Allcapcorp Ltd v. Chc Consulting LLC ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALLCAPCORP LTD, DBA Allegiance No. 20-55457
Capital Corporation, 20-55758
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
8:19-cv-00206-JVS-JDE
v.
CHC CONSULTING LLC; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
ALLCAPCORP LTD, DBA Allegiance No. 20-55513
Capital Corporation,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellee, 8:19-cv-00206-JVS-JDE
v.
CHC CONSULTING LLC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 2, 2021
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Allcapcorp Ltd. Co. (Allcap) sued CHC Consulting LLC (CHC), alleging
that it was entitled to a “Success Fee” based on their Engagement Agreement and
the eventual sale of CHC to Congruex LLC (Congruex). The district court granted
summary judgment for CHC finding that the Engagement Agreement was not
enforceable under California law, and awarded CHC $771,996.15 in attorneys’
fees. Allcap appeals the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorneys’
fees, and CHC cross-appeals, arguing that the Agreement is void under California
law on a ground presented to, but not adopted by, the district court. We have
jurisdiction over all three appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Mahach-Watkins v.
Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm the district court’s orders.
1. Allcap asserts that Texas law, rather than California law, applied to the
Agreement. The parties agree that the district court properly looked to Texas law
to determine which state’s law applied to the Agreement. The parties also agree
that Texas follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine
which state has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.
The district court’s choice-of-law determination is reviewed de novo and the
district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See Zinser v. Accufix
Rsch. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). The choice-of-law
provisions of Texas apply, Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990),
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and the district court properly applied the factors set forth in sections 188 and 6 of
the Restatement for contracts that do not contain an express choice-of-law
provision. See Sonat Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228,
231 (Tex. 2008). We conclude, noting that the Agreement concerned the sale of a
California corporation, that Allcap has not shown that the district court erred in
holding California law applies in this case.
2. Allcap challenges the district court’s determination that the Agreement
was not enforceable under California law because it violates the provision of
California Business & Professions Code § 10176(f) by not having “a definite,
specified date of final and complete termination.” Allcap asserts that § 10176(f)
authorizes the Real Estate Commissioner to investigate a contract but does not
necessarily invalidate a contract. It further contends that a sale of a business
opportunity is exempt from § 10176(f) if the broker/dealer exception in California
Business & Professions Code § 10008.5 applies.
Allcap’s first argument was rejected by the California courts in Dale v.
Palmer, 235 P.2d 650, 652 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“The imposition by statute
of a penalty implies a prohibition of the act to which the penalty is attached, and a
contract founded upon such act is void.”). Allcap’s second argument is not
persuasive because it does not appear that the presence of a broker is likely to
avoid the concerns that underlie § 10008.5 and Allcap offers no case law directly
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supporting its argument. Allcap has not shown that the district court
misinterpreted or misapplied California law in holding that the Agreement did not
have a termination date and was unenforceable.1
3. Even if the Agreement were enforceable under California law, the grant
of summary judgment would have been proper because the record shows that there
was no sale of CHC within two years of the termination of the Agreement. Allcap
asserts that in the Agreement the terms “consummate” and “close” have different
meanings and that the sale of CHC to Congruex should have been “consummated”
in July 2017. The Agreement cannot reasonably be read as creating distinct
meanings for “consummate” and “close” as to when a Success Fee could be
calculated and become due. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that CHC
had any obligation to complete the sale to Congruex within the Agreement’s two-
year tail period.
4. Allcap argues that the award of attorneys’ fees should be reversed or
significantly reduced. It first asserts that because the district court held that the
Agreement was not enforceable, the right to attorneys’ fees under the contract
never matured. This assertion is contrary to California’s mutuality of remedy
1
Because we hold that the Agreement was unenforceable under California
law because it lacked “a definite, specified date of final and complete termination,”
§ 10176(f), we need not, and do not, consider the argument raised in CHC’s cross-
appeal that the Agreement is unenforceable because Allcap did not have a broker
as required by California Business and Professions Code § 10130.
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doctrine. See Cal.-Am. Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d
110, 114 (Cal. App. 2017) (citing Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 407 (Cal.
1998), as holding that if a party would have been exposed to fees had the court
found against it, then that party is entitled to fees if it prevails); see also Golden
Pisces, Inc. v. Fred Wahl Marine Constr., Inc., 495 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.
2007) (recognizing that the California Supreme Court has upheld California’s
mutuality of remedy doctrine). Allcap has not shown that CHC was not entitled to
attorneys’ fees.
Allcap also challenges the amount of fees awarded. We review the amount
of attorneys’ fees awarded for abuse of discretion. PSM Holding Corp. v. Nat’l
Farm Fin. Corp., 884 F.3d 812, 828 (9th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider
whether the district court’s decision is illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d
1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Allcap objects to the hours spent on the
case, the hourly rates of the attorneys, the number of attorneys who worked on the
case, blocked-billed time, and quarterly-hour billing. The district court, however,
found that “the hourly rates billed by the three law firms were reasonable and
commensurate with the respective attorneys’ experience and skill,” and that its
review of most of the billing entries revealed “no duplicative, excessive,
redundant, unrelated, clerical or unnecessary work.” Nonetheless, the district court
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gave the fee request a 10% “haircut,” noting that it could have “alternatively
impose[d] a similar reduction as a result of the block billing and quarter-hour
billing practices.” Allcap has not supported its objections to the amount of fees
awarded with the type of fact-based assertions that would allow us to determine
whether the district court’s 10% “haircut” was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, in appeals Nos. 20-55457 and 20-55758, we AFFIRM the
district court’s grant of summary judgment and award of attorneys’ fees, and we
DISMISS CHC’s cross-appeal, No. 20-55513, as moot. CHC shall recover its
costs on appeal.
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