Williams v. Franklin Towers Homeowners Association Inc. , 386 F. App'x 609 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JUL 06 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In the Matter of: G. GREGORY                     No. 08-55109
    WILLIAMS,
    D.C. No. CV-07-06720-ABC
    Debtor,
    MEMORANDUM *
    G. GREGORY WILLIAMS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    FRANKLIN TOWERS HOMEOWNERS
    ASSOCIATION INC.; et al.,
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Audrey B. Collins, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 29, 2010 **
    Before:        ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    G. Gregory Williams, a Chapter 13 debtor, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his appeal from the
    bankruptcy court’s November 29, 2004, and November 30, 2004, orders. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo jurisdictional issues and
    the district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court. Mantz v. Cal. State
    Bd. of Equalization (In re Mantz), 
    343 F.3d 1207
    , 1211 (9th Cir. 2003). We may
    affirm on any ground supported by the record. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr.,
    
    502 F.3d 1056
    , 1059. We affirm.
    Williams’ challenge to the bankruptcy court’s recusal order is barred by the
    law of the case doctrine. See Williams v. Gordon, Gaumer, Bovshow, Levi Estates,
    LLC (In re Williams), Case No. 06-55435, 234 F. App’x 741, 741-42 (9th Cir.
    2007) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying recusal); Merritt v. Mackey,
    
    932 F.2d 1317
    , 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (under the law of the case doctrine, one panel
    of an appellate court will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided
    on a prior appeal in the same case).
    As we held previously, In re Williams, 234 F. App’x at 741-42, we lack
    jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s remand order, see Things
    Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 
    516 U.S. 124
    , 128-29 (1995) (court of appeals does
    2                                    08-55109
    not have jurisdiction to review a bankruptcy court’s order remanding a case to state
    court).
    The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to review orders issued in state court proceedings. See Reusser v.
    Wachovia Bank, N.A, 
    525 F.3d 855
    , 858-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from
    exercising appellate review over final state court judgments.”); Dubinka v. Judges
    of Sup. Ct., 
    23 F.3d 218
    , 221 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Federal district courts may exercise
    only original jurisdiction; they may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state
    court decisions.”).
    We reject Williams’ remaining contentions.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    08-55109