Regulo Sierra v. Janina Hoskins , 530 F. App'x 619 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REGULO SIERRA, No. 12-15047
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-03630-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JANINA M. HOSKINS, Chapter 11
Trustee in Bankruptcy,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013 **
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Regulo Sierra appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the
bankruptcy court’s order sustaining the trustee’s objections to Sierra’s claim and
disallowing the claim in its entirety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Sierra’s
request for oral argument is denied.
We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court.
Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d
1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Sierra could not assert a secured
claim as the property allegedly securing the debt had been abandoned by the
bankruptcy trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (stating that secured claim is one
“secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest” (emphasis
added)); see also Catalano v. Comm’r., 279 F.3d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[Abandonment] is the formal relinquishment of the property at issue from the
bankruptcy estate. Upon abandonment, the debtor’s interest in the property is
restored nunc pro tunc as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.”). To the extent
Sierra contends that the trustee’s abandonment of the property is ineffective
because of a lack of notice, this argument is waived. See Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. v. Hoopai (In re Hoopai), 581 F.3d 1090, 1099 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding an argument waived where appellant did not raise it to the bankruptcy
court).
Disallowance of Sierra’s unsecured claim based on his alleged
disproportionate payment of the property’s common expenses was proper because
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Sierra failed to support the claim. See In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424, 437 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. 2005) (“If the creditor does not provide information or is unable to support
its claim, then that in itself may raise an evidentiary basis to object to the
unsupported aspects of the claim . . . thereby coming within Section 502(b)’s
grounds to disallow the claim.”).
We do not address Sierra’s due process, separation of powers, illegal
takings, or elder abuse arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v.
Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will not consider arguments
that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).
The trustee’s motion to take judicial notice, filed on May 31, 2012, is
granted.
AFFIRMED.
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