Singh v. Garland ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GORPREET SINGH, No. 22-1264
Agency No.
Petitioner, A216-578-470
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 17, 2023**
San Jose, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and PAEZ and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Gorpreet Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) order affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We grant the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
petition in part and deny in part.
We review questions of law de novo and factual findings for substantial
evidence. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under the
substantial evidence standard, we uphold the agency’s determination unless
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
1. Asylum and Withholding of Removal. When deciding whether Singh
could relocate within India, the BIA afforded Singh the presumption of future
persecution. The government thus had the burden of showing that it would be both
safe and reasonable for him to relocate. See Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101
(9th Cir. 2020). In Singh v. Whitaker, we held that in determining whether the
government has met that burden, the BIA is required to analyze whether an
applicant would be “substantially safer in a new location if he were to continue
expressing his support” for his political organization. 914 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir.
2019).
In Singh, we held that “[a]lthough the BIA discussed the Law Library Report
and its conclusion that the police will likely pursue only high-profile militants
outside of Punjab, it erred by failing to address the potential harm Congress Party
members, or other local authorities, might inflict upon Singh in a new state.” Id. at
661 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the BIA relied on similar record
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evidence, including an updated version of the Law Library Report which indicated
that “only Mann Party members who are considered high-profile militants or are
listed on a list of chronic offenders are at risk of persecution if they relocate
outside of Punjab.” The BIA did not specifically address, however, what might
happen to Singh at the hands of authorities in Uttar Pradesh (“the UP”) if he were
to engage in future political activity for the Mann Party.
The immigration judge (“IJ”) addressed this more directly. The IJ noted that
“the record documents are less clear about what would happen if [Singh] actively
supported the Mann Party in the UP,” but nonetheless concluded that, “based on
what it [had] been able to glean from the record documents, that it would be
sufficiently safe for [Singh] to advocate for the Mann Party in the UP.” The BIA
affirmed this reasoning. Under Singh, however, the BIA is required to do more
than rely on unclear evidence to conclude that a petitioner would be “sufficiently
safe” in the new location. Rather, Singh requires an individualized analysis of
whether a petitioner would be “substantially safer.” 914 F.3d at 660; see also
Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33 (B.I.A. 2012) (the proposed location
“must present circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim” (emphasis
added)).
Here, the agency did not conduct an individualized analysis as to whether
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Singh would be substantially safer in the UP if he were to continue advocating for
the Mann Party. The BIA concluded that Singh’s past political engagement as a
low-level party member made him an unlikely target. But although the IJ and BIA
relied on evidence in the Law Library Report to justify the reasonableness of
relocation, the BIA failed to address other evidence in the same report stating that
the UP is one of a few states in which police forces have cooperated with police in
Punjab to target Sikhs advocating for independence.
By failing to address critical evidence and failing to analyze how such
evidence might impact whether Singh would be substantially safer in the UP, the
BIA’s internal relocation determination is insufficient under Singh. We thus grant
Singh’s petition for review with respect to his asylum and withholding of removal
claims, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.
2. Convention Against Torture. To qualify for relief under CAT, Singh must
establish that “it is more likely than not that [he] would be tortured if removed” to
India. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The BIA concluded that Singh failed to meet this
burden. This decision is supported by substantial evidence. Singh argued that
“background documents” compel the conclusion that he would be tortured, but the
documents he offered only provide evidence about generalized corruption and
violence in India, not about a specific threat to him. Additionally, the past harm he
suffered may have constituted persecution, but it does not compel a finding that it
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is more likely than not that he would be tortured. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d
1183, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining that, although being taken into
custody and beaten on four occasions is “certainly [a] form[] of persecution, it is
not clear that these actions would rise to the level of torture.”). We thus deny
Singh’s petition for review with respect to his CAT claim.
Each party shall bear its costs on appeal.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART; REMANDED.
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