United States v. Jesus Contreras ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50187
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:21-cr-00569-RGK-1
v.
JESUS CONTRERAS, AKA Chewy, AKA MEMORANDUM*
Chuey, AKA Chuy, AKA Alejandro
Contreras,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 16, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District
Judge.
Jesus Contreras (“Contreras”) appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence found in a consent search during a traffic stop. He
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
argues that officers unreasonably prolonged an otherwise lawful traffic stop to
search for criminal activity involving drugs and weapons. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the legal
conclusions underlying a motion to suppress and its factual findings for clear error.
See United States v. Bontemps, 977 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.
1. We agree with the district court that officers did not unreasonably
prolong the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. During the first few
minutes of the traffic encounter, and before consent to search the vehicle was
obtained, the officers acted diligently in their traffic-related duties and took
appropriate safety precautions to effectuate the traffic stop. See Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (explaining that officers do not exceed the
scope of a traffic stop when their actions “address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns”) (citations omitted).
Officers were permitted to ask Contreras about his supervisory release status as an
ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop. See United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th
1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that police officers did not measurably prolong
traffic stop by asking defendant about his arrest history). Officers were also
allowed to conduct a criminal records search. See United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th
842, 848 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that police officers did not need independent
reasonable suspicion to perform a criminal history check during a traffic stop).
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Likewise, the interest in officer safety justified Officer Gonzalez’s decision to wait
for his partner to complete the pat down of Contreras before proceeding to the
patrol car to conduct the criminal records search.
We reject Contreras’s argument that the mere request for consent to search
the vehicle itself resulted in an unlawful prolongation of the traffic stop. A traffic
stop is not unreasonably prolonged where, as here, one officer asks for and
receives consent to search a vehicle while a second officer conducts a lawful
records search. United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2007);
see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (observing that officers may conduct certain
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop so long as these activities
do not prolong the stop).
2. We review the district court’s determination that Contreras voluntarily
consented to the vehicle search for clear error. See United States v. Jones, 286
F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002). The voluntariness of consent depends on a
holistic review of five factors: “(1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2)
whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings
were given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that [they] had a right not to
consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told a search warrant could be
obtained.” Id. Although a heightened degree of restraint occurs when an individual
is placed in handcuffs, the use of such restraints does not necessarily render
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consent involuntary. See United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622 (9th Cir.
1990) (“The fact that consent was given while under arrest does not, in an of itself,
make it involuntary, especially where a defendant was informed of his right not to
consent and informed of his Miranda rights.”) (citations omitted).
As the district court found, the interactions between Contreras and Officer
Gomez appeared to be both calm and cooperative. Shortly after receiving consent,
Gomez informed Contreras of his right to withdraw his consent and his ability to
stop the officers “anytime.” Moreover, Contreras interacted with only two officers
who did not draw their firearms, subject him to undue force or intimidation, or
advise him that his refusal would be futile. See Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1243 (describing
similar factors as weighing in favor of finding voluntariness of consent). Based on
these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in
finding that Contreras voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle.
3. Finally, we reject Contreras’s challenge to the duration of the traffic
stop based on post-consent inquiries. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358
n. 22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment
requirements.”) (citations omitted). Contreras does not challenge the scope of the
search nor argue that he was unable to withdraw his consent. See United States v.
McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a suspect is
free, after initially giving consent to a car search, to delimit or withdraw his
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consent at anytime). Officers discovered the loaded magazine and firearm
approximately five minutes into the car search and twelve minutes into the traffic
stop. Nothing in the record indicates that the officers conducted the vehicle search
in an objectively unreasonable manner.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Because we conclude that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged, we
need not decide whether search of the vehicle was justified by independent
reasonable suspicion or under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
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