C. Q. v. River Springs Charter Schools ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
C. Q., a minor, by and through Guardians No. 18-55779
Ad Litem Saku Quezada and Pablo
Quezada, D.C. No.
5:18-cv-01017-SJO-SHK
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM *
RIVER SPRINGS CHARTER SCHOOLS, a
California Local Education Agency,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and BEA, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE,** District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant River Springs Charter Schools (“River Springs”)
informed Plaintiff-Appellee C.Q. (“C.Q.”) that River Springs would transfer her to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
a different school during spring break of her current semester. C.Q. qualifies for
protection under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and filed a motion with the state administrative agency
requesting an order to stay put at the school she was currently attending, Prentice.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (students entitled to stay-put at then-current educational
setting while legal dispute proceeds). After the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
denied C.Q.’s motion and failed to determine C.Q.’s then-current educational
setting, C.Q. filed a complaint in the district court and motion for preliminary
injunctive relief requesting Prentice as her stay-put placement. The district court
conducted a de novo review of the issue and granted C.Q.’s motion. River Springs
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse
of discretion. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citing Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)). A
district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal
standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577
F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1052). Thus,
application of an incorrect legal standard in granting preliminary injunctive relief
or with regard to an underlying issue is grounds for reversal. See Earth Island Inst.
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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In this case, River Springs argues that the district court applied an incorrect
legal standard by conducting a de novo review instead of implementing the
traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief, which requires the
plaintiff to establish that: (1) she “is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) she “is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the
balance of equities tips in [her] favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). While
district courts throughout this circuit have applied both the de novo standard and
the traditional four-factor test, this court has yet to consider the issue of the
appropriate standard of review when an ALJ fails to determine a student’s stay-put
placement.
Upon review of the record, we find no need to answer this standard of
review question because, even under the more stringent four-factor test, we find
that C.Q. has met her burden to establish that preliminary injunctive relief was
warranted. We find that C.Q. was likely to succeed on the merits because Prentice
was the only rational then-current placement. The homeschool program was not a
nonpublic school as required by the IEP, and C.Q. was not currently enrolled in a
homeschool program when River Springs proposed the transfer to Flabob.
Similarly, Flabob was not an available alternative because C.Q. was not currently
attending Flabob. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in eliminating
3 18-55779
the homeschool alternative and Flabob and concluding that Prentice was C.Q.’s
then-current placement.
Furthermore, the other three factors weigh in favor of preliminary relief. We
agree with the district court that C.Q. would suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of relief because River Springs intended to transfer her to a new school in the
middle of the current semester causing an immediate disruption in her education.
The balance of hardships tips in C.Q.’s favor, and the public has an interest in
maintaining a child’s then-current educational environment while the parties
litigate the disputed transfer. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s issuance of
the injunction.
AFFIRMED.
4 18-55779
FILED
C.Q. v. River Springs Charter Schools, Case No. 18-55779
JUN 12 2019
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the result reached by the majority because, and only because, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on out-of-circuit authority to support her
decision regarding the effect of a temporary placement on the “stay-put”
determination. In the absence of binding authority supporting the ALJ’s
conclusion, I am unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
granting injunctive relief. See Johnson ex. rel. Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing
Office, 287 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a district court abuses its
discretion when it commits an error of law).
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