s liability for her allegedly criminal
    activity—receipt of the loan modification—was not directly
    connected to the criminal activity she failed to report,
    Greybull’s use of nominee borrowers.
    White Eagle’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment is
    insufficient because her disclosure of Greybull’s scheme
    would not have provided a strong enough “link in the chain
    of evidence needed to prosecute” her for her own misdeeds.
    Cf. King, 
    402 F.2d at 697
     (Fifth Amendment protections
    apply where the “individual has reasonable cause to fear he
    might . . . be convicted” because of the information he
    reveals.). It is true, as White Eagle argues, that the disclosure
    of Greybull’s fraud might have led to an audit that might have
    exposed other frauds, which might in turn have implicated
    White Eagle. However, as the government points out,
    Menz’s complaint had already triggered an OIG investigation,
    but no extensive audit, so discovery was by no means assured
    even if White Eagle had reported Greybull’s activity.
    Because the connection between disclosure and prosecution
    was tenuous and speculative, no Fifth Amendment violation
    arises out of White Eagle’s convictions on Counts V and VI.
    26            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    II. SENTENCING
    We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of
    the Sentencing Guidelines, its application of the Guidelines
    to the facts for abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for
    clear error. United States v. Loew, 
    593 F.3d 1136
    , 1139 (9th
    Cir. 2010).
    The district court correctly set White Eagle’s base offense
    level at 14, as she was a public official within the meaning of
    the law.         See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2C1.1(a)(1) (Nov. 2012); 
    18 U.S.C. § 201
    (a)(1). However, the district court appears to have erred
    in the next step: adjusting the sentence based on “the value of
    the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return
    for the payment, the value of anything obtained or to be
    obtained . . . , or the loss to the government from the offense,
    whichever is greatest.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2). The district
    court appropriately looked to the loan modification, but
    simply recited the Guidelines language before concluding that
    “the value is the $15,000 loan” and making adjustments to
    that figure based on White Eagle’s payments. While the
    district court’s cryptic statement gives little insight into its
    methodology, it appears that it valued the loan modification
    using standard “loss” calculations instead of focusing on the
    “value of the benefit” White Eagle received as the Guidelines
    require.
    Given our reversal of the conversion and misapplication
    conviction, there is no $15,000 “loss” to the government that
    could be used as the basis for the sentencing adjustment. Nor
    is there any evidence that White Eagle’s loan modification
    was fraudulently obtained such that its entire amount could be
    considered a loss under § 2B1.1, which governs loss
    UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE                    27
    calculations for financial crimes based in fraud and other
    forms of theft. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, introductory cmt.
    (noting that § 2B1.1 addresses “basic forms of property
    offenses [like] theft, embezzlement, fraud, forgery,
    counterfeiting”). Any sentencing adjustment must therefore
    be based on the value of the loan modification as a bribe.
    Section 2C1.1, which governs valuation, does not
    contemplate using § 2B1.1 to determine the “value of the
    benefit received or to be received” in a bribery conviction.
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, cmt. n.3 (stating that “‘[l]oss,’ for purposes
    of [§ 2C1.1(b)(2)], shall be determined in accordance with”
    § 2B1.1, but separately discussing the value of the benefit or
    payment) (emphasis added). Where, as here, there is no loss,
    or the loss is not the largest of the listed values, § 2B1.1
    becomes relevant only after the value of the benefit or
    payment is otherwise determined.                See U.S.S.G.
    § 2C1.1(b)(2) (“If the value of the payment [or] the
    benefit . . . exceeded $5,000, increase by the number of levels
    from the table in § 2B1.1.”). The district court therefore erred
    to the extent it relied on § 2B1.1’s methodology for valuation
    purposes.
    The district court also erred in equating the value of the
    loan modification to a cash payment of the same size. “The
    value of a transaction is often quite different than the face
    amount of that transaction.” United States v. Fitzhugh,
    
    78 F.3d 1326
    , 1331 (8th Cir. 1996). The Fitzhugh court
    looked to § 2C1.1 for guidance in a commercial bribery
    matter governed by § 2B4.1 and concluded that “[w]hen a
    loan is obtained by bribes, it is likely to be at favorable terms,
    in which case its value will typically be the difference
    between the actual cost of the loan, and the cost of the same
    loan at fair market terms and conditions.” Id. This
    28            UNITED STATES V . WHITE EAGLE
    conclusion follows from § 2C1.1’s mandate to focus on the
    net value of “‘the benefit received or to be received.’”
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, cmt. n.3 (noting that where a contract is
    awarded in exchange for a bribe, the “benefit” from the
    contract is the profit made thereon, not the entire payment
    due under the contract).
    The Eighth Circuit’s Fitzhugh decision is instructive here
    because White Eagle was not bribed with a loan she was not
    expected to repay. Instead, she received an expedited loan
    that appears to have issued on better terms than standard
    Credit Program loans. It is unclear, however, whether White
    Eagle would have received the loan at all absent Greybull’s
    intervention. Both of those issues can factor in to the
    ultimate valuation of the net benefit conferred on White Eagle
    by the loan modification. We are not in a position to dictate
    the precise valuation methodology on appeal. Instead,
    because the district court rested its valuation decision on the
    face value of the loan and did not link its calculations to the
    “value of the benefit [White Eagle] received,” we remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion. U.S.S.G.
    § 2C1.1, cmt. n.3; see also Fitzhugh, 
    78 F.3d at 1331
     (finding
    that “the scanty evidence of record regarding the [favorable]
    loan . . . suggests that its value, properly calculated, would be
    far less than its face amount” and remanding for a correct
    determination of its value).
    CONCLUSION
    White Eagle’s convictions on Counts I, II, IV, and V are
    REVERSED. Her convictions on Counts III and VI are
    AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED to the district
    court for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.