Peter Strojnik v. Four Sisters Inns, Inc ( 2019 )

O 1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 11 PETER STROJNIK, SR., Case № 2:19-CV-02991-ODW (JEMx) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING 14 FOUR SISTERS INNS, INC., d/b/a MOTION TO DISMISS [6] CHANNEL ROAD INN, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Four Sisters Inns, Inc., d/b/a 20 Channel Road Inn (“Defendant’) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). (Mot. to Dismiss 21 (“Mot.”), ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF 22 No. 9.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.1 23 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 24 Peter Strojnik (“Plaintiff”) is legally disabled due to a “right-sided neural 25 foraminal stenosis with symptoms of femoral neuropathy, prostate cancer and renal 26 cancer, and a degenerative right knee.” (Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1.) Due to his 27 28 1 Having considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 disability, “Plaintiff requires an [American with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’)] compliant 2 lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility, both ambulatory and 3 wheelchair assisted.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) 4 Defendant owns or leases a hotel located at 95065 219 West Channell Road 5 Santa Monica, California 90402 (“Hotel”). (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges he intended 6 to visit the Santa Monica area on an unspecified date, and reviewed third-party hotel 7 booking websites and Defendant’s first-party website to find lodging. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 8 19.) Plaintiff alleges that the websites “failed to identify and describe mobility related 9 accessibility features and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in 10 enough detail to reasonably permit Plaintiff to assess independently whether 11 Defendant’s Hotel meets his accessibility needs.” (Compl. ¶¶ 17,19.) Plaintiff also 12 alleges that the websites “failed to make reservations for accessible guest rooms 13 available in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms.” 14 (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.) 15 Plaintiff submits an Addendum that includes photographs from the websites, 16 which Plaintiff alleges discloses architectural barriers at the Hotel. (Compl. ¶ 22 17 (citing Addendum A).) For each of the alleged barriers, Plaintiff states: 18 The manner in which the barriers denied Plaintiff full and equal use 19 of access, and which deter Plaintiff from visiting the hotel: Barrier denied Plaintiff full and equal access by failing to identify and describe 20 accessible features in the hotel and guest rooms in enough detail to 21 reasonably permit Plaintiff to assess independently whether the hotel or guest room meet his accessibility needs. 22 23 (Compl., Addendum A at 11–33) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges that “the 24 ADA violations described in Addendum A relate to Plaintiff’s disability and interfere 25 with Plaintiff’s full and complete enjoyment of the Hotel.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) As a 26 result, Plaintiff did not book a room at Defendant’s hotel and booked a room 27 elsewhere. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges he is deterred from visiting the Hotel 28 because the Hotel is not ADA or State Law compliant, but intends to visit the Hotel at 1 a “specific time” after Defendant cures the alleged ADA violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 2 12.) 3 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant asserting claims for violation of 4 the ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, and for 5 negligence. (See Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of standing and 6 failure to state a claim. (Mot. 1–2.) 7 III. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to seek 9 dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant may 10 bring a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on a lack of standing. See White v. Lee, 11 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because standing . . . pertain[s] to a federal 12 court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, [it is] properly raised in a motion 13 to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6).”). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional 14 attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 15 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242). A facial attack is based on the 16 challenger’s assertion that allegations in the complaint are “insufficient on their face 17 to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. A factual attack disputes the validity of allegations 18 that, if true, would invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. 19 Rule 12(b)(6) allows an attack on the pleadings for failure to state a claim on 20 which relief can be granted. “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a 21 judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” 22 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, a court is “not 23 bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft 24 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 25 555 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of 26 ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in 27 original). A complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 28 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. This means that the complaint must plead “factual content 1 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 2 the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. There must be “sufficient 3 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 4 defend itself effectively . . . [and] factual allegations that are taken as true must 5 plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 6 opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” 7 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 9 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 10 experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “But where the well-pleaded 11 facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 12 complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to 13 relief.