Roderick McBroom v. David Reaves , 472 F. App'x 808 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             APR 27 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THOMAS G. JUNGHANS; RODERICK                     No. 10-17190
    R. McBROOM,
    D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00375-ROS
    Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    DAVID M. REAVES, Chapter 7 Trustee,
    Appellee,
    12 PERCENT FUND I LLC; COYOTE
    GROWTH MANAGEMENT LLC,
    Debtors - Appellees.
    RODERICK R. McBROOM; THOMAS                      No. 11-15988
    G. JUNGHANS,
    D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00375-ROS
    Appellants,
    v.
    DAVID M. REAVES, Chapter 7 Trustee,
    Appellee,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    12 PERCENT FUND I LLC; COYOTE
    GROWTH MANAGEMENT LLC,
    Debtors - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Roslyn O. Silver, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 17, 2012 **
    Before:        LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    In these consolidated appeals, Roderick R. McBroom and Thomas G.
    Junghans appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy
    court’s judgment allowing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid their judgment liens
    against estate property. They also appeal from the district court’s order denying
    their motion for a stay pending appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 158(d). We review independently the bankruptcy court’s decision, without
    deference to the district court’s determinations. Leichty v. Neary (In re Strand),
    
    375 F.3d 854
    , 857 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm No. 11-15988 and dismiss No. 10-
    17190.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2                                    10-17190
    Appeal No. 11-15988
    The bankruptcy court properly concluded that, regardless of whether
    Arizona or Colorado law applies, appellants’ judgment liens do not relate back to
    the filing of the notices of lis pendens and instead were recorded within 90 days of
    the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, and, thus, the judgment liens were properly
    subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). See Hurst Concrete Prods., Inc. v.
    Lane (In re Lane), 
    980 F.2d 601
    , 604-06 (9th Cir. 1992) (under California’s lis
    pendens statute, judgment relates back to the date of the recording of lis pendens
    only if the judgment is entered upon those specific claims asserting any interest in
    the real property); Tucson Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
    729 P.2d 954
    , 957 (Ariz.
    Ct. App. 1986) (Arizona lis pendens statute was taken from California’s lis
    pendens statute); Perry Park Country Club, Inc. v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 
    813 P.2d 841
    , 843-44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (when claims affecting rights in real property
    are lost, any corresponding lis pendens expires).
    Appeal No. 10-17190
    Appellants appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for a
    stay pending their appeal of the bankruptcy court’s judgment. Because we have
    resolved that appeal, there is no longer need for any stay and, thus, this appeal is
    dismissed as moot. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 
    167 F.3d 514
    , 521 (9th
    3                                    10-17190
    Cir. 1999) (“If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for
    his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”).
    AFFIRMED AND DISMISSED.
    Appeal No. 11-15988: AFFIRMED.
    Appeal No. 10-17190: DISMISSED.
    4                                     10-17190