Perry v. Chase Auto Finance (In Re Perry) ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 13 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: AVRAM MOSHE PERRY, No. 09-60052
Debtor. BAP No. 09-1135-PaHMo
AVRAM MOSHE PERRY, MEMORANDUM *
Appellant,
v.
CHASE AUTO FINANCE,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Pappas, Hollowell, and Montali, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2012 **
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Perry’s request
for oral argument is denied.
Avram Moshe Perry, a Chapter 7 debtor, appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to
abstain from considering Perry’s state law claims, and dismissing as moot Perry’s
appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order denying Perry injunctive relief and granting
Chase Auto Finance stay relief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s abstention decision.
Siragusa v. Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1994). We
review de novo the BAP’s mootness determination. Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm.
Sys., Inc. v. Stanley (In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc.), 152 F.3d 1178,
1180 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from
deciding Perry’s unlawful repossession claims because Perry filed a nearly
identical action for the repossession which was pending in state court. See In re
Siragusa, 27 F.3d at 408-09; see also Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enters., Inc. (In re
Conejo Enters. Inc.), 96 F.3d 346, 351 (9th Cir. 1996) (bankruptcy court’s
discretionary decision will be reversed only if based on legal error or if the record
contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have based that decision).
The BAP properly concluded that Perry’s appeal of the denial of injunctive
relief and grant of relief from the automatic stay was moot because the car had
2 09-60052
been sold to a third party purchaser and effective relief could no longer be granted.
See In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1179-81 (affirming
dismissal of appeal on constitutional mootness grounds where property at issue
was sold and court could not grant effective relief).
Perry’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 09-60052