Holcomb v. New Castle Financial Group, Inc. , 375 F. App'x 775 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               APR 14 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In the Matter of:                      )     No. 07-56630
    SCOTT P. HOLCOMB,                      )
    )     D.C. No. CV-07-00206-ODW
    Debtor.                          )
    )     MEMORANDUM*
    )
    SCOTT P. HOLCOMB, doing                )
    business as Holcomb Enterprises,       )
    )
    Appellant,                       )
    )
    v.                               )
    )
    NEW CASTLE FINANCIAL                   )
    GROUP, INC.,                           )
    )
    Appellee.                        )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 6, 2010**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
    argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before:        FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    Scott P. Holcomb appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy
    court’s decision that Holcomb was not entitled to discharge of his debt to New
    Castle Financial Group, Inc. See 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(2)(B). We affirm.
    (1)      Holcomb first asserts that the bankruptcy court erred when it
    considered evidence that went to issues which were not properly before it because
    they were not covered by the Pretrial Order. Pretrial orders do control the course
    of proceedings,1 but they are not given a crabbed interpretation.2 The evidence in
    question was actually listed in the Pretrial Order, was admissible on the issues of
    reasonable reliance, intent, and credibility, and did not result in improper prejudice
    to Holcomb. The bankruptcy court did not err.
    (2)      Holcomb then asserts that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy New
    Castle’s burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence3 that he was not
    entitled to his discharge. That, he says, is because the elements of 
    11 U.S.C. § 1
    See El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 
    415 F.3d 1068
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2005).
    2
    See First Card v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 
    238 F.3d 1098
    , 1101–02 (9th Cir.
    2001).
    3
    See Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 
    90 F.3d 1466
    , 1469
    (9th Cir. 1996); La Trattoria, Inc. v. Lansford (In re Lansford), 
    822 F.2d 902
    , 904
    (9th Cir. 1987).
    2
    523(a)(2)(B) were not shown.4 He claims that the bankruptcy court’s factual
    determinations to the contrary were clearly erroneous. See Greene v. Savage (In re
    Greene), 
    583 F.3d 614
    , 618 (9th Cir. 2009); Cooper v. Allustiarte (In re
    Allustiarte), 
    786 F.2d 910
    , 917 (9th Cir. 1986). We disagree.
    On this record, the evidence was sufficient to support the findings that
    Holcomb tendered a written financial statement to New Castle,5 respecting his
    financial condition;6 that the statement was materially false;7 that under all of the
    circumstances (including his failure to mention his just filed bankruptcy petition)
    his intent was to deceive New Castle;8 and that New Castle reasonably relied9 upon
    that statement when it advanced Holcomb credit. As to the latter element, we note
    that while New Castle could undoubtedly have been more wary and done more
    4
    See In re Candland, 
    90 F.3d at 1469
    ; In re Lansford, 
    822 F.2d at 904
    .
    5
    
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(2)(B).
    6
    
    Id.
     § 523(a)(2)(B)(ii).
    7
    Id. § 523(a)(2)(B)(i).
    8
    See Khalil v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. (In re Khalil), 
    578 F.3d 1167
    ,
    1169 (9th Cir. 2009); Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 
    108 F.3d 1015
    , 1018
    (9th Cir. 1997); Pub. Fin. Corp. of Redlands v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 
    514 F.2d 1370
    , 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1975).
    9
    The totality of the circumstances supports that determination. See In re
    Candland, 
    90 F.3d at 1471
    ; see also Cashco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. McGee (In re
    McGee), 
    359 B.R. 764
    , 774 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006).
    3
    investigation, Holcomb clearly knew that the information regarding his financial
    condition was important to New Castle,10 and it was not at all obvious that
    Holcomb was in great financial difficulty.11
    AFFIRMED.
    10
    See In re Lansford, 
    822 F.2d at 904
    .
    11
    In fact, there were no real difficulties with a prior transaction. Cf. Kentile
    Floors, Inc. v. Winham, 
    440 F.2d 1128
    , 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1971) (more
    investigation needed when creditor had a great deal of information suggesting
    debtor distress).
    4