Hunt v. Miller ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: PELI POPOVICH HUNT, No. 14-55776
Debtor. D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02705-MMM
______________________________
PELI POPOVICH HUNT, individual and MEMORANDUM*
Trustee,
Appellant,
v.
ELISSA D. MILLER, Chapter 7 Trustee; et
al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2017**
Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the bankruptcy court’s order granting the chapter 7 trustee’s motion to sell real
property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the
district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same
standards of review applied by the district court. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677
F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to approve the sale of the real property
because an order approving the sale of estate property is enumerated as a core
bankruptcy proceeding that bankruptcy judges are empowered to hear and
determine. See 11 U.S.C. § 157(b). Hunt’s interest in the property became
property of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of her bankruptcy petition. See 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (all
legal or equitable interests of a debtor in property become property of the
bankruptcy estate upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case).
Contrary to Hunt’s contention, the trustee’s motion was timely noticed.
Hunt was not entitled to the additional three days provided by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9006(f) because the deadline to oppose the trustee’s motion was fixed by the
scheduled hearing date, and not the date of service. See Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 9013-
1(f) (setting a party’s deadline to oppose a noticed motion).
To the extent Hunt challenges the bankruptcy court’s order as the
representative of a separate legal entity, the appeal is dismissed because “a non-
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lawyer ‘has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’” Johns
v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.E. Pope
Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject Hunt’s contentions that the bankruptcy court and district court
demonstrated bias.
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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