Quinzell Hoofbooker v. Theresa Cisneros ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 QUINZELL HOOFBOOKER, C ase No. 2:22-cv-01028-SPG-JDE 12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED 13 v. STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 THERESA CISNEROS, 15 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the First Amended Petition for 20 Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 30 (“Petition”)), the records 21 on file, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF 22 No. 49 (“Report”)), and Petitioner’s Objections to Report and Recommendations (ECF 23 No. 52 (“Objections”)). The Court has further made de novo determinations as to the 24 portions of the Report to which Petitioner filed objections. 25 The Petition raises eleven grounds for habeas relief. (Pet. at 5–11). The Report 26 recommends denial of the Petition and dismissal of this action with prejudice. (R. & R. 27 28 1 at 55). For the following reasons, Petitioner’s Objections to the Report do not warrant a 2 change to the Report’s findings or recommendations.1 3 For Ground One, Petitioner objects that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing, 4 at the resentencing hearing, to ask the trial court to strike Petitioner’s prior strike 5 convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (Cal. 1996). (Objs. 6 at 12–16). As the Report reasonably found, however, trial counsel filed an unsuccessful 7 Romero motion at Petitioner’s original sentencing hearing, and Petitioner “has not shown 8 any likelihood of a different outcome had his counsel repeated his Romero” argument on 9 resentencing. (R. & R. at 22–23). Although Petitioner argues he would have received a 10 different outcome, particularly due to his youth, (Objs. at 14–15), the trial court was aware 11 of this argument and rejected it during his sentencing hearing, (ECF No. 41-9 at 229). 12 Thus, Petitioner failed to show that a renewed Romero motion “would have resulted in a 13 successful motion and a concomitantly reduced sentence.” Daire v. Lattimore, 818 F.3d 14 454, 466 (9th Cir. 2016). 15 For Ground Two, Petitioner objects that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 16 to argue that his sentence of 75 years to life is cruel and unusual punishment. (Objs. at 16– 17 18 19). The California Court of Appeal has already rejected this exact argument. (ECF No. 19 13-5 at 65–67). Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel could have prevailed 20 on such an argument by presenting a comprehensive mitigation memorandum, psychiatric 21 evaluations, and character witnesses. (Objs. at 17–19). This argument, which fails to 22 specify what such documents and evidence would demonstrate, is speculative. See 23 Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that petitioner 24 failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate potentially 25 26 1 Because the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claims was not 27 objectively unreasonable, the Report reasonably concluded that an evidentiary hearing was 28 unwarranted. (Report at 23 n.9). 1 mitigating evidence of mental illness or call family to testify on petitioner’s behalf and 2 holding that “[s]uch speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice”); Cooks v. 3 Spalding, 660 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (rejecting ineffective assistance 4 of counsel claim grounded in lawyer’s choice to try case before six- rather than twelve- 5 person jury and holding that the petitioner’s “claim of prejudice amounts to mere 6 speculation”). 7 For Ground Three, Petitioner objects that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 8 to appeal the sentence of 75 years to life that was imposed during the resentencing hearing. 9 (Objs. at 19–22). “[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the 10 defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant 11 would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or 12 (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested 13 in appealing.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000). “[T]he failure to take a 14 futile action can never be deficient performance . . . .” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 15 16 (9th Cir. 1996). Although Petitioner points out that his new sentence means he would be 17 ineligible for parole until he is 98 years old (Objs. at 19, 21), this fact alone does not mean 18 he had a nonfrivolous ground for appeal of his sentence. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 19 F.3d 1135, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence 20 of life without parole did “not qualify as a nonfrivolous ground for appeal” where sentence 21 would not have been invalidated as cruel and unusual). Furthermore, the Report recognized 22 that Petitioner’s counsel had already unsuccessfully raised this argument on a prior appeal, 23 supporting a conclusion that appealing on these grounds again would be futile. (R. & R. 24 at 22–23). Thus, the Report reasonably found that Petitioner failed to show deficient 25 performance from his trial counsel’s failure to appeal the new sentence. (Id. at 18). 26 For Ground Four, Petitioner objects that he raised “a different issue” than what the 27 Report analyzed. (Objs. at 22–25). The Report analyzed Petitioner’s claim that the trial 28 court erroneously denied his motion for acquittal under California Penal Code Section 1 1118.1 and concluded that the trial court did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights 2 by denying the motion. (R. & R. at 28–29). Petitioner claims that the actual issue is 3 whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions under Jackson v. Virginia, 4 443 U.S. 307 (1979). (Objections at 22). Although the Petition contends that the “[t]rial 5 court erroneously denied Hoofbooker’s § 1118.1 motion,” (Pet. at 6), both the Report and 6 the California Court of Appeal provided extensive analysis under the Jackson standard and 7 concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Petitioner perpetrated or aided and 8 abetted the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, (R. & R. at 28–29; ECF No. 13-5 9 at 41–47). Moreover, each of Petitioner’s arguments—about purportedly unreliable 10 eyewitness identifications, “guilt by association,” possible confusion between Petitioner 11 and his brother, and Petitioner’s acquittal on a different charge, (Objs. at 24–25)—were 12 considered and rejected by the California Court of Appeal, (ECF No. 13-5 at 13, 41–47). 