Stephen Tanner, I v. Idaho Department of Fish and Game ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 26 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN A. TANNER I, No. 20-35886
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00456-DCN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 26, 2022**
Before: D.W. NELSON, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Stephen (“Steve”) Tanner appeals pro se the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendment rights and his rights under the Idaho Constitution. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d
1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
because Tanner failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants violated his rights under the federal Constitution or Idaho Constitution.
See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (reasoned that the plaintiff
fails to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim based on arrest when
probable cause exists and others similarly situated were also arrested.); United
States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 312 (9th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that searches
incident to an arrest are lawful); United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 932 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding checkpoint stops are constitutional if they are not used as crime
control devices and are employed reasonably); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d
910, 925 n.15 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiff must demonstrate a statement they
made was used in a criminal case to establish a Fifth Amendment violation of their
right to remain silent.); United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 505 (9th
Cir. 2004) (reasoning that arrests are valid when probable cause of a crime exists);
Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reasoning allegations of excessive force on the basis of handcuffing must be
supported by evidence); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 314-15 (Idaho Ct. App.
1999) (holding Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides no greater
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protection in these situations than does the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanner’s motion to
strike. See Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanner’s motion for
reconsideration of his motion to compel because Tanner set forth no valid grounds
for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanner electronic
filing privileges. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 757, 769 & n.11 (9th Cir.
2008) (setting forth standard of review for a district court’s decisions regarding
management of its docket).
Tanner’s motions to correct the caption (Docket Entry No. 23) and to
withdraw his motion at Docket Entry No. 36 (Docket Entry No. 43) are granted.
Tanner’s motion to strike Docket Entry Nos. 36 and 37 (Docket Entry No. 44) is
denied. Tanner’s motion to expedite the case (Docket Entry No. 46) is denied as
moot. Tanner’s motion to certify questions to the Idaho Supreme Court, as set out
in his opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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