Gciu-Employer Retirement Fund v. quad/graphics, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 7 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GCIU-EMPLOYER RETIREMENT FUND                   No.    17-55667
    and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
    GCIU-EMPLOYER RETIREMENT FUND,                  D.C. Nos.
    2:16-cv-03391-ODW-AFM
    Plaintiffs-counter-                       2:16-cv-03418-ODW-AFM
    defendants-Appellees,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC.,
    Defendant-counter-
    plaintiff-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 10, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Before: HURWITZ and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and PRESNELL,** District
    Judge.
    The issue for decision is whether Quad/Graphics, Inc. (“Quad”) partially
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Gregory A. Presnell, United States District Judge for
    the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    withdrew from the GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund (“the Fund”) in 2010, after
    employees at Quad’s Versailles, Kentucky, facility voted to decertify a collective
    bargaining agreement (“CBA”). An arbitrator found that Quad had not withdrawn,
    but on review, the district court disagreed. We have jurisdiction of Quad’s appeal
    from the district court judgment under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Like the district court, we
    must presume the arbitrator’s factual findings are correct but review his conclusions
    of law de novo. See 
    29 U.S.C. § 1401
    (c); CMSH Co. v. Carpenters Tr. Fund for N.
    Cal., 
    963 F.2d 238
    , 239–40 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm the district court’s decision.1
    1. An employer partially withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan when
    it “permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under one or more but
    fewer than all collective bargaining agreements under which the employer has been
    obligated to contribute.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 1385
    (b)(2)(A)(i); see 
    id.
     § 1385(a)(2). The
    district court correctly held that Quad partially withdrew from the Fund in 2010. The
    Versailles CBA “became void prospectively as of the decertification of” the union
    as the employee’s bargaining representative in December 2010, extinguishing
    Quad’s ongoing obligations to contribute to the Fund on behalf of Versailles
    employees. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. W. Coast Sheet Metal Co., 
    954 F.2d 1506
    , 1509 (9th Cir. 1992).
    1
    In a separately filed opinion, we today also affirm the district court’s judgment
    concerning the sequence of calculations to be applied in determining withdrawal
    liability.
    2
    2.   The Versailles CBA did not explicitly extend Quad’s contribution
    obligation past the union’s decertification. See 
    id.
     (“A contract to contribute to a
    trust fund of a Union with which [the employer] has no ongoing collective
    bargaining relationship makes no sense.”). Rather, the CBA states only that Quad
    “will contribute monthly . . . for each . . . shift worked or paid for under this
    Agreement.” It does not provide for contributions for any payments for work
    performed after decertification. That Quad did not pay the contribution incurred
    because of shifts worked in December 2010 until after the following January 1 does
    not mean it had ongoing obligations under the CBA.              See 
    29 U.S.C. § 1385
    (b)(2)(A)(i).
    3. Although we may consider extrinsic evidence in interpreting a CBA, see
    Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local 395 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund
    v. Conquer Cartage Co., 
    753 F.2d 1512
    , 1517 (9th Cir. 1985), Quad has identified
    no evidence suggesting that the parties intended Quad to be contractually obligated
    to pay into the Fund after decertification. The arbitrator’s factual finding that
    Versailles employees used some CBA-banked vacation time after the decertification
    vote, at most indicates that Quad believed its employees were still entitled to
    vacation. It does not bear on whether Quad had continuing obligations to the Fund.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17-55667        FILED
    OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                          DEC 7 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I respectfully dissent. I agree with the analytical framework described:  As
    of a union’s decertification, a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) typically
    becomes void prospectively, but an employer’s obligations could continue beyond
    decertification if a CBA explicitly provides. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n
    v. W. Coast Sheet Metal Co., 
    954 F.2d 1506
    , 1509 (9th Cir. 1992). I disagree,
    however, with the holding that this CBA did not explicitly extend the obligations
    of Quad/Graphics, Inc. (Quad) beyond decertification.
    The CBA entitled Quad employees to earned vacation time that they could
    use at any point during the year. Alternatively, Quad employees could elect not to
    use their earned vacation time and have it paid out to them at the year’s end. Quad
    was only contractually obligated to “pay out any unused vacation time at the end of
    a calendar year on or before January 31st of the following year.” Therefore, even
    after decertification, Quad’s obligation to pay for unused vacation time was
    continuing since it could not make this contribution until at least January 1, 2011.
    See Alday v. Raytheon Co., 
    693 F.3d 772
    , 784-85 (9th Cir. 2012).
    As such, I disagree that Quad partially withdrew from the Fund in December
    2010 and would reverse the district court’s decision.
    1