Warne Young v. County of Hawaii , 578 F. App'x 728 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
WARNE KEAHI YOUNG, No. 13-16226
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00580-ACK-
RLP
v.
COUNTY OF HAWAII, a municipal MEMORANDUM*
corporation; HAWAII ISLAND
HUMANE SOCIETY S.P.C.A., a non-
profit corporation; DONNA WHITAKER,
individually and in her official capacity as
Executive Director of the Hawaii Humane
society S.P.C.A.; STARR K. YAMADA,
individually and in her official capacity as
a Humane Officer; MICHAEL G.M.
OSTENDORP; CARROLL COX;
DARLEEN R.S. DELA CRUZ;
ROBERTA KAWENA YOUNG,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Alan C. Kay, Senior District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted June 10, 2014**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Warne Keahi Young appeals from a district court judgment, granting summary
judgment against him on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. Young alleged that the Hawaii
Island Humane Society (HIHS) and its employees (collectively, the HIHS defendants)
violated his constitutional rights by seizing—pursuant to a judicial
warrant—seventeen dogs from his residence and by accepting the legal transfer of the
dogs after Young’s mother presented a notarized power of attorney (POA) from
Young. Young also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Michael Ostendorp on Young’s § 1983 claim that Ostendorp, Young’s attorney,
conspired with HIHS officials to violate his constitutional rights. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the HIHS
defendants. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures is not
violated if a government official’s conduct is objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1971). The HIHS
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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defendants acted reasonably in executing a valid judicial warrant that authorized
seizure of the dogs and in accepting the legal transfer of the dogs from Roberta
Young, who presented a POA certified by a notary as signed by Warne Young.
2. Contrary to Young’s arguments, the district court did not grant summary
judgment sua sponte on federal claims that were not challenged in the HIHS
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion sought judgment on all of
Young’s § 1983 claims. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 971–72 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a district court may grant summary judgment on
any claim in a complaint if “the losing party has reasonable notice that the sufficiency
of his or her claim will be in issue”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor did the
HIHS officials lack authority to apply for and execute the search warrant, as they are
“law enforcement officers” who may obtain search warrants under Hawaii law. See
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 710-1000(18), 711-1109.1, 711-1110.
Young’s remaining Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims also fail. Because
Young’s property was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant, there was no
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442, 452 (1996). State tort law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies, see,
e.g., Freddy v. Nobriga Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands, 129 Haw.
123, 128–30 (Ct. App. 2013), which meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981),
overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Finally,
Young’s property was seized pursuant to a “subjective, individualized decision,”
which is not subject to an Equal Protection Clause claim under a class-of-one theory.
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603–04 (2008).
3. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ostendorp
on Young’s § 1983 claim. Ostendorp, a private actor, told HIHS that Roberta Young
had legal authority to transfer the dogs. The agency verified these representations by
speaking to Roberta Young and obtaining a copy of the notarized POA. Even
assuming that Ostendorp and Roberta Young conspired to obtain the POA
fraudulently, Young presented no evidence of a conspiracy between the HIHS
defendants and Ostendorp.
AFFIRMED.
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