Irvine Unified School District v. Sharon Landers ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 26 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IRVINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, No. 21-55290
21-55663
Plaintiff-Appellant, 21-55882
v. D.C. No.
8:20-cv-01001-DOC-JDE
SHARON LANDERS; JOSEPH
GAGLIANO, Parents on behalf of A.G., a
minor, MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 11, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, CHRISTEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Irvine Unified School District (“Irvine”) appeals from the district court’s
judgment affirming the Office of Administrative Hearings’ (“OAH”) determination
that Irvine did not provide A.G. (“Student”) with a Free Appropriate Public
Education (“FAPE”) in individualized education programs (“IEPs”) offered from
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
October 2016 through June 2018 under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”). Irvine also appeals from the district court’s orders awarding
attorneys’ fees to Student. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We affirm.
We review de novo whether a school district provided a FAPE. Amanda J.
ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001).
However, we give “due weight” to the OAH’s decision, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), and defer to its findings when “they are thorough and
careful,” Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994). We
review attorneys’ fees awards for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal analysis de
novo and factual findings for clear error. P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 474 F.3d
1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
1. We defer to the OAH’s findings because, as the district court found, its
decision was “thorough and careful.” Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1524. The
OAH decision spanned seventy-five pages, made 240 detailed factual findings
concerning the many IEP iterations Irvine offered, and individually evaluated
sixty-eight issues and sub-issues. See Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 792
F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2015) (deferring to a hearing officer’s nineteen-page
memorandum disposition).
Irvine contends that we should not defer to the OAH because it did not allow
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Irvine to present additional evidence on remand of the certified nonpublic school’s
curriculum and “made a fundamental error in concluding that [the certified
nonpublic school] offers a high school diploma for which Student was on track to
obtain.” Neither argument is persuasive. First, Irvine sought to present evidence
of the certified nonpublic school’s “current educational program” in December
2019; such evidence would have been irrelevant to the OAH decision, which
concerned the school’s curriculum for the 2018–2019 school year. Second, the
OAH decision did not turn on whether Student would receive a diploma from the
certified nonpublic school. Rather, it focused on whether Student was on track to
receive a diploma, as an indication of Student’s curriculum.
2. We affirm the OAH’s award of reimbursement to Student. “A parent or
guardian is ‘entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both
(1) that the public placement violated the IDEA, and (2) that the private school
placement was proper under the Act.’” Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch.
Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Under the IDEA, an
IEP must provide a “meaningful benefit” to the student. N.B. v. Hellgate Elem.
Sch. Dist., ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Moving a student from the general education curriculum to a modified
curriculum is a last resort. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A). A certified nonpublic
school placement is proper if it “provides educational instruction specially
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designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such
services as are necessary to permit a child to benefit from instruction.” C.B. ex rel.
Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
The OAH properly concluded that Irvine violated the IDEA by denying
Student a FAPE. Both expert psychologists credibly testified that Student’s
cognitive level was high enough to participate in the general curriculum with her
non-disabled peers. See Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.W., 21 F.4th 1125,
1133–34 (9th Cir. 2021) (considering expert testimony to determine whether IEP
goals were appropriate for the student’s unique needs). Despite this, Irvine offered
Student below grade-level standards for math and reading. See Anchorage Sch.
Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n IEP developed for a
second grader is not reasonably calculated to ensure educational benefits to that
student in his third grade year.”). This modified curriculum offered by Irvine was
not focused on progressing Student from grade to grade. See Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v. Douglas Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 401 (2017) (“[A] FAPE will
involve integration in the regular classroom and individualized special education
calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade.”). Irvine in one instance
responded to Student’s parents’ concerns by stating that Student “did not make as
much progress on grade-level standards because she worked on below grade-level,
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modified curriculum” and advised that Student’s parents should “watch her
progress by looking at specific goal areas, not by looking at grade-level standards.”
Student did not progress in Irvine’s modified curriculum; her assessment scores in
math and reading dropped following the modifications. See id. at 399 (“The IEP
must aim to enable the child to make progress.”).
