Dameion Douglas v. Donald Reese ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 19 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAMEION DOUGLAS, No. 18-35563
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:16-cv-00048-AA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DONALD REESE, Multnomah County
Prosecutor; JOHN DOE, Multnomah County
Court Clerk; JOHN DOE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 17, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Dameion Douglas appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Douglas alleges that prosecutor Donald Rees1 and two
unnamed Multnomah County officials violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights during postconviction litigation in state court. In particular,
Douglas challenges the defendants’ failure to provide chain-of-custody records
beyond 2002 for a ski cap that was submitted as evidence at his criminal trial in
2000. The district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review
de novo. Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
The district court interpreted the “crux” of Douglas’s request for the chain-of-
custody records to be his contention that the prosecution nefariously altered his cap
to look like a mask during his criminal proceedings. Although Douglas asserted that
his only ambition in this phase of postconviction litigation is access to the records,
the district court reasoned that an underlying Brady claim of evidence suppression
would be Douglas’s only cognizable route to relief. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutorial suppression of material evidence
favorable to a criminal defendant violates due process). However, the court
concluded, because Douglas’s success on a Brady claim “would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction,” the Heck doctrine requires dismissal of his
1
Although defendant is identified as “Donald Reese” in the complaint and
case caption, we acknowledge that defendant’s name is properly spelled “Donald
Rees.”
2
complaint. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
On appeal, Douglas seeks to circumvent Heck. Douglas again stresses that he
solely seeks access to chain-of-custody information, which, he notes, may prove
immaterial to his conviction. Acknowledging that his claim is a misfit with Brady,
Douglas leans on the argument that he has a right to postconviction access to
evidence pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in District Attorney’s Office for
Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) and Skinner v. Switzer, 562
U.S. 521 (2011).
But, as the district court explained, this argument is unavailing. The Court in
Osborne made clear that there is no Brady-analogue for postconviction relief:
“nothing in our precedents suggest[s] that this disclosure obligation continue[s] after
the defendant was convicted and the case was closed.” 557 U.S. at 68. While the
Court in Skinner concluded that a plaintiff could seek postconviction DNA testing
of crime-scene evidence in a Section 1983 action, it was careful to cabin the holding
to the state statutes governing DNA testing—a distinctive and developing
evidentiary tool. See 562 U.S. at 529, 535–36. Although there may be a distinction
between Douglas’s “immediate plea” and his “ultimate aim,” see Skinner, 562 U.S.
at 535, Douglas has failed to identify a freestanding constitutional right that would
obligate production of chain-of-custody records detailing the cap’s location in years
after criminal proceedings had concluded.
3
Moreover, as the Court in Osborne stipulated, “[f]ederal courts may upset a
State’s postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally inadequate
to vindicate the substantive rights provided.” 557 U.S. at 69. Douglas makes no
such contention. Because Douglas has not shown or even suggested that Oregon’s
postconviction procedures are fundamentally unfair, he cannot avail himself of this
avenue for relief.
AFFIRMED.
4