Efrain Ramirez Munoz v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EFRAÍN RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ, No. 21-70431
Petitioner, Agency No.
A022-446-571
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney OPINION
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022
San Francisco, California
Filed June 26, 2023
Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Jennifer Sung, Circuit
Judges, and Joseph F. Bataillon,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Nguyen
*
The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
2 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
SUMMARY**
Immigration
Granting Efraín Ramírez Muñoz’s petition for review of
a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and
remanding, the panel concluded that Ramírez’s
misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers for
the purpose of avoiding removal proceedings did not render
him inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) for falsely
claiming U.S. citizenship “for any purpose or benefit under”
federal or state law.
During two arrests for driving under the influence of
alcohol, Ramírez falsely presented himself as a U.S.
citizen. The BIA found him barred from adjusting status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), which renders
inadmissible “[a]ny alien who falsely represents, or has
falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the
United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal or
State law.” The BIA, relying on In re Richmond, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 779 (B.I.A. 2016), concluded that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
applied because Ramírez lied about his citizenship “for the
purpose of avoiding removal proceedings.”
The panel explained that the key question was what it
means for a purpose or benefit to be “under” federal or state
law. The BIA concluded that this means that a false claim
must be made to achieve a purpose or obtain a benefit that is
“governed by” federal or state law. The panel concluded
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 3
that the BIA’s interpretation was untenable, agreeing with
the Third Circuit that that its construction was unmoored
from the purposes and concerns of the statute.
The panel explained that the BIA’s interpretation was
incoherent in that it bestowed “under” with two different
meanings at once, as if the statute read: “for any purpose of
the alien related to any law or any benefit provided by any
law. The panel also concluded that the BIA’s interpretation
was unreasonably broad, explaining that it encompassed
lying about one’s citizenship with a purpose of avoiding
removal proceedings regardless of whether the lie’s recipient
had a legal obligation to obtain citizenship information and
report suspected undocumented persons to the immigration
authorities. Rather, the statute would apply when an
individual lies about his citizenship to anyone at all to
minimize the risk of being detected by immigration
authorities. The panel concluded that the statutory text and
legislative history showed that Congress did not intend
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to sweep so broadly; rather,
Congress’s concern was with individuals who falsely claim
citizenship to obtain a legal benefit reserved for citizens or
to invoke a law intended for citizens. The panel also
observed that Richmond’s sweeping restriction on speech
would raise serious First Amendment concerns. Thus, the
panel declined to afford the BIA’s construction of “under”
any deference and rejected Richmond’s derivative holding
that the term “purpose” includes the avoidance of negative
legal consequences—including removal proceedings.
Noting that the panel’s rejection of the BIA’s
construction did not free it to forge its own, the panel
observed that, in Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955(9th Cir. 2018), the court explained that
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) uses the word “under” in several
4 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
places that consistently reflect the meaning “in accordance
with.” In the context of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), the panel
concluded that the person making a false claim of citizenship
must do so for a purpose or benefit in accordance with a
law. Thus, for § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to bar admission, the
noncitizen must have made the false claim of citizenship to
comport with some specific legal requirement. And the
noncitizen must have intended to obtain a benefit authorized
by or achieve a purpose consistent with the specific law at
issue. However, the panel explained that a noncitizen does
not act in accordance with the law by attempting to evade it.
As to this case, the panel concluded that Ramírez’s
misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers
did not trigger § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Joining the Third
Circuit, the panel concluded that a false claim of citizenship
to the police to minimize the risk that the police would report
an arrest to DHS does not satisfy § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
because minimizing that risk is not, in and of itself, a legal
benefit. Because the BIA failed to identify any statute that
Ramírez sought to invoke through his false claims of U.S.
citizenship, the panel granted the petition and remanded.
COUNSEL
Marco A. Jimenez (argued), Jimenez Law Office, Riverside,
California, for Petitioner.
Sharon M. Clay (argued), Trial Attorney; Nancy Friedman,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation;
Brian Boynton, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division;
United States Department of Justice; Washington, D.C.; for
Respondent.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 5
OPINION
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:
Efraín Ramírez Muñoz (“Ramírez”), a native and citizen
of Mexico, petitions for review of the denial of his
application to adjust his immigration status to lawful
permanent resident while in removal proceedings. During
two prior arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol,
Ramírez falsely presented himself as a U.S. citizen. Based
on these incidents, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) found that Ramírez was barred from adjusting status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), which renders
inadmissible “[a]ny alien who falsely represents, or has
falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the
United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal or
State law.”
