Brian T. Hill v. Ralph Diaz ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRIAN T. HILL, Case No. CV 19-8989-MWF(JC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF 13 v. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE IN PART; (2) DENYING 14 JIM BONNIFIELD, et al., PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS REQUESTS; AND (3) DISMISSING 15 Defendants. ACTION WITH PREJUDICE 16 17 18 The procedural history of this case is lengthy and somewhat complicated due 19 primarily to Plaintiff’s multiple, repeated filings. That history has been documented 20 in the numerous screening orders issued by the Court and the assigned Magistrate 21 Judge, the Court’s orders accepting the Magistrate Judge’s prior screening orders, and 22 the Report and Recommendation filed by the Magistrate Judge (“Report”). (Docket 23 Nos. 16, 30, 45, 48, 67). The parties are familiar with that history, as is the Court, and 24 it will not be repeated. 25 As relevant here, before the Court are the following matters: (1) the Motion to 26 Dismiss filed by the remaining Defendants in this action seeking dismissal of the 27 operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (“Motion to Dismiss,” Docket No. 28 55); (2) Plaintiff’s Request for Judgment of Default (“First Default Request,” Docket 1 No. 57); (3) the Report (Docket No. 67); (4) Plaintiff’s Notice of Intent to Stand Upon 2 the SAC as Filed (“Notice of Intent,” Docket No. 69); (5) Plaintiff’s Second Request 3 for Default (“Second Default Request,” Docket No. 70); (6) Plaintiff’s Request for 4 Sanctions against Defendants’ counsel (“Sanctions Request,” Docket No. 73); (7) 5 Plaintiff’s Request to Certify Orders as Final Judgment for Immediate Appeal 6 (“Appeal Certification Request,” Docket No. 74)1; and (8) Plaintiff’s Objections to the 7 Report (“Objections,” Docket No. 80). 8 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed all filings related to the 9 Motion to Dismiss and Report, Plaintiff’s other various filings and requests, and other 10 relevant records on file. 11 Plaintiff pinpoints two primary grounds that form the basis of his objections. 12 (Docket No. 80 at 2 (citing Report at 3-4), 6 (citing Report at 12-13). While the Court 13 has reviewed the entire Report, to the extent Plaintiff has failed to specifically object 14 to other aspects of it, the statute does not require such review by this Court or an 15 appellate court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (“The statute 16 [pertaining to objections review] does not on its face require any review at all, by 17 either the district court or the court of appeals, of any issue that is not the subject of an 18 objection.”). Furthermore, although an individualized analysis is also not required, in 19 an abundance of caution the Court briefly discusses Plaintiff’s points. See United 20 States v. Ramos, 65 F.4th 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2023) (“the district court ha[s] no 21 obligation to provide individualized analysis of each objection”); Wang v. Masaitis, 22 416 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming a cursory district court order summarily 23 adopting, without addressing any objections, a magistrate judge’s report and 24 recommendation). 25 26 27 1 Matters 5, 6, and 7 are referred to collectively as Plaintiff’s “Subsequent 28 1 First, Plaintiff continues to maintain that entry of default is warranted based on 2 Defendants’ failure to respond to the SAC within twenty-one days of the Court’s 3 Order Re Service of Process and issuance of summons. (Docket No. 80 at 2-5). 4 Plaintiff also raises this in his Second Default Request. (Docket No. 70, 2-3). 5 However, as the Report adequately explains, Defendants timely responded. (Docket 6 No. 67 at 4). More importantly, even if the Court were to assume Defendants missed 7 the response deadline, default would nonetheless be inappropriate. Entry of default is 8 required only “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 9 has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Generally, as here, 10 when a party has defended an action by filing a motion to dismiss, even if untimely, 11 default is not favored or warranted. See Nathan v. Fry’s Elecs. Inc., 607 F. App’x 12 623, 624 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of a motion for default where motion to 13 dismiss was filed before clerk acted on request for entry of default); Harper v. City of 14 Monterey, 519 F. App’x 503, 503 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of request for 15 default where defendant had filed motion to dismiss); see also Eitel v. McCool, 782 16 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he general rule [is] that default judgments are 17 ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever 18 reasonably possible.”). 19 Second, Plaintiff objects to the Report’s conclusion that he failed to state a First 20 Amendment free-exercise claim. (Docket No. 80 at 6-8). But, as he admits, he mostly 21 repeats arguments he has already extensively made in prior filings. (Docket No. 80 at 22 6 (Plaintiff indicating that he had addressed the sufficiency of his claim “in the 23 Opposition to Dismiss, the Points and Authorities submitted in support thereof, the 24 Declaration attached, the Exhibits[] submitted in support of his Declaration, [and] the 25 Operative [SAC] . . .). The Magistrate Judge considered those filings and the Report 26 adequately addressed how the SAC pleads insufficient facts to state a claim. (Docket 27 67 at 12-13). Notably, however, Plaintiff also appears to content in the Objections 28 that his claims are “not predicated [on his] being admitted to or removed from the 1 [prison’s Religious Meat Alternative (“RMA”)] Program.” (Docket No. 80 at 7). 2 That, however, is belied by the SAC. (Docket No. 44 at 15 (contending that Plaintiff 3 was informed he was no longer on the RMA list, signifying he was “terminated from 4 [the] program in violation of [his] First Amendment Constitutional Rights . . ..”). 5 Accordingly, the Objections are OVERRULED and the Court accepts the 6 Report’s recommendation to deny the First Default Request and grant the Motion to 7 Dismiss. 8 Regarding the next steps in this action, the Report also recommends that 9 Plaintiff be given leave to amend and provided him multiple options, including filing a 10 Third Amended Complaint or filing a Notice of Intent to Stand on the SAC, which the 11 Report cautioned may result in the dismissal of this action based upon the SAC 12 defects identified in the Report. (Docket No. 67 at 3, 13-14). Since the filing of the 13 Report, Plaintiff has elected to stand on the SAC. (Docket No. 69). Accordingly, 14 there is no need to afford Plaintiff further leave to amend, and the Court declines to 15 adopt that portion of the Report. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 16 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (when plaintiff elects to stand on complaint dismissed with 17 leave to amend, district court should enter final order dismissing claims with 18 prejudice); see also Lopez v. City of Needles, Cal., 95 F.3d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1996) 19 (“[F]iling of [a notice of intent not to file an amended complaint] gives the district 20 court an opportunity to reconsider, if appropriate, but more importantly, to enter an 21 order dismissing the action . . ..”). 22 Finally, in light of the Court’s Order below directing the Clerk to enter a final 23 Judgment, and because they do not advance any plausible grounds to warrant relief, 24 the Subsequent Requests are DENIED. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 3 (1) The Report is ACCEPTED and adopted as the Court’s own findings and 4 conclusions; 5 (2) Plaintiff's First and Second Default Requests, and Sanctions Request are 6 || DENIED (Docket Nos. 57, 70, 73); 7 (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED (Docket No. 55); 8 (4) The SAC (Docket No. 44), and this action, are DISMISSED with prejudice; 9 || AND 10 (5) Plaintiff's Appeal Certification Request (Docket No. 74) is DENIED as 11 |;}unnecessary and moot by this Order, and without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a timely 12 notice of appeal. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 ( | | / My We 2) 15 ||Dated: April 12, 2024 16 MICHAEL W. FITZG D [ United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28