Raymond Nakano v. United States , 742 F.3d 1208 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAYMOND T. NAKANO,                       No. 11-18013
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                    2:08-cv-01026-ROS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.            OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Roslyn O. Silver, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    January 16, 2014—San Francisco, California
    Filed February 18, 2014
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber,
    and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Graber
    2                  NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    SUMMARY*
    Tax
    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
    in favor of the government in a tax refund action after the
    Internal Revenue Service assessed unpaid excise taxes against
    plaintiff pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
    Plaintiff, a former vice president and chief financial
    officer of National Airlines, Inc., contended that his failure to
    pay the excise tax was not “willful” under § 6672(a)—which
    provides for personal liability for those required to collect
    such excise taxes who willfully fail to transfer them to the
    federal government—because of the airline’s bankruptcy.
    The panel was unpersuaded by plaintiff’s contention that the
    airline’s funds were encumbered by its bankruptcy
    obligations, such that the failure to pay excise taxes was not
    willful. The panel also was unpersuaded by plaintiff’s
    contention that § 6672 liability does not apply to excise tax
    payments deferred under the Air Transportation Safety and
    System Stabilization Act, which gave airlines an opportunity
    to defer transfer of the third-quarter 2001 excise taxes for a
    few weeks in response to the terrorist attacks on September
    11, 2001, but did not amend plaintiff’s obligation to hold
    excise taxes in trust for the federal government under § 6672.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                       3
    COUNSEL
    Richard D. Salgado (argued) and Laura L. Gavioli, SNR
    Denton US LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Jennifer M. Rubin (argued) and Robert W. Metzler,
    Attorneys, and Kathryn Keneally, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    GRABER, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff Raymond T. Nakano served as Senior Vice
    President and Chief Financial Officer of National Airlines,
    Inc. (“National”), from its founding in 1995 until it filed for
    Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 2003. The Internal Revenue
    Service (“IRS”) assessed unpaid excise taxes against Plaintiff
    personally, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672. He then brought
    this civil action against the United States, pursuant to
    26 U.S.C. § 7422, for a refund of taxes erroneously assessed.
    The government filed a counterclaim for the unpaid balance
    of the tax assessments. The district court granted summary
    judgment to the government on both the claim and the
    counterclaim.
    In considering this timely appeal, we address two
    questions: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that
    Plaintiff’s failure to pay the excise taxes was “willful” within
    the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) despite the airline’s
    bankruptcy and (2) whether § 6672 liability applies to excise
    tax payments deferred under the Air Transportation Safety
    4                 NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    and System Stabilization Act (“Stabilization Act”), Pub. L.
    No. 107-42, § 301(a)(1) (2001). Reviewing those legal
    questions de novo, Ilko v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (In
    re Ilko), 
    651 F.3d 1049
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 2011) (order), we
    affirm. We hold that: (1) assets are “encumbered” for
    purposes of § 6672 only if “the taxpayer is legally obligated
    to use the funds for a purpose other than satisfying the
    preexisting employment tax liability and if that legal
    obligation is superior to the interest of the IRS in the funds,”
    Honey v. United States, 
    963 F.2d 1083
    , 1090 (8th Cir. 1992),
    a test that is not met here; and (2) the Stabilization Act does
    not “allow the airlines to use the excise taxes as working
    capital” and does not defeat trust status for unpaid excise
    taxes for purposes of personal liability under § 6672, Conway
    v. United States, 
    647 F.3d 228
    , 236 (5th Cir. 2011).
    Federal law requires all airlines to collect certain excise
    taxes from passengers and to remit those taxes, held in trust,
    to the federal government at quarterly intervals. 26 U.S.C.
    §§ 4261, 4291, 7501. The airline passengers have original
    liability for the excise taxes, but the airlines incur liability for
    the taxes if they fail to transfer the trust funds on time.
    Begier v. Comm’r, 
    496 U.S. 53
    , 55 (1990).
    National began flying passengers in 1999, but it did not
    report a profit for any year during its operation. The airline
    filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 6, 2000.
    Shortly before that filing, National mailed to the IRS its
    quarterly excise payment check for the third quarter of 2000,
    in the amount of $1,832,501.01. The IRS received and
    deposited the check but, before it could clear, National
    restructured its accounts under Chapter 11 rules, and the
    check was returned unpaid. National made no additional
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                      5
    efforts to pay the quarterly excise taxes, but it did begin to
    pay other excise taxes collected during the bankruptcy period.
    In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
    Congress passed the Stabilization Act. Among many other
    provisions, the Act gave airlines an opportunity to defer
    transfer of the third-quarter 2001 excise taxes for a few weeks
    after the usual due date. Stabilization Act § 301(a)(1). The
    Act included a grant of discretionary authority to the
    Secretary of the Treasury to further extend the third-quarter
    2001 and fourth-quarter 2001 excise tax due dates until
    January 15, 2002, an option that the Secretary exercised. 
    Id. § 301(a)(1)(A).
    The Act also provided that airlines could
    collect direct government grants. 
    Id. § 101(a).
    National
    received such a grant, in the amount of $21 million. It did not
