Sharyl Glendenning v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2023 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 16 2023
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARYL L. GLENDENNING, No. 22-35391
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00131-TJC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Timothy J. Cavan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 12, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Sharyl Glendenning appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the
denial of her application for social security disability insurance benefits. “We
review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
benefits de novo and reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal
standard.” Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations
omitted). Additionally, we “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of a
harmless error.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. Glendenning contends that the ALJ erred in giving her treating
podiatrist’s opinions only “minimal weight.” We find neither of her two
arguments persuasive.
First, Glendenning argues that the ALJ ran afoul of the law of the case by
articulating reasons to discount her podiatrist’s opinions that had not been included
in the ALJ’s first, deficient decision. “The law of the case doctrine generally
prohibits a court from considering an issue that has already been decided by that
same court or a higher court in the same case.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567
(9th Cir. 2016). However, nothing in the district court’s remand order prevented
the ALJ from putting forth a new rationale for discounting the podiatrist’s
opinions. The district court simply instructed the ALJ to “reconsider the weight”
applied to the opinions.
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Second, Glendenning argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the
podiatrist’s opinions based on erroneously finding that Glendenning’s physical
examinations “demonstrated no major neuromuscular deficits.” But that finding is
supported by substantial evidence and provides a “specific and legitimate reason”
for discounting the podiatrist’s controverted opinions. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53
F.4th 489, 494–95 (9th Cir. 2022). The podiatrist noted an unremarkable
musculoskeletal exam in January 2014 and normal neurological exams in August
2014, November 2014, and January 2015. Glendenning’s physician assessed her
for bilateral lower extremity paresthesia in February 2013, but two weeks later he
noted that prescribed medicine was helping. In January 2015, her physician noted
that the paresthesia was “intermittent” and did not seem to interfere with her
activities. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that
Glendenning did not suffer from major neuromuscular deficits.
2. Glendenning argues the ALJ improperly discounted her symptom
testimony, because the ALJ failed to specifically identify portions of her testimony
that conflicted with the objective medical evidence.
“Where, as here, an ALJ concludes that a claimant is not malingering, and
that she has provided objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment
which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged, the ALJ may
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reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806
F.3d 487, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The ALJ
does not pinpoint portions of Glendenning’s testimony that are inconsistent with
the objective medical evidence. However, even assuming the ALJ’s reasoning
regarding the objective medical evidence was insufficiently specific, any error was
harmless, because the ALJ relied on other valid reasons to discredit Glendenning’s
testimony including inconsistencies with her testimony, the conservative nature of
her treatment, and her daily activities. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115
(9th Cir. 2012), superceded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (“[A]n
ALJ’s error [is] harmless where the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for
disbelieving a claimant’s testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were
supported by the record.”).
3. There is no indication the ALJ failed to comply with Social Security
Rulings 16-3p and 96-8p. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017);
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ discussed Glendenning’s
treatments, finding that they were “conservative” in nature. Glendenning fails to
point to any other factor included in Social Security Ruling 16-3p that the ALJ
should have, but did not, consider.
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4. Finally, Glendenning argues that the ALJ failed to include all of
Glendenning’s limitations when posing hypotheticals to the vocational expert. She
argues that degenerative changes in her spine support additional limitations.
The ALJ did not err by excluding limitations related to Glendenning’s back
condition. “It is . . . proper for an [ALJ] to limit a hypothetical to those
impairments that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Britton v.
Colvin, 787 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Osenbrock v.
Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001)). As discussed above, treatment notes
support the ALJ’s finding that Glendenning suffered from no major neuromuscular
deficits. Furthermore, an MRI revealed only “mild” degenerative changes in
Glendenning’s spine. The ALJ’s determination that Glendenning’s back condition
was “mild” is thus supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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