Popovici v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 21 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    Vasile Popovici,                                No. 21-541
    Petitioner,                       Agency No.       A059-973-500
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted April 19, 2023**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: RAWLINSON and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS,*** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Vasile Popovici, a native of Romania, petitions for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), dismissing an appeal
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for
    the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
    1
    from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), sustaining the charge of
    removability and finding that Popovici had abandoned his lawful permanent
    resident status. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We deny in part
    and dismiss in part the petition.
    1.     Popovici argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s finding that
    he abandoned his lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status. Whether Popovici
    abandoned his LPR status “is an intrinsically fact-specific question and is
    therefore reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.” Khodagholian v.
    Ashcroft, 
    335 F.3d 1003
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2003). The government bears the
    burden of proving by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
    [Popovici]’s status has changed.” Singh v. Reno, 
    113 F.3d 1512
    , 1514 (9th Cir.
    1997). Combining our standard of review with the government’s burden, we
    must decide “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear,
    unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Popovici] abandoned his lawful
    permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian, 
    335 F.3d at 1006
    .
    To qualify for re-entry as a returning resident alien, a noncitizen “must be
    returning to an ‘unrelinquished lawful permanent residence’ after a ‘temporary
    visit abroad.’” Singh, 
    113 F.3d at 1514
     (quoting Matter of Huang, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 749
    , 753 (1988)). A temporary visit abroad is one that is for “a period
    relatively short, fixed by some early event,” or “will terminate upon the
    occurrence of an event having a reasonable possibility of occurring within a
    relatively short period of time.” Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 
    792 F.2d 932
    , 937 (9th
    2
    Cir. 1986). If “the length of the visit is contingent upon the occurrence of an
    event and is not fixed in time and if the event does not occur within a relatively
    short period of time, the visit will be considered a ‘temporary visit abroad’ only
    if the alien has a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United
    States during the entirety of his visit.” 
    Id.
     Factors relevant to whether a
    noncitizen held a continuous, uninterrupted intent to return to the U.S. include
    the noncitizen’s family ties, property holdings, and business affiliations within
    the United States; the duration of residence in the United States; family,
    property, and business ties in the foreign country; the noncitizen’s conduct
    outside the United States, including whether he conferred with American
    officials during his visit about retaining his status; and the noncitizen’s purpose
    in departing the United States. See id.; Khodagholian, 
    335 F.3d at 1007
    ; Huang,
    19 I&N Dec. at 753.
    In this case, between the time when Popovici first came to the U.S. in
    2009 and his attempt to return in 2016, Popovici spent approximately five
    weeks in the U.S. He never established a residence in the U.S., staying instead
    with his brother. He never filed taxes in the U.S., and never opened a bank
    account. When he returned to Romania in 2010, he became involved in several
    multi-million Euro projects as a volunteer, consultant, and project manager.
    Considering these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding
    by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that Popovici abandoned his
    LPR status. See Singh, 
    113 F.3d at 1515
    ; Huang, 19 I&N Dec. at 756–57.
    3
    Popovici argues that he had a continuous, uninterrupted intention to
    return to the U.S. during the entirety of his return to Romania but was prevented
    from returning due to the ongoing projects at his foundation, which ended in
    2015. The delay caused by those ongoing projects is not the type of delay
    outside of a noncitizen’s control that we have found to be consistent with an
    intent to return. Compare Chavez-Ramirez, 
    792 F.2d at
    937–38 (noncitizen’s
    decision to remain in Mexico for two and a half years after her ill mother no
    longer needed her weighed in favor of finding abandonment) with
    Khodagholian, 
    335 F.3d at 1005, 1007
     (noncitizen’s 15-month trip to Iran was
    not evidence of abandonment when noncitizen was required to remain in Iran
    involuntarily because of an unpaid tax bill). But even if Popovici intended to
    return to the U.S., his “desire to retain his status as a permanent resident,
    without more, is not sufficient; his actions must support his professed intent.”
    Singh, 
    113 F.3d at
    1515 (citing Huang, 19 I&N Dec. at 753). Because
    substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding, we deny the petition as to
    Popovici’s claim of error related to the abandonment of his LPR status.
    2.     Popovici raises a due process claim for the first time on appeal. His
    claim relates to his attorney’s failure to request voluntary departure. As a
    prudential matter, we generally require a noncitizen who argues ineffective
    assistance of counsel to exhaust his administrative remedies by first presenting
    the issue to the BIA. See Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 
    213 F.3d 1121
    , 1124 (9th Cir.
    2000). To do otherwise deprives this court of the benefit of the agency’s
    4
    expertise and a fully developed record. 
    Id.
     “A motion to reopen is the
    procedural vehicle through which a petitioner may bring, usually for the first
    time, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the BIA.” Id.at 1123. We
    therefore dismiss the petition as to Popovici’s claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
    5