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing and 16 failure to state a claim. (Mot. 1–2.) “[T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, 17 a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and 18 particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the 19 injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, 20 as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 21 decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 22 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 23 To satisfy standing under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has 24 suffered an “injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return,” or alternatively is 25 deterred from returning to the premises. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 26 F.3d 939, 944, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 28 1 A. Injury-In-Fact 2 An injury in fact must be concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent. 3 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180. A plaintiff “lacks standing . . . if the barriers he 4 seeks to enjoin do not pose a real and immediate threat to him due to his particular 5 disability.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. An injury is particularized when it affects the 6 plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 7 Here, Plaintiff alleges that, due to his disability, he “requires an ADA compliant 8 lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility, both ambulatory and 9 wheelchair assisted.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) Despite alleging that the websites lack sufficient 10 detail to allow Plaintiff to “assess independently whether Defendant’s Hotel meets his 11 accessibility needs” (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19), Plaintiff concludes that the website 12 photographs show ADA-violations (see Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, Addendum A). Addendum 13 A contains (as in other cases filed by Plaintiff2) a series of dark, grainy photographs 14 with captions of purported barriers. These captions include: “[a]pparently 15 inaccessible breakfast bar”; “[i]naccessible route with no apparent signage to 16 accessible route”; “[i]naccessible spa tub”; and “[i]naccessible bathroom.” (See 17 Compl., Addendum A at 17–33.) 18 Plaintiff alleges broadly that “[t]he ADA violations described in Addendum A 19 relate to Plaintiff’s disability and interfere with Plaintiff’s full and complete 20 enjoyment of the Hotel.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) However, Plaintiff does not state facts 21 showing how the purported violations affect him or interfere with his mobility needs, 22 and the captions in the Addendum are bare legal conclusions cast in the form of 23 factual allegations. See Pasadena Robles, No. 2:19–cv–02067–AB–PJW, (Doc. No. 24 23 at 4 n.1) (finding photos captioned as ADA violations to be legal conclusions, not 25 26 2 See, e.g., Strojnik v. Hotel Circle GL Holdings (“Hotel Circle”), No. 1:19-cv-01194-DAD (EPGx), 2019 WL 6212084, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019); Strojnik v. 1315 Orange LLC (“1315 Orange”), 27 No. 19-CV-1991-LAB (JLB), 2019 WL 5535766, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2019); Strojnik v. 28 Pasadena Robles Acquisition, LLC (“Pasadena Robles”), No. 2:19–cv–02067–AB–PJW, (Doc. No. 23 at 4 n.1) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019). 1 factual allegations, and disregarding them accordingly). Thus, “the addendum does 2 not identify any barriers that would affect Strojnik, deny him equal access, or deter 3 him from staying at the hotel.” 1315 Orange, 2019 WL 5535766, at *2. 4 Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that these alleged barriers “relate to [his] disability” 5 does not explain how the purported barriers violate the ADA, relate to his particular 6 disability, or interfere with his use or enjoyment of the Hotel. (See Compl. ¶ 24.) 7 This is insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See Spokeo, Inc. v. 8 Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (a plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural 9 violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 10 of Article III”); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953 (“An ADA plaintiff . . . lacks standing . . . 11 if the barriers he seeks to enjoin do not pose a real and immediate threat to him due to 12 his particular disability.”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an 13 injury that is concrete and particularized.3 14 B. Intent to Return 15 A plaintiff establishes standing under the ADA by demonstrating an injury in 16 fact coupled with an intent to return. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. An intent to return 17 may satisfy the actual or imminent injury prong if the “plaintiff demonstrates an intent 18 to return to the geographic area where the accommodation is located and a desire to 19 visit the accommodation if it were made accessible.” D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & 20 Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods 21 Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002)). A general intent to return to a public 22 accommodation is “insufficient to confer standing in an action for injunctive relief.” 23 Molski v. Kahn Winery, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lujan, 24 504 U.S. at 564). Accordingly, a plaintiff “lacks standing if he is indifferent to 25 returning . . . or if his alleged intent to return is not genuine.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 26 953. 27 28 3 As Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege an injury that is concrete and particularized, the Court does not reach the question of whether that alleged injury is also actual or imminent. 1 Courts generally look to four factors to determine whether a plaintiff has 2 pleaded an intent to return: “(1) the proximity of the place of public accommodation to 3 plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the 4 definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel 5 near defendant.” Antonio v. Yi, No. 2:14-CV-04323-SVW (ASx), 2015 WL 13603781, 6 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (collecting cases). 