Fortunato Amador Duenas v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 27 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FORTUNATO DE JESUS AMADOR                       No.    18-71987
    DUENAS,
    Agency No. A205-318-278
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted July 20, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
    Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas petitions for review of an order from the
    Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen removal
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), and we deny the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
    decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    petition for review.
    1.     In a published opinion issued concurrently with this memorandum
    disposition, we hold that the appointment and removal process for Immigration
    Judges and members of the BIA comports with the Constitution. These officials are
    inferior officers of the United States, see Lucia v. SEC, 
    138 S. Ct. 2044
    , 2051–53
    (2018); Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 
    561 U.S. 477
    , 510 (2010), so the Constitution’s
    Appointments Clause permits their appointment by the Attorney General. U.S.
    Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    .
    And Amador Duenas has identified no impermissible restriction on the Attorney
    General’s ability to remove these officials. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493,
    495–96.
    2.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Amador Duenas’s
    motion to reopen the removal proceedings. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    ,
    986 (9th Cir. 2010). A petitioner must support a motion to reopen with “previously
    unavailable, material evidence.” 
    Id.
     Amador Duenas accompanied his motion with
    declarations from him and his attorney regarding his attorney’s failure to file the
    documents necessary to receive a briefing schedule for his appeal to the BIA. This
    evidence does not affect Amador Duenas’s eligibility for relief from removal.
    Because it would not “change the result in the case,” it cannot support reopening
    removal proceedings. See Shin v. Mukasey, 
    547 F.3d 1019
    , 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).
    2
    3.     We will not consider Amador Duenas’s argument that the agency erred
    in denying his application for cancellation of removal. Amador Duenas never sought
    review of the BIA’s on-the-merits dismissal of his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s
    determination that he was ineligible for cancellation because he failed to provide
    evidence showing ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States.
    He petitions for review only of the BIA’s later decision to deny his motion to reopen
    the removal proceedings. “Our review is, therefore, limited to consideration of that
    order, rather than the merits of [Amador Duenas’s] underlying claim for cancellation
    of removal.” See Hernandez-Velasquez v. Holder, 
    611 F.3d 1073
    , 1077 (9th Cir.
    2010); see also Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 
    94 F.3d 1256
    , 1257–58 (9th Cir. 1996).
    Nor will we address Amador Duenas’s argument that his waiver of the right
    to appeal the Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA was ineffective. This
    argument is misplaced—the BIA determined that Amador Duenas did not waive his
    right to appeal before dismissing his appeal on the merits.
    In his briefing to this court, Amador Duenas separately argues that the Notice
    to Appear that initiated the removal proceedings against him was defective because
    it did not include the date and time of his initial removal hearing. He thus maintains
    that his time of continuous physical presence in the United States has not ended
    under Pereira v. Sessions, 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
    , 2109–10 (2018), and that he is now
    eligible for cancellation of removal. Although the BIA could exercise its discretion
    3
    to reopen Amador Duenas’s removal proceedings sua sponte to consider this
    argument, see Menendez-Gonzales v. Barr, 
    929 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2019), we
    will not consider it because Amador Duenas did not raise it in the motion to reopen
    at issue in this appeal. See Hernandez-Velasquez, 
    611 F.3d at 1077
    .
    PETITION DENIED.
    4