William Myers, Jr. v. Neil Wake ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 26 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WILLIAM J. MYERS, Jr.,                          No. 22-16379
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00631-SMM-MTM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    NEIL V. WAKE, Senior United States
    District Judge,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 17, 2023**
    Before:      CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
    William J. Myers, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order
    dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action alleging various claims
    arising out of two prior actions. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 
    741 F.3d 1082
    , 1086
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Myers’s action because Myers failed to
    establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
    Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 89 (1998) (explaining that an action may be dismissed for lack
    of subject-matter jurisdiction where the alleged federal claim is “wholly
    insubstantial and frivolous” or “otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
    involve a federal controversy” (citations omitted)); Franklin v. State of Or., State
    Welfare Div., 
    662 F.2d 1337
    , 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that a district court
    may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction, even before issuing a
    summons); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    , 356 (1978) (explaining that
    judges are immune for their judicial acts, even if “alleged to have been done
    maliciously or corruptly,” unless taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”).
    Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, we do not consider Myers’s contentions regarding the merits of his
    claims.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Myers’s amended
    complaint, which was filed after the action was dismissed, or by allegedly rejecting
    Myers’s motion for reconsideration after having previously instructed the clerk to
    reject any further filings in the case, except in furtherance of an appeal. See Ready
    Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 
    627 F.3d 402
    , 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth
    2                                    22-16379
    standard of review and explaining that federal district courts have the “inherent
    power to control their docket” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Myers’s contentions that the district
    court was biased against him, acted improperly, or denied him due process.
    All pending motions are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   22-16379