    pay excise taxes during the deferral period.
    On January 15, 2002, the deadline set by the IRS to
    transfer excise taxes collected, National filed a return,
    without enclosing payment, and requested a six-month
    extension. National did not submit payment for those taxes
    after requesting the extension, but it did submit payments and
    returns for later quarters. On January 30, 2002, National
    again filed a return for fourth-quarter 2001 excise taxes, but
    again failed to submit any payment.
    Nine months later, National ceased operations and, on
    May 7, 2003, the airline converted its bankruptcy to Chapter
    7. On January 29, 2003, during Chapter 7 proceedings, the
    IRS demanded that National remit unpaid excise taxes in the
    amount of $11,572,151.91. Following an administrative
    appeal of an earlier assessment, the government reissued
    assessments against Plaintiff personally in the amounts of
    $148,325.00, $3,497,448.32, and $4,803,626.85, for the
    6                NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    taxable quarters ending September 30, 2000, September 30,
    2001, and December 31, 2001, respectively, plus statutory
    interest. Plaintiff paid a nominal amount of the assessments
    and then filed an administrative refund claim, which the IRS
    denied.
    Plaintiff then filed the present action in district court for
    recovery of taxes paid and an abatement of the amounts
    owing. The government counterclaimed for the amount
    owing and followed with a motion for summary judgment.
    Plaintiff moved to dismiss the government’s counterclaim.
    The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion, granted the
    government’s motion, and entered judgment for the
    government in the amount of $11,553,586.11, which
    represents the full amount due from all three quarters plus
    statutory interest through November 30, 2011.
    An individual can incur personal liability under 26 U.S.C.
    § 6672(a) for unpaid excise taxes:
    Any person required to collect, truthfully
    account for, and pay over any tax imposed by
    this title who willfully fails to collect such tax,
    or truthfully account for and pay over such
    tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to
    evade or defeat any such tax or the payment
    thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties
    provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
    to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not
    collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
    To impose personal liability, the statute requires that the
    individual (1) was “required to collect, truthfully account for,
    and pay over the withholding taxes” (commonly known as a
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                          7
    “responsible person”) and (2) “willfully failed to meet one or
    more of these obligations.” United States v. Sotelo, 
    436 U.S. 268
    , 274 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). In an
    action to collect taxes, the government bears the initial
    burden of proof. Oliver v. United States, 
    921 F.2d 916
    , 919
    (9th Cir. 1990). The government satisfies its burden by
    introducing evidence of the tax assessment under § 6672. 
    Id. The burden
    then shifts to the taxpayer to prove that he is not
    liable. 
    Id. On appeal,
    Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s
    finding that he is a “responsible person” for purposes of
    § 6672.1 But he does argue that his failure to pay over the
    excise taxes was not “willful” under the second prong of the
    Sotelo standard. In particular, Plaintiff asks us to adopt a rule
    that the element of willfulness under § 6672 cannot be
    satisfied by a failure to use “encumbered” funds to make
    excise tax payments, Elmore v. United States, 
    843 F.2d 1128
    ,
    1133–34 (8th Cir. 1988), and to hold that National’s
    bankruptcy obligations rendered all funds encumbered as a
    matter of law for the purpose of analyzing willfulness under
    § 6672.
    In general, “[w]illfulness, within the meaning of § 6672,
    has been defined as a voluntary, conscious and intentional act
    to prefer other creditors over the United States.” Davis v.
    United States, 
    961 F.2d 867
    , 871 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not dispute that his
    preference for other creditors was voluntary, conscious, and
    intentional. The failure to pay over the excise taxes was
    1
    Michael Conway, who was the founder, CEO, president, and chairman
    of the board of National did argue, unsuccessfully, that he was not a
    “responsible person.” 
    Conway, 647 F.3d at 232
    –34.
    8                NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    therefore “willful” unless Plaintiff’s legal argument prevails.
    It does not.
    We have yet to define what renders assets encumbered
    and thereby unavailable to support a finding of willful non-
    payment of excise taxes under § 6672. See Purcell v. United
    States, 
    1 F.3d 932
    , 938–39 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to reach
    the issue of what constitutes “encumbered funds” for § 6672
    purposes). Every other circuit to have addressed the issue has
    established a narrow rule that only a legal prohibition on the
    expenditure of funds renders the assets encumbered.
    The leading case to take this view is 
    Honey, 963 F.2d at 1089
    –90. There, the Eighth Circuit considered in detail what
    funds are “encumbered” and “unencumbered” in this context.
    The court examined the text of the statute, the sparse existing
    precedents, and especially the purpose of § 6672. 
    Id. The court
    concluded that the purpose of the statute is to ensure
    that the excise tax is paid and that the statute must be broadly
    construed to permit the government to reach those who are
    responsible for the corporation’s failure to pay the taxes
    owed. 
    Id. at 1090.
    The court distilled the applicable rule to
    the following: “funds are encumbered only where the
    taxpayer is legally obligated to use the funds for a purpose
    other than satisfying the preexisting employment tax liability
    and if that legal obligation is superior to the interest of the
    IRS in the funds.” 
    Id. Every other
    circuit to have considered the question agrees
    with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis and definition. See Bell v.
    United States, 
    355 F.3d 387
    , 394–95 (6th Cir. 2004)
    (adopting the Honey definition); United States v. Kim,
    
