Michael McLaughlin v. Central Peninsula General Hosp ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL L. MCLAUGHLIN, No. 20-35187
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:19-cv-00154-TMB-MMS
v.
CENTRAL PENINSULA GENERAL MEMORANDUM*
HOSPITAL, a non-profit corporation;
TRENA RICHARDSON, President; JAMES
MCHALE, Vice President; MARK
DIXSON; SAL MATTERO; STEVE
MANLEY; RUSSELL PETERSON; MARK
PREMO; STEVEN HORN; STEVEN
HORN; GREGG MONTONAGA; DEBRA
SHUEY; JOHN BRAMANTE, CPGH
Directors; MICHAEL T. BLAKE, D.O.;
JASON HELTON; RACHEL GILLILAND;
DEBRA A. BLIZZARD; KATELIN E.
HIMES; MATTHEW M. MEADE;
DIANNE J. CRONIN, CPGH staff;
MICHAEL LEVY; LEVI DOSS; JESSICA
SMITH; HENRY KANE; CY COX; T.J.
COX, Nikiski Fire Dept; MARK PEARSON,
Sgt.; SAMUEL J. WEBBER; JOSEPH
MINNICK; CASEY HERSHBERGER,
Alaska State Troopers; IRVING CARLISLE,
Secretary/Treasurer,
Defendants-Appellees.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 19, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Michael L. McLaughlin appeals from the district court’s dismissal of this case
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because the facts are
known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.
I
McLaughlin contends that the district court erred in abstaining from
exercising jurisdiction over his civil rights claims under the Younger abstention
doctrine, which instructs that federal courts should refrain from enjoining state
criminal proceedings except in very rare circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 41 (1971). A four-element test governs our application of Younger: a federal
court should abstain if (1) “a state-initiated procedure is ongoing,” (2) the procedure
“implicates important state interests,” (3) “the litigant is not barred from litigating
federal constitutional issues in that proceeding,” and (4) “the court’s action would
enjoin, or have the practical effect of enjoining, ongoing state court proceedings.”
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Under this standard, the case falls squarely within the proper application of
Younger. McLaughlin’s criminal proceedings remain ongoing. Enforcing Alaska
state law is undoubtedly an important state interest. Mr. McLaughlin is free to raise
his constitutional claims in state court and has done so. Finally, McLaughlin’s claims
are intertwined with his criminal case—ruling on appellant’s claims that his
constitutional rights were violated in the course of his arrest would have the
“practical effect of enjoining[] ongoing state court proceedings.”
AmerisourceBergen Corp., 495 F.3d at 1149. In sum, to exercise jurisdiction in this
case would be to interfere with the State of Alaska’s judicial process. The district
court correctly held that these constitutional claims should be decided in the pending
state litigation.
II
McLaughlin additionally challenges the district court’s dismissal of his qui
tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA). But this court’s precedents
unambiguously establish that pro se litigators cannot become relators of FCA qui
tam actions. Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir.
2007) (“While [28 U.S.C. § 1654] allows Stoner to prosecute his own actions in
propria persona, that right is personal to him… Stoner has no authority to prosecute
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an action in federal court on behalf of others than himself.”). The district court thus
did not err in dismissing McLaughlin’s qui tam action.
III
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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