Linda Condello v. Columbia County ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA CONDELLO, an individual, No. 22-35322
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01985-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COLUMBIA COUNTY, an Oregon
municipality,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 17, 2023
Portland, Oregon
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Linda Condello (“Plaintiff”) appeals the denial of a motion for new trial after
the jury rendered a defense verdict for Columbia County (“Defendant”). The jury
found that Defendant was not negligent in its maintenance of the courthouse chair
in which Plaintiff sat, and which broke under her. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The parties are familiar with the facts of the case, so we do not recite them
here. A district court’s denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). Under
that standard, we first assess “whether the trial court identified and applied the
correct legal rule to the relief requested” and then “whether the trial court’s
resolution of the motion resulted from a factual finding that was illogical, implausible,
or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
The district court applied the correct legal rule. Under Oregon law, res ipsa
loquitur “specifies certain facts or circumstances which, when found in combination,
raise an inference of negligence.” Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, 224 P.2d 552, 555 (Or.
1950) (emphasis added) (citing Ritchie v. Thomas, 224 P.2d 543 (Or. 1950)).
Namely, the tort doctrine creates
an inference [that] is enough to satisfy, in the first instance, the
plaintiff’s burden of introducing evidence from which reasonable
men may find in his favor. It is enough to avoid a nonsuit or a
dismissal. It is not enough to entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict,
even though the defendant offers no evidence. It shifts no ‘burden’ to
the defendant, except in the sense that unless he produces evidence he
runs the risk that the jury may find against him. The jury may accept
the inference, but it is not compulsory, and if they see fit to find for the
defendant they are free to do so. In other words, the inference makes
enough of a case to get to the jury and no more.
Ritchie, 224 P.2d at 550 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183,
2
217 (1949)). This is precisely the rule of decision the district court applied.
Even were we to assume the district court misunderstood Oregon law1 and
that defendants must present evidence to defeat a tort plaintiff’s prima facie case
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the error would be harmless because
Defendant did present exculpatory evidence. Without objection or a motion to strike
from Plaintiff, Defendant called two witnesses in its defense. Those witnesses
detailed the visual inspections of the facilities and furniture that the maintenance
crew conducted every morning. The facilities manager testified that the courthouse
staff conduct more thorough, quarterly safety inspections. And the jury heard
unchallenged testimony that no previous incidents involving broken chairs or loose
screws or fasteners at the courthouse were ever reported to the courthouse staff. That
evidence admitted at trial strongly supports the jury’s verdict: that the accident that
befell Plaintiff was unusual and that Defendant had otherwise taken reasonable care
to maintain its furniture. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Plaintiff’s motion for new trial; it found that the weight of the evidence supported the
jury’s verdict that Defendant was not negligent, because the court relied on reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence admitted at trial. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1263.
AFFIRMED.
1
It did not. See the above citation and language from Gow and Ritchie.
3