    111 F.3d 1351
    , 1359 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Barnett v.
    Comm’r, 
    988 F.2d 1449
    , 1458 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). In
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                         9
    Purcell, we noted a broader rule, offered by the Eastern
    District of Michigan Bankruptcy Court, that encompassed
    restrictions on assets imposed by a creditor, beyond those
    imposed by 
    law. 1 F.3d at 939
    (citing In re Premo, 
    116 B.R. 515
    , 535 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990)). But the Sixth Circuit
    has since rejected that rule and has adopted explicitly the
    Eighth Circuit’s narrower definition. 
    Bell, 355 F.3d at 395
    ;
    see also Huizinga v. United States, 
    68 F.3d 139
    , 145 (6th Cir.
    1995) (citing approvingly the Honey definition). We, too, are
    persuaded by Honey and now adopt the quoted test as our
    own.
    Applying that test, we conclude that Plaintiff failed to
    satisfy his burden to show that the assets he had at his
    disposal as a “responsible person” were “encumbered” and
    thereby unavailable to satisfy his obligations under § 6672.
    
    Purcell, 1 F.3d at 939
    . He argues that, because the excise
    taxes were post-Chapter 11 petition taxes, 11 U.S.C.
    § 503(b)(1)(A)–(B) mandates that operating expenses take
    priority over taxes due. We read the statute differently.
    Section 503(b)(1)(A)–(B), by its clear terms, mandates
    equally the payment of operating expenses and taxes.
    Operating expenses do not gain a higher priority. In short,
    the district court properly held that Plaintiff willfully failed to
    pay over excise taxes that he was obligated to pay as a
    responsible person.
    In addition to arguing that § 6672 liability was improperly
    applied to him, Plaintiff challenges the applicability of § 6672
    liability to all excise tax payments afforded a deferred due
    date under the Stabilization Act. He offers two theories.
    First, he contends that the Stabilization Act exempted
    implicitly the deferred excise taxes from § 6672 liability by
    directing that the collected taxes be used for other purposes,
    10              NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    thereby undermining the taxes’ status as funds held in trust.
    Second, Plaintiff relies on Slodov v. United States, 
    436 U.S. 238
    (1978), for the principle that § 6672 liability cannot apply
    where it would frustrate the purpose of a statute; in his view,
    Congress intended that the deferred funds be used for
    operational expenses. Neither theory avails Plaintiff.
    As a threshold matter, it bears noting that, although the
    Fifth Circuit was not presented with arguments identical to
    those offered by Plaintiff here, that court expressly applied
    § 6672 to excise tax payments that National deferred under
    the Stabilization Act and held National’s Chief Executive
    Officer personally liable under § 6672. Conway, 
    647 F.3d 228
    . Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that nothing in the
    Stabilization Act evinced a congressional intent to authorize
    the airlines to use the trust funds as working capital or to
    “render payment of the excise taxes beyond the ordinary
    course of business.” 
    Id. at 236.
    We see no reason to depart
    from the approach of our sister circuit.
    Ordinarily, excise taxes collected by a carrier on behalf of
    the government are held in trust, and the funds cannot be used
    by the carrier for any other purpose. See 
    Begier, 496 U.S. at 55
    –56 (“Because the amount of these taxes is ‘held to be a
    special fund in trust for the United States,’ [26 U.S.C.]
    § 7501, they are often called ‘trust-fund taxes.’”). The carrier
    incurs liability for the trust fund taxes because, once the
    carrier collects them, the taxes are credited as paid by the
    passenger. See 
    Slodov, 436 U.S. at 242
    –45 (describing third-
    party collector liability in the context of employment taxes
    held in trust). Without recourse to the third-party collector,
    the government would have no means to collect the taxes due.
    
