Loren Miller v. Jeremy Faith , 696 F. App'x 297 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: LOREN MILLER; SARAH No. 16-55032
MILLER,
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01681-DOC
Debtors,
------------------------------ MEMORANDUM*
LOREN MILLER,
Appellant,
v.
JEREMY W. FAITH, Trustee,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor Loren Miller appeals pro se from the district court’s order
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders denying his motions to convert his petition
and to transfer venue. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review
the bankruptcy court’s decision independently, without giving deference to the
district court. Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s motion to
convert his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings to Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings because the record supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that Miller
had acted in bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (granting courts power to take any
action or make any determination necessary to prevent an abuse of process);
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373-76 (2015) (the right to
convert bankruptcy proceedings is impliedly limited by the bankruptcy court’s
power to take any action necessary to prevent bad-faith conduct or abuse of the
bankruptcy process); see also In re Rosson, 545 F.3d at 771 (9th Cir. 2008)
(reviewing for an abuse of discretion a bankruptcy court’s decision to convert a
bankruptcy case, and for clear error its factual findings).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s motion to
transfer his bankruptcy proceedings because Miller has not demonstrated that such
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relief is in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties. See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 1014 (bankruptcy court may transfer the case to any other district if the
court determines that the transfer is in the interest of justice or for the convenience
of the parties); see also Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d
834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review).
Miller’s motions to file a late reply brief (Docket Entry Nos. 18, 19) are
denied as moot.
Miller’s request to take judicial notice of the underlying proceedings, set
forth in his opening brief, is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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