Aguiluz v. Jaffe (In Re Aguiluz) ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: HEROICO MARTIN AGUILUZ, No. 11-60050
Debtor, BAP No. 10-1411
HEROICO MARTIN AGUILUZ, MEMORANDUM *
Appellant,
v.
HOWARD M. JAFFE,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Markell, Kirscher, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted February 7, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Debtor Heroico Aguiluz appeals a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting summary judgment
to judgment creditor Howard Jaffe on Jaffe’s complaint to determine
dischargeability. The bankruptcy court found that nine monetary sanctions
imposed on Aguiluz for discovery violations in two state court actions were
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because they arose from Aguiluz’s
“willful and malicious injury” to Jaffe. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
158(d), and we affirm.
The bankruptcy court’s order declaring the sanctions debt nondischargeable
was not moot on account of the bankruptcy court’s previous order discharging
Aguiluz from bankruptcy. By statute and by its express terms, the discharge order
was subject to Jaffe’s pending complaint to determine dischargeability. See 11
U.S.C. § 727(b).
To the extent Aguiluz challenges the transfer of the adversary proceeding
from Judge Bufford to Judge Carroll, case assignment decisions are “matter[s] of
judicial administration committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Cruz v.
Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987). Transfer of Judge Bufford’s calendar
to some other judge was inevitable on account of Judge Bufford’s imminent
retirement, and the transfer of all of Judge Bufford’s chapter 7 cases to Judge
2
Carroll was an unbiased method of reassignment that was well within the
bankruptcy court’s discretion.
Although a BAP member “may not hear an appeal originating in the district
for which such member is appointed or designated,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5), that
was not the case here. Aguiluz’s appeal originates from the Central District of
California. Each of the three BAP judges in this case was appointed to another
judicial district. Hon. Bruce A. Markell is a bankruptcy judge for the District of
Nevada. Hon. Ralph B. Kirscher is the chief bankruptcy judge for the District of
Montana. Hon. Randall L. Dunn is a bankruptcy judge for the District of Oregon.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguiluz’s
motion for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings. Aguiluz offered
no evidence showing that the sanctions debt had been paid and failed to explain
why he could not have presented such evidence in a timely manner. The
bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that Aguiluz failed to show the requisite
diligence. See Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.
2008).
The bankruptcy court properly granted Jaffe’s motion for summary
judgment—both on the ground of collateral estoppel, see Papadakis v. Zelis (In re
3
Zelis), 66 F.3d 205, 208–09 (9th Cir. 1995), and because Aguiluz raised no
genuine issue of material fact in opposition to the motion.
Aguiluz lacks standing to challenge the BAP’s refusal to publish its
disposition affirming the bankruptcy court. He fails to allege any personal injury
that is fairly traceable to the disposition remaining unpublished and that is likely to
be redressed by its publication. See Pub. Lands for the People, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 697 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
AFFIRMED.
4