Jose Ramirez v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 10 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOSE LEONARDO RAMIREZ,                          No.    19-71960
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A099-531-493
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted May 3, 2023
    San Francisco, California
    Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
    Jose Leonardo Ramirez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of the
    Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review de novo the BIA’s legal
    conclusions, Parada v. Sessions, 
    902 F.3d 901
    , 908 (9th Cir. 2018), including
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    whether a “particular social group” is cognizable, Cordoba v. Barr, 
    962 F.3d 479
    ,
    482 (9th Cir. 2020). Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Parada,
    902 F.3d at 908. To the extent that the BIA incorporated the IJ’s reasoning, we
    review both decisions. Iman v. Barr, 
    972 F.3d 1058
    , 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we grant in part, deny in part, and remand.
    Ramirez contends that the BIA erred in denying his applications for asylum
    and withholding of removal because it improperly rejected his proposed particular
    social group of “individuals erroneously perceived as gang members.” The IJ found
    that the proposed group “ha[d] not been defined or delineated with particularity” and
    lacked an “immutable characteristic” or a “showing that such a group is perceived
    as such in the country of El Salvador.” The BIA offered a brief affirmation of the
    IJ’s findings and conclusion on this issue, followed by a string of citations that
    included Matter of E-A-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 591
     (B.I.A. 2008).
    The BIA’s cursory analysis and reliance on Matter of E-A-G- conflicts with
    our recent decision in Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 
    7 F.4th 888
    , 897 (9th Cir.
    2021). There, we overruled Matter of E-A-G- as inconsistent with the requisite
    “case-by-case determination” of whether a particular society recognizes a proposed
    group. Vasquez-Rodriguez, 7 F.4th at 897–98 (quoting Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 
    750 F.3d 1077
    , 1084 (9th Cir. 2014)). In Vasquez-Rodriguez’s appeal, the BIA erred by
    conflating perceived with actual gang membership and by “adopt[ing] a legal rule
    2
    categorically barring people erroneously perceived to be gang members from
    recognition as a particular social group.” 
    Id.
     Although the BIA did not have the
    benefit of Vasquez-Rodriguez at the time it reviewed Ramirez’s appeal, its decision
    replicated the same reversible error. Thus, we grant Ramirez’s petition for review
    with respect to his asylum and withholding of removal claims and remand to the
    agency to conduct an evidence-based, case-by-case determination of Ramirez’s
    potential particular social groups consistent with Vasquez-Rodriguez. Accordingly,
    we do not reach the issue of whether Ramirez established past or future persecution.
    See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 
    988 F.3d 1136
    , 1143 (9th Cir. 2021).
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Ramirez’s CAT claim. “To
    be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that
    she will more likely than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public
    official if removed to her native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 
    962 F.3d 1175
    ,
    1183 (9th Cir. 2020). When, as here, “an applicant posits multiple theories for why
    he would be tortured, the Agency should consider the aggregate risk posed by all
    sources and grant CAT relief if the cumulative probability of torture is greater than
    50 percent.” Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 
    49 F.4th 1149
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2022).
    Ramirez argues that the BIA erred by failing to address all of the evidence in the
    record and evaluate the risk of torture in the aggregate. But the BIA need not
    “individually identify and discuss every piece of evidence,” Hernandez v. Garland,
    3
    
    52 F.4th 757
    , 770 (9th Cir. 2022), since “we apply a ‘presumption that the BIA did
    review the record,’” id. at 771 (quoting Fernandez v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 592
    , 603
    (9th Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, the BIA did address Ramirez’s multiple grounds for
    CAT relief. Ramirez has not overcome the required presumption or proffered
    probative evidence that the violence that he fears would amount to torture. Nor has
    Ramirez demonstrated that the IJ’s multi-factor analysis of his ability to relocate in
    El Salvador was insufficient. Thus, we affirm the BIA’s denial of Ramirez’s CAT
    claim.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED in part; DENIED in part; and
    REMANDED.
    Each party shall bear its own costs on this petition for review.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-71960

Filed Date: 5/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/10/2023