Andrew Valenzuela v. W. Montgomery ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW VALENZUELA, No. 20-55867
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:17-cv-08410-CAS-SP
v.
W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 10, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, BERZON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Valenzuela appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253,
and we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Sanders v.
Cullen, 873 F.3d 778, 793 (9th Cir. 2017). We “may affirm the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
holding on any ground raised below and fairly supported by the record.” Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Proctor
v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal habeas
petitioner must show that the state court’s adjudication of the merits of the claim
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). Because
the California Supreme Court summarily denied Valenzuela’s petition, we look “to
the last . . . state-court decision that . . . provide[s] a relevant rationale” and
“presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v.
Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); see also Montiel v. Chappell, 43 F.4th 942,
958 (9th Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, No. 22-6570 (Jan. 11, 2023). The last
state-court decision to provide a rationale for rejecting Valenzuela’s claim was the
decision of the California Court of Appeal.
1. The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court adequately
instructed the jury that duress is a defense to kidnapping, and thus to felony murder
predicated on kidnapping. “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . criminal defendants [must] be afforded a meaningful opportunity
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to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
A criminal defendant is thus entitled to “an instruction as to any recognized
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in
his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
First, there is no evidence that Valenzuela was under duress when he
committed the crime of kidnapping, so any error regarding the application of the
duress instruction to the kidnapping charge could not possibly have been
prejudicial. Second, the trial court made clear to the jury that duress is a defense to
kidnapping. Specifically, the court instructed that “[a] person is not guilty of a
crime other than malice murder when he engages in conduct, otherwise criminal,
when acting under threats and menaces” to his life. As the Court of Appeal
explained, “[b]ecause kidnapping is a ‘crime other than malice murder,’ this
general instruction regarding the duress defense by its plain terms applied to the
crime of kidnapping.” Valenzuela thus received an instruction that covered his
duress defense to kidnapping and, by extension, to felony murder predicated on
kidnapping. No clearly established federal law states that he was entitled to an
even more specific instruction or that the trial court was obligated to arrange the
instructions to give greater prominence to the availability of the duress defense.
2. Valenzuela requested a special instruction that “[a]lthough duress is not
an affirmative defense to murder, the circumstances of duress are relevant to
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whether the evidence establishes the elements of premeditation or implied malice.”
We need not consider Valenzuela’s claim that the trial court’s refusal to give that
instruction was constitutional error. Even assuming error, Valenzuela cannot
establish prejudice.
Where, as here, a habeas petitioner alleges a trial error, the petitioner must
show that the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). “A ‘substantial and
injurious effect’ means a ‘reasonable probability’ that the jury would have arrived
at a different verdict had the instruction been given.” Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855,
860 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2006)).
The jury specifically found that Valenzuela killed David Padilla while
engaged in the crime of kidnapping, and the jury was instructed that “[t]he
unlawful killing of a human being . . . which occurs during the commission or
attempted commission of the crime of kidnapping is . . . murder of the first degree
when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit [kidnapping].” Thus, even if
the trial court had given Valenzuela’s special duress instruction, and even if that
instruction had led the jury to conclude that Valenzuela lacked the mens rea for
first-degree malice murder, Valenzuela would still have been convicted of first-
degree murder under a felony-murder theory. There is, therefore, no “‘reasonable
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probability’ that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict had the
instruction been given.” Byrd, 566 F.3d at 860 (quoting Clark, 450 F.3d at 916).
AFFIRMED.
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