United States v. Louis Smith , 714 F. App'x 701 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 14 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    15-30332
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    2:13-cr-00014-RMP-1
    v.
    LOUIS DANIEL SMITH, AKA Daniel                  MEMORANDUM*
    Smith, AKA Daniel Votino,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 31, 2017
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE,** District Judge.
    Defendant-Appellant Louis Smith appeals his convictions for conspiracy to
    introduce misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, import merchandise contrary
    to law, and defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (count one);
    introduction of misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, in violation of 21
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
    U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2) (counts two through four); and smuggling, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 (count six). These convictions stem from Smith’s
    manufacture, marketing, and distribution of Miracle Mineral Solution (“MMS”), as
    well as his importation of sodium chlorite, a chemical necessary to manufacture
    MMS. On appeal, Smith argues: (1) the indictment was defective on all counts for
    failure to allege an essential element of each crime; (2) there was insufficient
    evidence to sustain his conviction on each count; (3) the district court erred in its
    jury instructions on each count; (4) the district court erred in refusing to suppress
    evidence; (5) Smith’s appointed counsel suffered from a conflict of interest; and
    (6) the district court violated Smith’s Sixth Amendment rights by denying his
    various motions to continue his trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
    and affirm.
    I.    Counts Two Through Four
    Smith contends that his convictions on counts two through four must be
    reversed because the indictment failed to allege materiality. The sufficiency of the
    indictment is reviewed de novo. United States v. O’Donnell, 
    608 F.3d 546
    , 555
    (9th Cir. 2010). An indictment must be specific in what it charges and cannot
    simply repeat the language found in the criminal statute. 
    Id. However, it
    must “be
    read in its entirety, construed according to common sense, and interpreted to
    include facts which are necessarily implied.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Givens,
    2
    
    767 F.2d 574
    (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal marks omitted). We have found that
    materiality is a required element of proof in a misbranding offense. United States
    v. Watkins, 
    278 F.3d 961
    , 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002). However, an indictment does
    not have to allege materiality if the facts in the indictment support an inference of
    materiality. United States v. Berger, 
    473 F.3d 1080
    , 1103 (9th Cir. 2007).
    Counts two through four charged that, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a)
    and 333(a)(2), Smith and his co-defendants, with the intent to defraud and mislead,
    introduced, delivered for introduction, and caused the introduction and delivery
    into interstate commerce of a drug that was misbranded because it was
    manufactured in an establishment not registered with the Secretary of Health and
    Human Services. Section 331(a) provides two tiers of liability for misbranding
    violations. Felony misbranding, per § 333(a)(2), requires that the defendant acted
    with intent to defraud or mislead.
    Smith’s criminal intent to defraud or mislead is linked to his introduction of
    MMS into interstate commerce, which is sufficiently detailed in the indictment.
    The indictment alleged a pattern of systematic and widespread misrepresentations
    and omissions of material fact that were plainly made with the intent to deceive
    and mislead Smith’s suppliers and the government. Counts two through four of the
    indictment satisfied the requisite standard of sufficiency. Smith’s claim is without
    merit.
    3
    Smith next contends there was insufficient evidence to prove that the MMS
    relevant to counts two through four was manufactured in an unregistered facility,
    which rendered it a misbranded drug. Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de
    novo. United States v. Odom, 
    329 F.3d 1032
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2003). We must
    determine whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    The elements may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See United States v.
    Loveland, 
    825 F.3d 555
    , 561 (9th Cir. 2016). While mere speculation is
    insufficient to support a verdict, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor
    of the government.
    The trial testimony, viewed as a whole, established that at the time of the
    investigation, the facility in which the MMS was made was not a registered
    manufacturer of drugs as required by federal statutes and regulations. Viewed in
    the light most favorable to the prosecution and taking into account all reasonable
    inferences, the evidence was sufficient to prove that MMS was manufactured in an
    unregistered facility. Smith’s assertions to the contrary are without merit.
    Next, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
    substantive misbranding convictions. However, there was sufficient evidence at
    trial from which a rational jury could conclude that Smith intended to mislead
    4
    suppliers and authorities about the intended use of MMS by consumers. This
    challenge fails.
    Smith next insists that Jury Instruction 13, which was given in regards to the
    substantive misbranding counts, directed a verdict that MMS was misbranded.
