Vladimir Blasko v. Lasha Boyden ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VLADIMIR BLASKO, No. 22-15830
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:18-cv-01649-DAD-SAB
v.
LASHA BOYDEN, Acting United States MEMORANDUM*
Marshal for the Eastern District of
California,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 20, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,** WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Vladimir Blasko (“Blasko”) appeals a district court order denying habeas
relief from the certification of his extradition to Slovakia. On April 15, 2013, the
Nitra District Court in Slovakia entered a criminal judgment in absentia against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Blasko for abuse of power by a public official and misdemeanor infliction of
bodily harm in violation of the Slovakian Penal Code, and sentenced him to four
years in prison. According to the judgment, Blasko, while on duty as a police
officer, beat a bar patron to the point of hospitalization in 2007. The Slovakian
police department terminated Blasko in 2009, and Blasko arrived in the United
States on a student visa on February 26, 2010, and remained after his visa expired
on May 7, 2010.
Blasko contends that the applicable Slovakian statute of limitations bars his
extradition, and that the government failed to present “competent evidence”
sufficient to establish probable cause. Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(a), we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in determining that the applicable
Slovakian statute of limitations had not expired when Blasko was arrested on
October 6, 2017. Subsection 3 of Article 90 of the Slovakian Criminal Code
imposes a five-year statute of limitations for the execution of punishment for
Blasko’s offenses, which “shall not include the period during which the
punishment could not be enforced because the convicted sojourned abroad with the
intent to avoid the punishment.” Here, absent tolling, the statute of limitations
would have run on April 15, 2018, almost six months after Blasko had been
arrested in the United States. While Blasko was entitled to contest his extradition
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in court, it does not follow that the statute of limitations was not tolled while he
chose to fight extradition.
The extradition court properly deferred to a Slovakian judge’s declaration
that concluded that “[t]he fact that Mr. Blasko has been fighting against his
extradition, after being arrested in October 2017, confirms that he has known about
the judgment and that he has sojourned abroad with the intent to avoid punishment
under Article 90(3).” Contrary to Blasko’s arguments, Article V of the Extradition
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Slovak Republic (the
“Treaty”) does not require us to conduct an “independent analysis” of the meaning
of Slovakia’s statute of limitations.
Moreover, the district court did not defer solely to the Slovakian judge’s
interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, but conducted its own
analysis of the textual meaning of “sojourned abroad with the intent to avoid the
punishment.” While Blasko contends that he did not have “meaningful
knowledge” of the criminal proceedings against him until his arrest, there is ample
evidence that Blasko was aware of the charges against him prior to October 2017.
According to Blasko’s second international arrest warrant dated January 21, 2014,
a criminal prosecution against Blasko in connection with the incident began on
July 17, 2007, and charges were brought against him on January 8, 2008, while
Blasko remained in Slovakia. Blasko’s immigration attorney received copies of
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Slovakian court documents on June 5, 2015, which discussed his in absentia
conviction from 2013. Thus, the record strongly supports that Blasko was fully
aware of the criminal proceedings before 2017 and stayed in the United States
“with the intent to avoid the punishment.”
2. The district court properly concluded that “competent evidence”
supports the extradition court’s probable cause finding. “‘[B]ecause the
magistrate’s probable cause finding is. . . not a finding of fact in the sense that the
court has weighed the evidence and resolved disputed factual issues, it must be
upheld if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.’” Santos v.
Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 1001 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Quinn v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir. 1986)). As in the context of an arrest, “[p]robable
cause . . . exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” United
States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
Here, the extradition court considered at least fifteen detailed witness
statements (including six witnesses who appeared at the Slovakian trial),
documentary evidence, and an expert medical opinion that were summarized in the
Slovakian trial court decision. That evidence overwhelmingly substantiated that
Blasko beat a bar patron, unprovoked, for the first time at a bar, and a second time
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at a police station. While the evidence might not support guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in an American court, “[c]ompetent evidence to establish reasonable grounds
is not necessarily evidence competent to convict.” Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d
713, 717 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We have consistently held that hearsay
statements, including unsworn hearsay statements that are summarized by a foreign
court, can constitute “competent evidence” in extradition proceedings. See, e.g.,
Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1984); Manta v. Chertoff,
518 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, while American criminal courts do not conduct in absentia
proceedings, it is for the executive branch and the Senate, not the judiciary, to
examine the procedural fairness of foreign court systems and determine whether
they are adequate for extradition purposes. Here, the governing Treaty does not
require that we discount evidence from in absentia convictions, or that we seek
individual sworn declarations from witnesses to extradite a fugitive. Considering
the extensive evidence against Blasko detailed in the Slovakian court decision, we
affirm that competent evidence supports the extradition court’s probable cause
finding.
AFFIRMED.
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