13 The Court has no basis to find that the California Court of Appeal’s decision involved an 14 unreasonable application of Jackson. 15 16 For Ground Five, Petitioner objects that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of 17 Petitioner’s prior convictions. (Objs. at 26–31). This objection cannot overcome the 18 Report’s finding that habeas relief is precluded for this claim because of the absence of 19 clearly established federal law based on the holdings of the United States Supreme Court. 20 (R. & R. at 29, 32–33). See also Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 951 n.8 (9th Cir. 2020) 21 (“[T]here is no clearly established law that addresses whether the admission of a 22 defendant’s criminal history or prior bad acts would violate due process.”). 23 For Ground Six, Petitioner objects that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of 24 $8,300 and a gun that police found in a car in which Petitioner was riding. (Objs. at 31– 25 34). As with Petitioner’s objection as to Ground Five, this objection cannot overcome the 26 Report’s dispositive finding that habeas relief is precluded because of the absence of clearly 27 established federal law. (R. & R. at 29, 35–36) (citing Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 28 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020)). 1 For Ground Seven, Petitioner objects that he was prejudiced when the trial court 2 reprimanded Petitioner’s trial counsel in front of the jury. (Objs. at 34–36). As the Report 3 reasonably found, however, the trial court’s comment was not addressed towards 4 Petitioner’s counsel, and the trial court followed the comment with a limiting instruction 5 to the jury. (Report at 53–54). Accordingly, the Report reasonably concluded that the 6 incident fell well short of the “extremely high level of interference” necessary to show 7 judicial bias, nor did it establish a “pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.” (Id. at 8 53) (quoting Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995)). 9 For Ground Eight, Petitioner objects that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte 10 instruct the jury that accomplice testimony required corroboration and should be viewed 11 with caution. (Objs. at 36–37). Here, relief is precluded because, as the Report found, this 12 claim does not implicate a constitutional violation. (R. & R. at 48–49). Although 13 Petitioner argues that the failure to give the instruction lowered the prosecutor’s burden of 14 proof, (Objs. at 36–37), a prosecutor’s burden of proof is not lowered by admitting 15 16 accomplice testimony without an accompanying instruction. See Caminetti v. United 17 States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917) (holding that the failure to give an accomplice instruction 18 was not grounds for reversal and noting that “there is no absolute rule of law preventing 19 convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them”). In any event, as 20 recognized by the California Court of Appeal, even if this claim implicated Petitioner’s 21 constitutional rights, the trial court’s failure to issue this instruction sua sponte was 22 harmless because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other 23 witnesses. (ECF No. 35-5 at 56–57). 24 For Ground Nine, Petitioner objects that the trial court erred in excluding part of the 25 testimony of Dr. Eisen, the defense’s eyewitness identification expert. (Objs. at 37–39). 26 As the California Court of Appeal reasonably found, however, the exclusion of that 27 evidence was harmless for multiple reasons. (ECF No. 13-5 at 19–23). In particular, the 28 jury heard the essence of the excluded testimony—about the relationship between certainty 1 and accuracy in eyewitness identifications—from multiple sources, including the expert 2 witness himself. (Id. at 21–23). As a result, the Report correctly concluded that the trial 3 court’s erroneous exclusion of Petitioner’s expert witness testimony did not concern the 4 kind of “critical, corroborative defense evidence” that, if excluded, “may violate both the 5 Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial and the Sixth Amendment right to present 6 a defense.” (R. & R. at 46–47 (quoting Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 7 2004)). 8 For Ground Ten, Petitioner objects that the trial court erred in allowing a detective 9 to testify about gangs despite the prosecution’s dismissal of the gang enhancement. (Objs. 10 at 40–42). This objection cannot overcome the Report’s finding, which is dispositive, that 11 habeas relief for this claim is precluded because of the absence of clearly established 12 federal law. (R. & R. at 29, 39–40). See also Pena v. Tilton, 578 F. App’x 695, 695 (9th 13 Cir. 2014) (concluding that no clearly established federal law addresses whether the 14 admission of gang evidence would violate due process). The Report also correctly 15 16 recognized that any error would have been harmless, as the detective did not testify about 17 Petitioner specifically; instead, other witnesses described Petitioner’s gang affiliations and 18 the gang-related nature of his crimes. (R. & R. at 39). See also (ECF No. 13-5 at 39–40). 19 For Ground Eleven, Petitioner objects that cumulative errors deprived him of due 20 process and a fair trial. (Objs. at 42–43). Although Petitioner suggests there were 21 weaknesses in the prosecution’s case against him, (id.), this does not show cumulative 22 error. As the errors Plaintiff identified are at most harmless, the Report correctly concluded 23 that “there is no prejudice to accumulate.” (R. & R. at 54–55). See also Hayes v. Ayers, 24 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional 25 magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”); Nguyen v. Wingler, 468 F. 26 App’x 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where there was only one harmless error, as in this case, 27 there was no error to cumulate, and the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.”). 28 In sum, Petitioner’s objections are overruled. 1 IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation is accepted and adopted; 2 |land (2) Judgment shall be entered denying the Petition and dismissing this action with 3 prejudice. 4 > |/DATED: March 5, 2024 6 ~ HON. SHERILYN PEACE GARNETT 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28