Young v. Commissioner of Social Security , 594 F. App'x 914 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 05 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RANDY D. YOUNG, No. 12-17132
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01283-CMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Craig Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 3, 2014**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, NELSON, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Randy Young appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for disability
insurance benefits and for supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
We review the district court’s order de novo. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We may set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Id.
Young contends that the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) residual
functional capacity (RFC) finding was not supported by substantial evidence and
did not properly account for his mental and physical limitations. The ALJ’s
determination that Young had the RFC “to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels that involve simple routine tasks that have no frequent dealings
with the public and do not require good reading and writing skills,” was consistent
with the restrictions identified by the examining clinical neuropsychologist and
with the opinion of the state agency’s psychiatric consultant. Accordingly, the
RFC finding adequately captured Young’s mental limitations. See
Stubbs–Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ's
assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration,
persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified
in the medical testimony.”).
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As to Young’s contention that the RFC finding failed to take into account his
physical limitations, specifically his abdominal pain and obesity, the ALJ did not
err by determining at step two of the sequential evaluation that the abdominal pain
was a non-severe impairment because it did not last more than 12 consecutive
months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. Moreover, Young provided neither
evidence of how his pain had a functional effect on his ability to perform work, nor
evidence to refute the conclusion that the pain could be managed with proper
medication. See Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600–01
(9th Cir. 1999). Young also failed to provide any evidence that his obesity
exacerbated his reported mental and physical impairments. The ALJ was not
required to include additional limitations not supported by the record. See
Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2001).
Young contends that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony, the
written and oral testimony of his mother, and the written testimony of his sister
regarding the severity of his impairments. The ALJ provided specific, clear and
convincing reasons for rejecting Young’s testimony concerning the debilitating
effects of his mental and physical impairments and his functional limitations.
First, the ALJ found that Young’s assertion of debilitating mental problems was
undermined by the medical evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661,
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670-71 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ALJ properly relied on medical evidence
undermining claimant’s subjective assessment of limitations). Second, the ALJ
properly took into account that Young received only conservative treatment and
was often times noncompliant with his prescribed psychiatric medication regime.
See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[E]vidence of
‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding
severity of an impairment.”) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Moreover, the ALJ did not clearly err by determining that Young had
not reported limitations in daily living that were suggestive of totally debilitating
mental conditions. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that claimant’s testimony about her daily activities, including taking
care of personal needs, preparing easy meals, doing light housework and shopping
for groceries, may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a disabling
condition). Finally, although the ALJ may have erred in failing to provide reasons
for rejecting the testimony of Young’s mother and sister, any such error was
harmless because their testimony was substantially the same as Young’s. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121–22.
Young contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of psychiatric
nurse practitioner Gina Davis in assessing his mental limitations. The ALJ gave
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several germane reasons for discounting Davis’s opinion. See id. at 1111 (stating
that an ALJ may discount the opinion of a physician’s assistant if the ALJ provides
germane reasons for doing so); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.
2005) (recognizing that inconsistency with medical evidence is a germane reason).
As the ALJ noted, Davis’s assessment did not cite any objective clinical findings
that would corroborate her determinations of a permanent disability. Moreover,
Davis’s disability determination was contradicted by her own treatment notes and
was not consistent with the findings of the clinical neuropsychologist and the state
agency’s psychiatric consultant.
Finally, Young contends that the ALJ should not have relied on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, but rather was required to use a vocational expert
in determining that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy
which he could perform. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination
that Young’s mental impairments were not a sufficiently severe non-exertional
limitation that required the assistance of a vocational expert. See Hoopai v. Astrue,
499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that claimant’s moderate depression
was not a sufficiently severe non-exertional limitation that required the assistance
of a vocational expert).
AFFIRMED.
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