We must decide whether Ramírez’s conduct—lying to
local authorities about U.S. citizenship—was for a “purpose
or benefit under” a particular law. The BIA, relying on its
Richmond decision, concluded that Ramírez lied about his
citizenship “for the purpose of avoiding removal
proceedings.” See In re Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 788
(B.I.A. 2016) (holding that a “purpose” under a law
“includes the avoidance of negative legal consequences—
including removal proceedings”). The BIA’s interpretation
of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) is untenable. We agree with our
sister circuit that “the BIA’s construction of the ‘purpose or
benefit’ language [is] . . . ‘unmoored from the purposes and
concerns’ of the statute.” Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356,
370 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S.
42, 64 (2011)).
6 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
A purpose or benefit under a law means a purpose or
benefit in accordance with that law. Acting for “any purpose
or benefit under” a law precludes acting to evade the law’s
operation. Because the BIA failed to identify any statute that
Ramírez sought to invoke through his false claims of U.S.
citizenship, we grant the petition and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Ramírez is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1997, he
was admitted to the United States on a six-month
nonimmigrant visa and never left. After a couple of years,
Ramírez acquired a U.S. birth certificate belonging to David
Arthur Vargas, which he used to obtain a driver’s license in
Vargas’s name.
Ramírez twice used Vargas’s name when seeking
employment—at a cabinet manufacturer in California and a
slaughterhouse in Iowa. In addition, at issue here, he used
Vargas’s name during two arrests for driving under the
influence of alcohol.1
During his first arrest, in California in 2002, Ramírez
used Vargas’s name throughout the prosecution because he
feared deportation. During his second arrest, in Nebraska in
2011, Ramírez again identified himself as Vargas and
presented the corresponding driver’s license to local law
enforcement. To avoid deportation, Ramírez presented a
1
Ramírez may have used Vargas’s name to obtain unemployment
assistance payments, as he stated on his application for adjustment of
status, though he denied it at the hearing. The agency did not address
this discrepancy or rely on Ramírez’s receipt of unemployment benefits
in its decision.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 7
copy of Vargas’s birth certificate and claimed that he was a
U.S. citizen.2
Although the Nebraska criminal charges were later
dismissed, local authorities transferred Ramírez to the
custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
about 15 days after his arrest. While Ramírez was in ICE
custody, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
commenced removal proceedings, charging Ramírez with
overstaying his visa in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
Ramírez sought adjustment of status to lawful permanent
resident after one of his sons acquired U.S. citizenship. The
immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the application, finding that
Ramírez made a false claim of U.S. citizenship under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).
Applying Richmond, the IJ determined that Ramírez
made a false claim of citizenship in two ways—to “avoid the
negative legal consequences of removal proceedings” after
being arrested and to obtain private employment. The BIA
affirmed only the first of these findings.3
2
Ramírez denied ever telling the police that he was a U.S. citizen. He
testified that the police took his wallet, which contained the copy of
Vargas’s birth certificate, but never asked him about the document or his
citizenship. The agency rejected this explanation, and we lack
jurisdiction to review its factual findings. See Patel v. Garland, 142 S.
Ct. 1614, 1618–19 (2022) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)
precludes courts from reviewing any factual findings that underlie the
denial of certain discretionary relief, including adjustment of status).
3
There is no evidence in the record that Ramírez made a false
representation of citizenship on an I-9 employment form, as we require
when the purpose or benefit at issue is employment. See Diaz-Jimenez
v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2018). Because the BIA did not
address the issue, however, we do not review the IJ’s finding that
8 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s legal
conclusions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we review
them de novo. See Rivera Vega v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1146,
1152 (9th Cir. 2022).
II.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides
that “[a]ny alien who falsely represents, or has falsely
represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United
States for any purpose or benefit under [the INA] (including
[8 U.S.C. § 1324a]) or any other Federal or State law is
inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Stated more
succinctly, this provision bars the admission of someone
who has falsely claimed U.S. citizenship for any purpose or
benefit under federal or state law.
In Richmond, the BIA held that the noncitizen must have
“the ‘subjective intent’ to obtain a ‘purpose or benefit’”
under the law. Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 784. Ramírez
concedes that his “subjective intent . . . in both arrest[s] was
to avoid being removed from the United States.” Such an
intent, however, is not “for any purpose or benefit under . . .
Federal or State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).
A.
An initial question is what deference, if any, we owe the
BIA’s Richmond decision. In Diaz-Jimenez, we interpreted
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) without mentioning Richmond.