    Id. at 243.
    The carrier is then obligated to pay over those
    taxes to the government on regular intervals or risk, among
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                        11
    other forms of liability, personal liability for its officers under
    § 6672. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4261(d), 4263(d), 4291.
    Out of concern for the airline industry following the
    tragedy on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the
    Stabilization Act, which extended the due date for excise tax
    deposits as follows:
    SEC. 301. EXTENSION OF DUE DATE
    F O R E X C IS E T A X D E P O S IT S ;
    TREATMENT OF LOSS COMPENSATION
    (a) EXTENSION OF DUE DATE FOR
    EXCISE TAX DEPOSITS.—
    (1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an
    eligible air carrier, any airline-related deposit
    required under section 6302 of the Internal
    Revenue Code of 1986 to be made after
    September 10, 2001, and before November
    15, 2001, shall be treated for purposes of such
    Code as timely made if such deposit is made
    on or before November 15, 2001. If the
    Secretary of the Treasury so prescribes, the
    preceding sentence shall be applied by
    substituting for “November 15, 2001” each
    place where it appears—
    (A) “January 15, 2002”; or
    (B) such earlier date after November
    15, 2001, as such Secretary may prescribe.
    12              NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    Stabilization Act § 301(a)(1). With that text, Congress
    passed, and the President signed into law, a mandatory
    deferral of carriers’ quarterly excise tax due date from on or
    after September 11, 2001, until November 15, 2001, or until
    January 15, 2002, at the discretion of the Secretary of the
    Treasury. 
    Id. Plaintiff contends
    that this Act rendered the
    deferred payments not trust funds under 26 U.S.C. § 7501
    and, therefore, not subject to § 6672 liability.
    “The starting point in discerning congressional intent is
    the existing statutory text . . . . It is well established that
    when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the
    courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is
    not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Lamie v.
    U.S. Tr., 
    540 U.S. 526
    , 534 (2004) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). “The plain meaning of a statute is
    always controlling unless that meaning would lead to absurd
    results.” SEC v. McCarthy, 
    322 F.3d 650
    , 655 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). It is only when statutory
    terms are ambiguous, that is, open to more than one plausible
    interpretation, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 
    534 U.S. 84
    , 90 (2001), that courts may look to legislative history,
    
    McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 655
    .
    The text of the law provides no support for the theory that
    Congress intended the Stabilization Act to strip trust status
    from collected excise taxes. As the unambiguous statute
    makes clear, it was enacted simply to authorize a short
    mandatory deferral, plus the possibility of a four-month
    discretionary deferral upon approval by the Secretary of the
    Treasury. Nothing in the text of the statute addresses the
    possibility that the trust funds could be used for other
    purposes or that Congress intended to repeal 26 U.S.C.
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                          13
    § 7501.2 See Branch v. Smith, 
    538 U.S. 254
    , 273 (2003) (“An
    implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two
    statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act
    covers the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly
    intended as a substitute.’”). An amendment to § 6672 to
    suspend personal liability for the deferred payments cannot be
    made by implication. Reg’l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 
    419 U.S. 102
    , 133–34 (1974). Moreover, there is no conflict, let alone
    an irreconcilable conflict, between a provision deferring for
    two to four months a particular payment and the trust status
    of the deferred funds.
    Indeed, Plaintiff makes no textual argument to support his
    theory that the Stabilization Act amended implicitly
    Plaintiff’s trust obligations for § 6672 purposes. Nor does he
    suggest that the text is ambiguous. Rather, citing United
    States v. Champlin Refining Co., 
    341 U.S. 290
    , 298 (1951),
    he contends that the only reasonable purpose for the
    Stabilization Act deferral was to make those funds available
    for operating expenses and that to hold otherwise would
    render the Act wholly without purpose, in contravention of
    basic principles of statutory interpretation. Plaintiff relies on
    2
    Title 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a) provides:
    Whenever any person is required to collect or
    withhold any internal revenue tax from any other
    person and to pay over such tax to the United States,
    the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held
    to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The
    amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and
    paid in the same manner and subject to the same
    provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are
    applicable with respect to the taxes from which such
    fund arose.
    14              NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    two sources to support his assertion. Neither helps him, even
    assuming that we may look past the text to legislative history.
    First, Plaintiff cites a few minor comments from the
    House floor debates to the effect that the Act was intended to
    keep airlines in operation. Those comments, though,
    addressed the Act generally and did not reference even
    indirectly the excise tax deferral provision.
    Second, Plaintiff cites a news article from the
    Philadelphia Inquirer in which carriers suggested that a
    deferral of the due date for excise taxes would mean that the
    funds could be used for daily operating expenses. But that
    article sheds no light on congressional purpose. Not only did
    the article contain only the carriers’ view, but it post-dated
    the enactment of the statute in question.
    Nor is Plaintiff correct as a matter of common sense,
    which he urges us to employ. There are other reasons,
    besides freeing funds for daily operating expenses, why
    Congress could have enacted the deferral. For example, as
    the district court noted, Congress could simply have intended
    to allow carriers to enjoy the time value of money. That
    concept encompasses not only the receipt of interest on the
    deferred payments, but also the ability to hold the funds to
    increase cash reserves. Larger cash reserves could make a
    company appear less risky and therefore more attractive to
    investors.
    In short, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that we need not
    examine legislative history, because the statute is clear.
    
