Christopher Frenci v. Rush Auto Corporation, LLC ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 15 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER FRENCI, No. 22-16628
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00414-MTL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RUSH AUTO CORPORATION, LLC, DBA
Pick-A-Part, DBA Rush Auto Recyclers
Incorporated, DBA We Buy Scrap, named as
Rush Auto Corporation LLC; JANET RUSH,
in her official and individual capacities;
DANIEL THORPE, in his official and
individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 12, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Frenci appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing his federal and state law employment action. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on the basis of claim preclusion. Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d
1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Frenci’s action because Frenci’s claims
were raised or could have been raised in a previous action between the parties that
resulted in a final adjudication on the merits. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
1166 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal court must follow state’s preclusion rules to
determine effect of a state court judgment); Peterson v. Newton, 307 P.3d 1020,
1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing requirements for claim preclusion under
Arizona law); see also Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 601 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz.
1979) (explaining that any dismissal, other than for lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, or failure to join a party, is an adjudication on the merits, unless the court
specifies otherwise).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Frenci’s motion for
reconsideration because Frenci failed to establish a basis for such relief. See
D. Ariz. R. 7.2(g)(1) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration); Bias v. Moynihan,
508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the standard of review for
compliance with local rules, and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a
2 22-16628
district court’s interpretation of its local rules”).
AFFIRMED.
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