Ramírez made a false claim of citizenship to obtain employment. See
Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Where the
BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than
adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision,
except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” (quoting
Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012))).
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 9
Normally, however, “[w]e afford Chevron deference to
published decisions of the BIA that interpret the INA.”
Bogle v. Garland, 21 F.4th 637, 646 (9th Cir. 2021); see
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Thus, “[i]f Congress has not spoken
to the particular issue or the statute is ambiguous, and if the
BIA’s interpretation is reasonable, we will accept that
interpretation, even if it differs from what we believe to be
the best interpretation.” Bogle, 21 F.4th at 646.
The key interpretive question here is what it means for a
purpose or benefit to be “under” federal or state law.
“[W]ords like ‘under’ . . . can have a variety of meanings,”
so “[c]ontext is especially important” when interpreting
them. Diaz-Jimenez, 902 F.3d at 960.
The BIA “interpret[ed] the phrase ‘under [the INA] . . .
or any other Federal or State law’ . . . to mean that a false
claim must be made to achieve a purpose or obtain a benefit
that is governed by one of these laws.” Richmond, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 784 (first omission in original). But “governed
by” doesn’t entirely make sense in this context. To govern
means to control. See Govern, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/g
overn. While laws can certainly govern benefits by
controlling who gets them, laws cannot similarly “govern”
purposes—the Constitution prohibits that. See, e.g., Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (recognizing that the
First Amendment protects “freedom of thought”).
The root of this linguistic awkwardness is the BIA’s
differential treatment of “purpose” and “benefit.” Both
words are modified by “under . . . any . . . law,” so “under”
should relate to them in the same way. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 587 (2008). Yet the
10 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
BIA’s interpretation looks to the purpose of the noncitizen
and the benefit of the law. The BIA thus bestows “under”
with “two different meanings at once,” id., as if the statute
read: “for any purpose of the alien related to any law or any
benefit provided by any law.” That is “incoherent.” Id. To
be consistent with the statutory text, both the “purpose” and
the “benefit” must be of the law. The BIA’s differential
treatment of “purpose” and “benefit” is also unnecessary.
The preposition “for” that precedes “any purpose or benefit”
already conveys that the noncitizen has a purpose in making
the false statement.
Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation of “under” is
unreasonably broad. In Richmond, the BIA acknowledged
that to avoid surplusage, § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s limiting
provisions “cannot be read so broadly that [they fail] to
exclude anything.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 784–85 (citing
Richmond v. Holder, 714 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2013)); see
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969 (2019) (explaining that
no statutory provision “should needlessly be given an
interpretation that causes it . . . to have no consequence”
(quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012))). Yet the agency’s
construction produces exactly that result.
In the BIA’s view, lying about one’s citizenship with a
purpose of “avoiding removal proceedings” satisfies
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) regardless of whether the lie’s
recipient has a legal obligation to obtain citizenship
information and report suspected undocumented persons to
the immigration authorities. Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
789. Under that construction, the statute would apply when
an individual lies about his citizenship not just to the police,
but to anyone at all, to minimize the risk of being detected
by immigration authorities. See Castro, 671 F.3d at 368
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 11
(observing that “evading detection by immigration
authorities” is a purpose that “would apply to virtually any
false claim of citizenship made by an individual unlawfully
present in the country, since the absence of legal status
always provides a reason to wish to avoid the attention of
DHS”).
Most people have no legal obligation to report suspected
violators of immigration laws to the immigration authorities,
yet they sometimes do so anyway. The Nebraska police
officers here, for example, despite lacking any apparent legal
mandate,4 turned Ramírez over to ICE. A noncitizen seeking
to avoid such officiousness might rationally misrepresent
himself as a U.S. citizen to all but his closest friends and
family. Under the BIA’s interpretation, the noncitizen
violates § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) each time he misrepresents
his citizenship to someone he encounters—be it a co-worker,
neighbor, or even relative—because his purpose is avoiding
removal proceedings.
In Richmond, the BIA asserted that its broad
interpretation was tempered by an objective materiality
requirement: “the [U.S.] citizenship must actually affect or
matter to the purpose or benefit sought.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at
787. Thus, the BIA reasoned, “not every false claim to
United States citizenship will trigger inadmissibility.” Id.
But in practice, the falsely claimed U.S. citizenship will
always matter to the noncitizen’s purpose of avoiding
4
While the INA permits state and local police officers to verify a
detainee’s immigration status through consultations with ICE, see 8
U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644; Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411–13
(2012), it does not require them to do so, see United States v. California,
921 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir. 2019). State law, however, may impose such
a requirement. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413.
