Charles Kinney v. Carolyn Cooper , 708 F. App'x 411 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 28 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHARLES G. KINNEY,                              No. 16-55343
    Plaintiff-counter-claimant-               D.C. No. 2:15-cv-08910-PSG-JC
    Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    CAROLYN COOPER,
    Defendant,
    and
    MICHELE R. CLARK; et al.,
    Counter-defendants-
    Appellees.
    CHARLES G. KINNEY,                              No. 16-55347
    Plaintiff-counter-claimant-               D.C. No. 2:15-cv-09022-PSG-JC
    Appellant,
    v.
    CAROLYN COOPER,
    Defendant,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    and
    MICHELE R. CLARK; et al.,
    Counter-defendants-
    Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 18, 2017**
    Before:      WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    In these consolidated appeals, Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the
    district court’s orders in two cases that Kinney removed from state court. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
    district court’s order declaring Kinney a vexatious litigant and imposing a pre-
    filing review order. Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 
    761 F.3d 1057
    ,
    1062 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by declaring Kinney a
    vexatious litigant and imposing a pre-filing review order. See 
    id. & n.2
    (setting
    forth standard of review and factors district court must consider before issuing a
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral
    argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
    2                                   16-55343
    pre-filing review order, and rejecting contention that “filing a notice of appeal
    divested the district court of jurisdiction to issue the vexatious litigant order”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Kinney’s first
    amended counterclaims and third-party complaints, his motions to withdraw the
    bankruptcy reference, and his amended notice of removal. See El Pollo Loco, Inc.
    v. Hashim, 
    316 F.3d 1032
    , 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to
    appellees because Kinney lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
    removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require
    payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as
    a result of the removal.”); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 
    546 U.S. 132
    , 141
    (2005) (“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under
    § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for
    seeking removal.”); Gardner v. UICI, 
    508 F.3d 559
    , 560-61 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (setting forth standard of review).
    We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders remanding these
    cases to state court, and denying Kinney’s motions to vacate. See 28 U.S.C.
    §§ 1447(d), 1452(b); see also Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 
    516 U.S. 124
    ,
    127-29 (1995) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b) bar appellate
    review of certain remand orders).
    3                                     16-55343
    In his opening brief, Kinney fails to address how the district court abused its
    discretion by awarding sanctions, and has therefore waived his challenge to the
    sanctions award. See Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n
    appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”);
    see also Greenwood v. FAA, 
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not
    manufacture arguments for an appellant . . . .”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney’s motion to
    recuse Judge Gutierrez. See Glick v. Edwards, 
    803 F.3d 505
    , 508 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (setting forth standard of review).
    We reject as meritless Kinney’s contentions that the district court erred by
    transferring Kinney’s cases from the Southern Division of the United States
    District Court for the Central District of California to the Western Division of that
    court, transferring Kinney’s cases to the docket of Judge Gutierrez, and failing to
    rule on Kinney’s motions to withdraw the bankruptcy reference.
    We reject as unsupported by the record Kinney’s contention that Judge
    Gutierrez was biased and should have recused himself.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Appellees’ request that the court entertain awarding damages and double
    costs against Kinney under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 is denied.
    4                                    16-55343
    All pending requests for judicial notice are granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    5                    16-55343