Quezada Quiroz v. Garland ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROOSEBELT QUEZADA No. 21-430
QUIROZ; IVAN ALBERTO QUEZADA Agency Nos.
VELEZ; MARIA BLANCA VELEZ A206-911-225
SANCHEZ; MATTEO QUEZADA A206-911-694
VELEZ,
A206-911-693
A206-911-695
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 28, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Roosebelt Quezada Quiroz, his wife, and two of their sons seek
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) decision dismissing their
appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying their applications for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and arguments in this
appeal.
“Whether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ … is a question of
law we review de novo.” Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010).
But whether an applicant has shown that his persecutor was or would be
motivated by a protected ground—i.e., whether the “nexus” requirement has been
satisfied—is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Parussimova
v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this deferential standard,
factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, to
reverse the BIA’s finding under substantial evidence review, “we must find that
the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
First, the agency did not err in determining there was no past persecution.
This court’s cases support the BIA’s holding that a one-time “detention, beating,
and vague threat 6 months later from a caller who did not know where the
respondent was located are insufficient to rise to the level of persecution.” See
1
“Petitioner” refers to Roosebelt Quezada-Quiroz, the lead petitioner in this
consolidated proceeding who alone testified before the agency.
2
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2021); Gu v. Gonzalez, 454
F.3d 1014, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2006).
Second, Petitioner has not established any protected ground that would
give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA concluded that in his
appeal before the agency Petitioner waived any challenge to the IJ’s
determination that his proposed social group—“family members of Roosebelt
Quezada Quiroz”—is not cognizable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). See Umana-Escobar
v. Garland, No. 19-70964, 2023 WL 3606117, at *5 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023).
Petitioner also failed to meaningfully challenge the BIA’s waiver conclusion in
his opening brief, and therefore has forfeited the issue before us. See Martinez–
Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1996).
And Petitioner’s refusal to join a gang with alleged government ties and
his opposition to their activities does not give rise to an imputed protected
political opinion. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081(9th Cir. 2013); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996). Absent any
evidence of Petitioner’s real or imputed political opinions, “the BIA could
reasonably determine that” the abuse he suffered at the hands of the gang was
“solely in retribution for refusing to join their group-and not because of his
religious or political beliefs.” Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th
Cir. 2000). Because Petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of future harm
based upon membership in a cognizable particular social group or an imputed
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political opinion, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
Petitioner failed to establish any nexus to a protected ground and therefore to
demonstrate eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See Zehatye v.
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
Finally, as to CAT relief, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Petitioner has not shown past torture. See Rivera Vega v.
Garland, 39 F.4th 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The lack of past persecution, a
lesser harm than torture, necessarily encompasses a lack of past torture.”).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding, affirmed by the BIA, that it was
not more likely that not that Petitioner would be tortured upon return to Mexico.
See Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The agency
reasonably concluded that Petitioner can safely relocate: he safely relocated to
Tijuana for six months before entering the U.S. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)–(ii).
PETITION DENIED.
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