United States v. Christin Didier ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 02 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30060
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
9:12-cr-00036-DWM-1
v.
CHRISTIN DIANNE DIDIER, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 29, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable David A. Ezra, Senior United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
Defendant-Appellant Christin Dianne Didier was convicted by a jury of her
peers for seven counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count
of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court
sentenced Didier to pay $213,163.25 in restitution. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution. United
States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the restitution order
itself for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.
2004). We affirm.
1. The district court did not err in ordering Didier to pay restitution. Didier,
through fraud, committed a crime against property, and caused losses to a victim:
Pacific Indemnity Company, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies (“Chubb”). The
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, “requires a district
court, in sentencing a defendant convicted of . . . an offense against property
committed by fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), to order restitution to each
victim ‘in the full amount of each victim’s losses.’” United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d
1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)).
2. The district court did not err in determining that the civil settlement agreement
Didier and Chubb signed pursuant to a bankruptcy suit, releasing each party from
liability, did not absolve Didier of any obligation to pay criminal restitution. A civil
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release of liability does not preclude further criminal liability for an offense, and civil
settlements and criminal restitution orders serve largely different interests. Rizk, 660
F.3d at 1136–37. For example, a bankruptcy settlement allows “the trustee and the
creditors to avoid the expenses and burdens associated with litigating sharply
contested and dubious claims,” United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d 1377, 1380–81 (9th Cir. 1986)),
whereas “a purpose of criminal restitution is to penalize,” Rizk, 660 F.3d at 1137, and
to make the victim whole. See United States v. Nosal, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 3608752,
at *17 (9th Cir. 2016).
3. The district court did not err when it included in the restitution order the
investigative costs and attorney’s fees Chubb expended to investigate Didier’s fraud.
The inclusion of such costs is not an abuse of discretion, so long as the costs are a
“‘direct and foreseeable result’ of the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” Gordon, 393
F.3d at 1057 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 863 (9th Cir. 2004)),
and are reasonably spent to determine the extent of the crime. See United States v.
Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 556–59 (9th Cir. 2008) (vacating restitution award and
remanding for determination that investigative costs and attorney’s fees were incurred
in aid of the investigation rather than to impermissibly shield others from
prosecution). Chubb’s investigative costs, which included inspections, travel,
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personnel costs, and attorney’s fees, were reasonably spent to determine the extent of
its losses, and were incurred as a direct result of Didier’s fraudulent conduct.
4. Didier makes a cursory argument that any restitution payments she is required
to make should be paid to the Crime Victim’s Fund rather than to Chubb. Chubb was
not compensated by the Crime Victim’s Fund for Didier’s fraud, and this argument
is not supported by legal authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) (authorizing restitution
payments to a third party only where: (1) the third party directly compensated the
victim for crime-related losses; and (2) the victim has received full compensation).
AFFIRMED.
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