Ashurst Land & Cattle, LLC v. Rancho Mountain Properties, Inc. , 609 F. App'x 500 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                JUL 14 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ASHURST LAND AND CATTLE, LLC;                    No. 13-56204
    et al.,
    D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01328-BEN-
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,           BLM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    RANCHO MOUNTAIN PROPERTIES,
    INC., a Delaware corporation; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    DOES, 1 through 100 and FIDELITY
    NATIONAL TITLE CORPORATION, a
    Nebraska corporation,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Submitted July 9, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    Ashurst Land and Cattle, LLC, Ray Gray, and Linda Gray (“Plaintiffs”)
    appeal the district court’s order granting defendant Rancho Mountain Properties,
    Inc.’s (“Rancho”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Reviewing the
    district court’s order de novo, see Andersen v. DHL Ret. Pension Plan, 
    766 F.3d 1205
    , 1210 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm.
    1. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs lack standing to raise
    the alleged unlawful foreclosure claims, as such claims are exclusive property of
    the bankruptcy estate. “[T]he bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with
    the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate.” Estate of Spirtos v. Superior
    Court, 
    443 F.3d 1172
    , 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also 
    11 U.S.C. § 323
    (b). Also, all claims arising out of the Ashurst Ranch property were released
    by the bankruptcy trustee in its settlement agreement with Rancho, and so may no
    longer be litigated.
    2. Acknowledging they lack standing to bring claims arising from the
    alleged foreclosure as to any real property, Plaintiffs contend that they should be
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    granted leave to amend their complaint to raise claims relating to personal property
    at Ashurst Ranch. “Dismissal without leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion.” Loos v. Immersion Corp., 
    762 F.3d 880
    , 886 (9th Cir. 2014). “Five
    factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to
    amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of
    amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”
    Johnson v. Buckley, 
    356 F.3d 1067
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims
    with prejudice. Although leave to amend is to be given liberally, there is
    considerable evidence suggesting that Plaintiffs brought this action, which has
    heretofore centered on the real property, in bad faith, and that the ensuing
    uncertainty regarding Ashurst Ranch’s legal status has caused significant delay and
    prejudice to Rancho. Moreover, Plaintiffs were already afforded an opportunity to
    amend their complaint. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 
    552 F.3d 981
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave
    to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to [his]
    claims, the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    3
    Finally, any amendments would likely be futile. Plaintiffs do not explain
    specifically how they would plausibly amend the complaint to confer standing. In
    response to Rancho’s argument that it conducted a “unified foreclosure sale,” in
    which Rancho took ownership of all real and personal property on Ashurst Ranch,
    Plaintiffs simply assert, without any further factual representations, that Pfau, Pfau
    & Pfau, LLC, the subject of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, “did not own
    the personal property at issue.” Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not respond to Rancho’s
    arguments that, even if they had standing, they fail to state a claim for ten of their
    thirteen causes of action. That Plaintiffs do not “propose any specific allegations
    that might rectify their failure . . . demonstrat[es] [] their inability . . . to make the
    necessary amendment.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 
    656 F.3d 1002
    ,
    1008 (9th Cir. 2011).
    In sum, all of the factors counsel against granting Plaintiffs leave to amend
    in this case.
    AFFIRMED.
    4