12 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
removal proceedings. The only time the BIA’s materiality
requirement would not be satisfied is in the theoretical (and
exceedingly unlikely) case where a noncitizen mistakenly
believes he is removeable and lies about his citizenship to
avoid a perceived—but in reality nonexistent—chance of
removal.
The statutory text shows that Congress did not intend
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to sweep so broadly. First, as we have
explained, the statute’s textual structure requires both the
“purpose” and the “benefit” to be “under” federal or state
law in the same way. Second, Congress could have used far
broader terms to define the statute’s scope but did not. For
example, Congress could have provided that the statute
applies to “any purpose related to or benefit under” federal
or state law, having made similar distinctions in other
statutes. See, e.g., In re Ray, 624 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he set of cases ‘related to’ a bankruptcy case is
‘much broader’ than the set of ‘arising under’ cases.”
(quoting In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th
Cir. 2005))). Instead, Congress used the narrower “under”
to apply to both “purpose” and “benefit.”
Third, Congress flagged one law in particular—8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a, which limits employment to U.S. citizens in most
cases—as having a purpose or benefit that might induce a
noncitizen to falsely claim citizenship. That specific
reference shows Congress’s concern with individuals who
falsely claim citizenship to obtain a legal benefit reserved for
citizens or to invoke a law intended for citizens (whether
characterized as a “benefit” or not). The statute does not
address an abstract concern that lying about one’s citizenship
impairs the orderly functioning of immigration laws.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 13
The legislative history confirms that the BIA’s
interpretation is unreasonably overbroad. Congress enacted
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. II, § 344(a), against a backdrop
of fear that foreigners were coming to the United States
without authorization to seek jobs and public assistance. See
142 Cong. Rec. 7300 (1996) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy) (“[J]obs are far and away the biggest magnet
attracting illegal aliens to the United States . . . We must do
more to deny jobs to those who are in the country
unlawfully.”); 142 Cong. Rec. 5657 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Frank Riggs) (“Those in this country without . . .
permission . . . take advantage of our public assistance
programs.”). California voters had recently passed
Proposition 187, a measure that sought “to prevent illegal
aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public
services in the State.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997). Congress
passed IIRIRA to address these concerns at a national level.
See 142 Cong. Rec. 7547 (1996) (statement of Sen. Alan
Simpson) (“We either resolve [immigration reform], or we
will have proposition 187’s in every State of the Union.”);
142 Cong. Rec. 24783 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith) (“This bill . . . prevents illegal aliens from taking
American jobs, and ends noncitizens’ abuse of the welfare
system.”).
An amendment to the bill that became
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) was introduced as a “disincentive for
falsely claiming U.S. citizenship.” 142 Cong. Rec. 7322
(1996) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 104-828, at 199 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that
IIRIRA would “improve deterrence of illegal immigration to
14 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
the United States . . . by reforming exclusion and deportation
law and procedures, [and] by improving the verification
system for eligibility for employment”). One of the
amendment’s supporters described it as “mak[ing] it a
deportable offense to falsely claim to be a citizen while
applying for jobs or welfare benefits.” 142 Cong. Rec. 7547
(1996) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy); see also
Castro, 671 F.3d at 368–69 (“The legislative history
suggests that Congress intended the bar to apply to false
citizenship claims made in conjunction with applications for
private employment . . . as well as for public services and
benefits.”).
Richmond’s sweeping restriction on speech would also
raise serious First Amendment concerns, as we have
observed in a related context. The criminal analogue to
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) punishes someone who “falsely and
willfully represents himself to be a citizen of the United
States.” 18 U.S.C. § 911. This language “is sufficiently
broad” to criminalize false claims of citizenship “without
regard to whether or not the person to whom the false
statement is made had good reason to inquire into the
[noncitizen’s] nationality status.” United States v. Esparza-
Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Smiley
v. United States, 181 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1950)).
Because we avoid construing statutes in a way that renders
them constitutionally suspect, see Marquez-Reyes v.
Garland, 36 F.4th 1195, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2022), we place
a limiting construction on the criminal statute: the false
claim of citizenship must “be made to a person having some
right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining [the]
defendant’s citizenship” and not merely “to stop the prying
of some busybody.” Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d at 1137–38
(quoting United States v. Achtner, 144 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 15
1944)). The BIA’s construction of the immigration statute
contains no such limitation.
