Loren Miller v. Jeremy Faith , 696 F. App'x 299 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: LOREN MILLER; SARAH No. 16-60011
MILLER,
BAP No. 15-1208
Debtors,
______________________________
MEMORANDUM*
LOREN MILLER,
Appellant,
v.
JEREMY W. FAITH, Trustee; SARAH
MILLER,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Farris, Taylor, and Kurtz, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor Loren Miller appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Panel’s (“BAP”) order dismissing for failure to prosecute his appeal from the
bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We review for an abuse of discretion. Morrissey v. Stuteville (In re
Morrissey), 349 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The BAP did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Miller’s appeal for
failure to file an opening brief and excerpts of record after the BAP provided
multiple extensions of time and warnings that failure to file a brief would result in
dismissal of the appeal. See id. at 1189-91; see also 9th Cir. BAP R. 8018(a)-2
(providing for dismissal of an appeal when an appellant “fails to file an opening
brief timely, or otherwise fails to comply with rules or orders regarding processing
the appeal . . .”); Clinton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Clinton), 449
B.R. 79, 83 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (pro se litigants in bankruptcy proceedings are not
excused from compliance with procedural rules).
The BAP did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s third motion to
extend time to file an opening brief because Miller did not demonstrate cause for
relief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 (explaining that the BAP “for cause shown may
at any time in its discretion” extend a deadline “if the request therefor is made
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed”).
2 16-60011
We reject as meritless Miller’s contentions regarding the alleged bad faith of
the BAP.
Miller’s request to take judicial notice of the underlying proceedings, set
forth in his opening brief, is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
3 16-60011