    Conway, 647 F.3d at 236
    . But no matter how far we pursue
    Plaintiff’s argument, we do not share his view that Congress
    meant a very small benefit (a short delay in paying one or two
    NAKANO V. UNITED STATES                      15
    quarters of excise taxes) to signal a massive change in the
    fundamentals of the long-standing statutory operation of
    excise taxes. Congress’ only discernable purpose was simply
    to provide a brief deferral for carriers’ excise tax payments.
    Interpreting the deferral provision of the Stabilization Act to
    serve only that small purpose satisfies any obligation we
    might have under Champlin Refining 
    Co., 341 U.S. at 298
    .
    Plaintiff’s final argument is that the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Slodov, 
    436 U.S. 238
    , precludes application of
    § 6672 liability to the deferred tax payments because doing so
    would frustrate congressional purpose. We disagree for two
    reasons. First, the situation here is not like the one that the
    Supreme Court considered. Second, the rule in Slodov rested
    narrowly on statutory text.
    In Slodov, a new owner had taken control of a business
    after the previous management had dissipated all liquid
    assets, including the collected taxes that have trust status
    under 26 U.S.C. § 
    7501. 436 U.S. at 240
    –41. The Supreme
    Court held that § 7501 trust status did not “impress a trust on
    after-acquired funds.” 
    Id. at 259.
    Because the after-acquired
    funds were not trust funds under § 7501, the new owner did
    not incur § 6672 liability for failing to pay over the funds. 
    Id. at 259–60.
    By contrast, here, Plaintiff himself dissipated the collected
    excise taxes held in trust under § 7501. Thus, Slodov does
    not support a conclusion that the funds were no longer trust
    funds at the time of dissipation. As we held in Davis, the
    Slodov rule does not apply to existing management. 
    Davis, 961 F.2d at 872
    –73.
    16              NAKANO V. UNITED STATES
    In addition, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the Court’s
    holding was grounded in the plain text of § 7501, 
    Slodov, 436 U.S. at 255
    –56 (recognizing that the text of § 7501
    applied to funds “collected” or “withheld” in the past tense
    and did not address the status of later-acquired funds). The
    Court did not establish a broader rule that § 6672 liability
    cannot apply whenever it might appear to frustrate the
    administration of a separate regulatory scheme.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-18013

Citation Numbers: 742 F.3d 1208

Judges: Diarmuid, Graber, Jacqueline, Nguyen, O'Scannlain, Susan

Filed Date: 2/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023

Authorities (20)

Conway v. United States , 647 F.3d 228 ( 2011 )

Richard D. Barnett v. Internal Revenue Service , 988 F.2d 1449 ( 1993 )

charles-l-honey-v-united-states-of-america-united-states-of-america , 963 F.2d 1083 ( 1992 )

Andrew G. Huizinga v. United States of America, & ... , 68 F.3d 139 ( 1995 )

Roxanne Bell v. United States , 355 F.3d 387 ( 2004 )

United States v. Moon H. Kim , 111 F.3d 1351 ( 1997 )

In Re Premo , 116 B.R. 515 ( 1990 )

Joseph F. Purcell, Plaintiff-Counter-Claim-Defendant-... , 1 F.3d 932 ( 1993 )

Dan O. Davis, Plaintiff-Counter-Claim-Defendant-Appellant v.... , 961 F.2d 867 ( 1992 )

Ilko v. California State Board of Equalization (In Re Ilko) , 651 F.3d 1049 ( 2011 )

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kevin Michael ... , 322 F.3d 650 ( 2003 )

Begier v. Internal Revenue Service , 110 S. Ct. 2258 ( 1990 )

Calvin F. Elmore v. United States , 843 F.2d 1128 ( 1988 )

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases , 95 S. Ct. 335 ( 1974 )

United States v. Champlin Refining Co. , 71 S. Ct. 715 ( 1951 )

Slodov v. United States , 98 S. Ct. 1778 ( 1978 )

United States v. Sotelo , 98 S. Ct. 1795 ( 1978 )

Chickasaw Nation v. United States , 122 S. Ct. 528 ( 2001 )

Branch v. Smith , 123 S. Ct. 1429 ( 2003 )

Lamie v. United States Trustee , 124 S. Ct. 1023 ( 2004 )

View All Authorities »