We conclude that Richmond’s construction of “under” is
unreasonable and do not afford it any deference.5
Consequently, we reject Richmond’s derivative holding that
“[t]he term ‘purpose’ . . . includes the avoidance of negative
legal consequences—including removal proceedings.”
Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 788.
B.
Our rejection of the BIA’s statutory construction does
not free us to forge our own; we have previously interpreted
the term “under” in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182. In Diaz-
Jimenez, we explained that the statute “uses the word ‘under’
in several places” that “consistently reflect the meaning ‘in
accordance with.’” Diaz-Jimenez, 902 F.3d at 960–61
(quoting Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519,
530 (2013)). “To qualify ‘under’ a statutory provision, the
regulated person or act must satisfy the criteria specified by
the provision.” Id. at 961. In the context of
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), the person making a false claim of
citizenship must do so for a purpose or benefit in accordance
with a law.
5
DHS argues that Richmond’s interpretation of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) is
unreasonable because the statute contains no language that would
support a materiality requirement. We need not consider Richmond’s
materiality requirement, however, because we conclude that Ramírez’s
subjective intent in making the false claims of citizenship to the police
was not for any purpose or benefit under any law. Our disagreement
with the BIA’s construction of the statute is limited to the word “under.”
We express no opinion as to the remainder of Richmond’s analysis and
whether it is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory text.
16 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
Diaz-Jimenez explained that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s
application depends on the particular law whose purpose or
benefit the noncitizen invokes when making the false claim
of citizenship. For example, a noncitizen who presents a
fraudulent U.S. birth certificate to a border official to obtain
entry into the United States—a legal benefit—thereby
violates § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). See Valadez-Munoz v.
Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1185(b) (requiring U.S. citizens to present proper
identification to enter the United States). Yet a noncitizen
who presents the same birth certificate to a private employer
to obtain employment does not violate § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
because the relevant law, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2), requires
that the representation of citizenship “[be] made . . . on a
Form I-9.” Diaz-Jimenez, 902 F.3d at 962.
Thus, for § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to bar admission into the
United States, the noncitizen must have made the false claim
of citizenship to comport with some specific legal
requirement. Any federal or state law requiring U.S.
citizenship will do, but not simply “the immigration laws”
generally. And the noncitizen must have intended to obtain
a benefit authorized by or achieve a purpose consistent with
the specific law at issue. But a noncitizen does not act in
accordance with the law by attempting to evade it.
C.
Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that
Ramírez’s misrepresentations about his citizenship to
California and Nebraska police officers do not bar him from
adjusting his status under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). The BIA
did not identify any federal or state law under which Ramírez
was required to establish his U.S. citizenship status during
either arrest.
RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND 17
The BIA concluded that Ramírez was barred only
because he lied about his citizenship for the purpose of
avoiding removal proceedings. But we, like the Third
Circuit, conclude that a false claim of citizenship to the
police “to minimize the risk that the police would report [an]
arrest to DHS” does not satisfy § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
because “[m]inimizing that risk is not, in and of itself, a legal
benefit.” Castro, 671 F.3d at 370.
DHS argues that Castro is distinguishable on its facts
because, unlike here, there was no evidence “that the
noncitizen mis[led] police officers about his true citizenship
in order to minimize the risk that arresting officers would
report his unlawful immigration status.” While the Third
Circuit criticized the “scant record support” for the BIA’s
imputing a “purpose of evading detection by immigration
authorities,” id. at 368, the court did not hold that the
agency’s finding lacked substantial evidence. Rather,
Castro held that such a purpose is not disqualifying under
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Id. at 368–71. Thus, even if the
evidentiary support for the purpose is greater here than in
Castro, that makes no difference. The problem in both cases
is the purpose’s legal—not factual—insufficiency.
DHS also contends that Castro is distinguishable
because in this case, the BIA found evidence that the
Nebraska police would report arrestees’ citizenship status to
DHS.6 See Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 785 n.6. But even
assuming that the Nebraska police had a reporting policy,
misrepresenting one’s citizenship status to avoid such a
6
This finding is questionable in that it is it based entirely on the Nebraska
police’s reporting Ramírez to DHS in this one instance. Lacking
jurisdiction to review the finding, however, we accept it as true.
18 RAMÍREZ MUÑOZ V. GARLAND
report—absent a legal requirement to disclose citizenship—
does not trigger § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s application.
We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to
the agency to either grant Ramírez’s application for
adjustment of status or explain, consistent with this opinion,
why not.
PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.