    When no objection is raised at trial to the jury instructions, we review for plain
    error. United States v. Nobari, 
    574 F.3d 1065
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2009). There are
    four requirements for a finding of plain error: (1) error, (2) that is plain,
    (3) affecting substantial rights, “which in the ordinary case means it affected the
    outcome of the district court proceedings,” and (4) “seriously affect[ing] the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
    Lapier, 
    796 F.3d 1090
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Marcus, 
    560 U.S. 258
    , 262 (2010)). Instruction 13 was provided in the context of defining and
    contextualizing each of the four elements the jury had to consider for the
    misbranding offenses. Instruction 13 did not direct a verdict, but merely reminded
    the jury of the precise way in which the offenses were charged in the indictment.
    The court did not err in giving Instruction 13.
    Smith also challenges Jury Instruction 10, which required the jury to
    consider whether he “acted with the intent to defraud or mislead when he
    introduced MMS products into interstate commerce.” The court did not err in
    giving Jury Instruction 10, which was an accurate statement of the law and
    5
    consistent with the charged statutes.
    II.   Count Six
    Smith avers that the indictment failed to charge materiality with respect to
    count six. Count six charged Smith with fraudulently and knowingly importing
    sodium chlorite, contrary to § 331(a), in that sodium chlorite was a bulk drug
    ingredient that was misbranded, and that Smith did knowingly and fraudulently
    receive, conceal, buy, sell, and facilitate the transportation, concealment, and sale
    of the sodium chlorite, after importation, knowing it to have been imported and
    brought into the United States contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545.
    Although the term materiality is not used in 18 U.S.C. § 545, the statute does
    use the term fraudulently, which can be interpreted as requiring an intent to
    defraud. Following Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    (1999), we have instructed
    that the settled meaning of intent to defraud requires a showing of materiality.
    
    Watkins, 278 F.3d at 965
    . Given this settled meaning, we “must presume that
    Congress intended to incorporate materiality unless the statute otherwise dictates.”
    
    Id. (quoting Neder,
    527 U.S. at 23). Here, the indictment was sufficiently detailed
    to warrant the inference of material misrepresentations and omissions made with
    respect to Smith’s importation of sodium chlorite. Smith’s claim is without merit.
    Smith next argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
    on count six. To the contrary, there was sufficient evidence at trial to establish that
    6
    Smith caused shipments of sodium chlorite to be imported or brought into the
    United States from Canada, contrary to law. Specifically, the evidence established
    that Smith paid a Canadian distributor to ship sodium chlorite to a fictitious
    company, created by Smith to facilitate the importation and receipt of this
    chemical, and that the stated purpose of the sodium chlorite was for use in
    wastewater treatment, which was plainly untrue, given Smith’s intent to employ it
    in the manufacture of MMS. There was sufficient evidence to sustain Smith’s
    conviction on this count, and his challenge fails accordingly.
    Smith next contends that the court plainly erred by not including a
    knowledge component in its jury instructions on count six. Instead, the court
    required the jury to find that Smith fraudulently imported the sodium chlorite.
    “Fraudulently” importing unlawful merchandise–doing so with the intent to
    defraud–requires specific intent, while “knowingly” committing an act requires
    only general intent. See generally Carter v. United States, 
    530 U.S. 255
    , 268-70
    (2000). Thus, specific intent is a more stringent standard and encompasses the
    lower standard of general intent. See United States v. Doe, 
    136 F.3d 631
    , 637 (9th
    Cir. 1998). The court did not err by requiring proof of intent to defraud, a specific
    intent standard, which was more rigorous to prove than knowledge, a general intent
    standard.
    7
    III.     Count One
    Smith challenges count one of the indictment, which charged one
    conspiracy, comprised of three different objectives: (1) to introduce misbranded
    drugs into interstate commerce, (2) to smuggle, and (3) to defraud the United
    States by impeding, impairing, and defeating the FDA’s functions and duties.
    Smith contends that because his substantive convictions should be reversed, we
    must necessarily reverse his conspiracy conviction. We reject this argument, as
    there was sufficient evidence to sustain the substantive convictions, as discussed
    above.
