Jeffrey Clark v. Martin Strand , 556 F. App'x 656 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 25 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: JEFFREY A. CLARK; No. 12-60051
JODENE M. CLARK,
BAP No. 11-1322
Debtors,
JEFFREY A. CLARK; MEMORANDUM*
JODENE M. CLARK,
Appellants,
v.
MARTIN STRAND;
GABRIELLE STRAND,
Appellees,
UST- UNITED STATES TRUSTEE,
SAN FERNANDO,
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kirscher, Hollowell, and Markell, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2014
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: SCHROEDER and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and COGAN, District
Judge.**
Jeffrey and Jodene Clark appeal from a decision by the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel reversing an order by the bankruptcy court denying a motion by
Martin and Gabrielle Strand to reopen the Clarks’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. We
affirm the BAP decision.
This Court conducts de novo review of a BAP decision. In re Burnett, 435
F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2002). This means that we review the bankruptcy court’s
denial of a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case for abuse of discretion. In re
DeVille, 361 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Weiner, 161 F.3d 1216, 1217 (9th
Cir. 1998).
The BAP was correct that the bankruptcy court applied the wrong standard
to the motion to reopen. “[R]eopening a case is typically ministerial and presents
only a ‘narrow range of issues.’” In re Lopez, 283 B.R. 22, 26 (9th Cir. BAP 2002)
(quoting In re Menk, 241 B.R. 896, 916-17 (9th Cir. BAP 1999)). Inquiries into
the merits of the underlying claim are inappropriate. Staffer v. Predovich (In re
Staffer), 306 F.3d 967, 972 (9th Cir. 2002).
**
The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2
The basis upon which the bankruptcy court concluded that the Strands
lacked standing was not entirely clear. At the outset of the hearing, the court stated
that the Strands lacked standing because they had dismissed their claim in state
court, but as the BAP decision explained, that dismissal was without prejudice and
did not extinguish their claim. The Clarks have offered other arguments why they
believe the Strands should not be treated as a “party in interest” under Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 5010, such as that the claim is barred by laches or the running of the
limitations period, but no court has adjudicated those arguments. The Clarks might
be right in arguing that the Strands’ claims are barred or lack merit, but such an
inquiry is inappropriate at this stage. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060,
1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[t]he jurisdictional question of standing precedes, and does
not require, analysis of the merits”).
Each side shall bear its own costs of appeal.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED.
3