Irvine contends that its modifications to Student’s curriculum were justified
based on her performance in its 2018 assessments. But the Irvine staff member
who conducted the assessments and Irvine’s lead psychologist conceded that its
2018 Woodcock-Johnson test returned an inaccurate intelligence quotient. See
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d at 1058 (finding an IEP was invalid because it “did
not provide an accurate assessment of [the student]’s present level of
performance”). Irvine thus presented no reliable evidence that the modified
curriculum it offered Student in its IEPs meaningfully benefited her.
Irvine also contends that Student’s repeating the sixth grade at the certified
nonpublic school constituted the same kind of modification it offered her, so her
progress at the certified nonpublic school shows that she would have progressed in
Irvine’s curriculum. But, as the OAH observed, the curricula are distinct; Irvine’s
did not focus on allowing Student access to the general education curriculum and
the “educational standards that apply to nondisabled children,” whereas the
certified nonpublic school’s did.
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Finally, Irvine argues that the OAH used the wrong definition of “modified
curriculum” in its decision and should have been held to the definition purportedly
“established by” the district court when it remanded the case. But there is no fixed
definition of “modified curriculum.” See, e.g., D.R. ex rel. R.R. v. Redondo Beach
Unified Sch. Dist., 56 F.4th 636, 642 (9th Cir. 2022) (using the phrase “modified
general education curriculum” to describe supplementary aids and services).
Further, the district court did not establish a definition of “modified curriculum”
that the OAH was required to apply. The district court based its definition on
Student’s expert’s testimony to identify an inconsistency in the OAH’s original
decision. The district court plainly stated that it was “not equipped” to determine
whether the certified nonpublic school’s curriculum was “modified.” The OAH
accordingly expanded its analysis to resolve this inconsistency, using a definition
of “modified curriculum” that the evidence before it supported.
The OAH also properly concluded that the certified nonpublic school
placement was proper. Student progressed academically and socially at the
certified nonpublic school. Though Student repeated sixth grade, Student’s expert
credibly testified that it was a necessary intervention to allow her to catch up to her
peers after her dip in progress at Irvine.
3. Last, we affirm the district court’s attorneys’ fees awards to Student. The
district court has discretion under the IDEA to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees
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. . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Generally, we defer to the district’s court award. Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the “lodestar
method,” the district court (1) calculates the lodestar amount by “determining how
many hours were reasonably expended on the litigation, and then multiply[ing]
those hours by the prevailing local rate for an attorney of the skill required to
perform the litigation,” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2008), and (2) adjusts the lodestar according to several factors, the most
important of which is the “degree of success,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
436 (1983). See also Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2006) (holding that IDEA attorneys’ fees awards are governed by the
standards of Hensley).
Irvine contends that the district court abused its discretion by not considering
the “degree of success” factor in the fees awards because Irvine “prevailed on 50
sub-issues out of the 68 sub-issues.” But the gravamen of Student’s complaint was
that Irvine did not provide her with a FAPE; Student won nine out of eleven issues
on this point and reimbursement of the full amount she sought. See Vargas v.
Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that a low level of success
meriting a fee reduction could be demonstrated by a large disparity between the
amount sought and the amount earned); Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison,
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598 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may award ‘full fees even
where a party did not prevail on every contention.’” (citation omitted)).
Irvine’s contention that the district court erred in setting attorney rates in
both fee awards is similarly unpersuasive. The district court properly set the rates
when it identified the relevant community and explained how it arrived at the
prevailing hourly rate. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (holding that the district
court abused its discretion by not identifying the relevant community or explaining
the prevailing hourly rate).
Irvine also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Student’s second attorneys’ fees motion. But the district court properly determined
that the issues in the appeal (the attorneys’ fees from the beginning of the litigation
to the appeal) differed from the issue in Student’s second motion for attorneys’
fees (the attorneys’ fees from the previous fees motion). See Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that a notice of
appeal “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal”).
AFFIRMED.
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