    Next, with respect to count one’s third objective only (conspiracy to defraud
    the United States by impeding, impairing, and defeating the FDA’s functions and
    duties), Smith challenges the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the
    evidence, and the jury instructions. Count one will stand regardless of our findings
    on objective three because count one’s two other objectives are unchallenged on
    appeal. Furthermore, the verdict form contained three separate findings, one for
    each objective of the conspiracy. The jury found Smith guilty of all three
    objectives. The guilty verdict can be sustained on the basis of any one or more of
    the objectives set forth in the indictment. Thus, an error in the charging, evidence,
    or instruction for the third objective, if any, would be harmless. This challenge
    fails.
    8
    Smith next asserts that the jury instructions were deficient because they
    failed to include a buyer-seller instruction. In this case, the buyer-seller instruction
    was not warranted by the evidence presented at trial. This claim is without merit.
    IV.   Suppression of Evidence
    Smith argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
    evidence of the conspiracy that was seized by federal agents during the execution
    of search warrants. “Whether a search is within the scope of a warrant is a
    question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. Hurd, 
    499 F.3d 963
    ,
    965 (9th Cir. 2007). Smith has failed to identify a single piece of evidence that he
    believes should have been suppressed; rather, he just refers generally to “evidence
    of the conspiracy.” Thus, Smith has failed to provide “citations to the authorities
    and parts of the record” on which he relies. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
    Furthermore, the conspiracy was based upon the same fraudulent scheme
    and the same overt acts as the substantive counts; therefore, evidence of the
    substantive counts necessarily constitutes evidence of the conspiracy. In this case,
    Smith has failed to pinpoint any discrete evidence that would be considered
    evidence of the conspiracy, but could not be deemed evidence of the substantive
    offenses. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
    V.    Conflict of Interest
    Smith asserts that his appointed counsel suffered from a conflict of interest
    9
    that required the district court to remove him as counsel. The court’s failure to do
    so, Smith submits, violated his Sixth Amendment rights. A defendant’s Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel includes the “correlative right” to conflict-free legal
    representation; that is, the right to be represented by an attorney with undivided
    loyalty. Wood v. Georgia, 
    450 U.S. 261
    , 271 (1981). To establish a violation of
    this right, a defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
    affected counsel’s performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 
    535 U.S. 162
    , 171 (2002). If
    the defendant can show that a conflict of interest “affected the adequacy” of
    counsel’s representation, then he need not demonstrate actual prejudice stemming
    from the conflict. 
    Id. (quoting Cuyler
    v. Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
    , 349-50 (1980)).
    “[U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting
    interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of
    ineffective assistance.” 
    Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350
    .
    Smith has not established that an actual conflict existed. The record does
    not support a finding that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Nor
    has Smith shown that a conflict, assuming one even existed, influenced counsel’s
    decisions. See United States v. Shwayder, 
    312 F.3d 1109
    , 1118 (9th Cir. 2002),
    amended by 
    320 F.3d 889
    (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that defendant must establish
    that an actual conflict influenced counsel’s performance). Because no actual
    conflict existed and nothing supports the view that counsel’s performance was
    10
    affected by any claimed conflict, Smith’s Sixth Amendment challenge fails as a
    matter of law.
    VI.   Effective Assistance of Counsel
    Smith claims that the court’s denial of his motions to continue denied him
    effective representation in myriad ways. “A district court’s decision to grant or
    deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion . . . .” United States v.
    Moreland, 
    622 F.3d 1147
    , 1158 (9th Cir. 2010). Smith must demonstrate that the
    trial court “abused its discretion through an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence
    upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Houston v.
    Schomig, 
    533 F.3d 1076
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 11-12 (1983) (internal marks omitted)).
    Here, the court granted numerous continuances over the two years between
    the indictment and trial. Smith insisted on representing himself and did not request
    representation until ten days before trial. Counsel’s lack of time to adequately
    prepare for trial was within Smith’s control. See 
    Moreland, 622 F.3d at 1158
    (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance
    when the “need for a continuance was Moreland’s fault”). Smith was clearly
    responsible for the delay in counsel’s appointment, counsel’s inability to fully
    engage in active trial preparation, and counsel’s lack of insight into the evidence,
    strategies, and theories of the case. The district court’s refusal to grant a sixth
    11
    continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Because the court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying another continuance, we need not reach the issue of whether
    the denial of the continuance resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
    AFFIRMED.
    12