7 Regarding the first factor, generally, if the plaintiff resides over one hundred 8 miles away from the place of public accommodation, “the distance subverts a 9 professed intent to return.” Id. (citing Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., LLC, 472 F. 10 Supp. 2d 1208, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2007)). However, this factor is “less relevant when 11 applied to hotels, because it is generally the purpose of hotels to provide a place to 12 stay away from someone’s residence.” See Strojnik v. Orangewood LLC 13 (“Orangewood”), 8:19-cv-00946-DFS-GJS, (Doc. No. 34 at 11) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 14 2019). Accordingly, this factor is less relevant because the place of accommodation at 15 issue is a hotel. 16 Plaintiff does not allege that he previously visited the Hotel, so the second 17 factor does not support an intent to return. See Antonio, 2015 WL 13603781, at *2 18 (“There is no evidence that Plaintiff ever visited [the defendant’s business], which 19 suggests Plaintiff lacked the requisite intent to return.”). As for the third factor, 20 Plaintiff alleges he “intends to visit Defendant’s Hotel at a specific time when the 21 Defendant’s noncompliant Hotel becomes fully compliant with ADAAG.” (Compl. 22 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff does not indicate when he planned to visit the Hotel for the trip at 23 issue, let alone when he might plan to return, other than some “specific time” in the 24 future. “Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or 25 indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a 26 finding” of an intent to return. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (discussing when an intent to 27 return can demonstrate actual or imminent injury sufficient for standing). 28 1 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “he intended to visit the Santa Monica area” and 2 “spend the night there.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 29.) He argues that, although he resides in 3 Arizona, he “often and regularly” visits California. (Opp’n 3.) Yet he does not 4 contend that any of his “regular” visits to California are to the Santa Monica area. 5 Therefore, this factor does not support an intent to return to Defendant’s Hotel. 6 Considering the factors above, Plaintiff has not alleged an intent to return and 7 thus has not established standing. 8 C. Deterrence 9 A plaintiff may alternatively establish an “injury-in-fact” by demonstrating 10 deterrence from returning to the premises due to a defendant’s failure to comply with 11 the ADA. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944; Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1138. To demonstrate 12 deterrence, a plaintiff must allege “actual knowledge of illegal barriers at a public 13 accommodation to which he or she desires access.” Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1135. 14 “[O]nce a plaintiff has actually become aware of discriminatory conditions existing at 15 a public accommodation, and is thereby deterred from visiting or patronizing that 16 accommodation, the plaintiff has suffered an injury.” Id. at 1136–37. “But a 17 plaintiff’s claimed deterrence cannot be merely ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” 18 Pasadena Robles, 2:19-cv-02067-AB (PJWx), (Doc. No. 23 at 7) (quoting Vogel v. 19 Salazar, SACV 14-00853-CJC, 2014 WL 5427531, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2014)). 20 “A plaintiff must allege facts to show that he would return if the establishment were 21 ADA-compliant.” Id. 22 Here, Plaintiff alleges that, based on his review of the websites, he could not 23 assess independently whether Defendant’s Hotel met his accessibility needs. (Compl. 24 ¶¶ 17,19.) Plaintiff alleges that he was consequently deterred from visiting the Hotel 25 based on his “knowledge that the Hotel is not ADA or State Law compliant as such 26 compliance relates to Plaintiff’s disability.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s independent 27 conclusion that the Hotel is not ADA-compliant, based solely on his own review of 28 website photographs, is merely conjectural and does not demonstrate actual 1 knowledge of illegal barriers. See Vogel, 2014 WL 5427531, at *2. Further, as 2 discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege how any feature at the Hotel is non- 3 compliant with the ADA or how it relates to his disability so as to deter him from 4 staying at the Hotel. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955 (discussing that a plaintiff must 5 identify how each of the alleged barriers “deter him from visiting . . . the [place of 6 accommodation] due to his disability”). 7 Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he “intends to visit Defendant’s 8 Hotel at a specific time when Defendant’s noncompliant Hotel becomes fully 9 compliant” is insufficient to establish standing. (Compl. ¶ 12.) “Plaintiff does not 10 allege or provide any facts that he actually would return to the [Hotel] if it were ADA 11 compliant.” Hotel Circle, 2019 WL 6212084, at *5 (quoting Vogel, 2014 WL 12 5427531, at *2). Plaintiff has not alleged that he visits the Santa Monica area often or 13 will go to the Santa Monica area again. “Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that he is 14 deterred from visiting [the Hotel] are insufficient to demonstrate that he would [stay at 15 the Hotel] if it were accessible. As a result, he lacks standing to pursue his claims.” 16 Id. (quoting Feezor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 608 F. App’x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2015)). 17 Thus, any alleged deterrence is unsupported. 18 As the complaint fails to allege standing under the ADA, the Court finds that it 19 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claim. Accordingly, the Court 20 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s first cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 21 D. Supplemental Jurisdiction 22 A district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has 23 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford v. 24 MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1367(c)(3)). As the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s sole federal claim, the Court 26 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and 27 they are DISMISSED. 28 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 3 || Dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (ECF No. 6). At the conclusion of Plaintiffs 4|| Opposition, Plaintiff requests leave to amend “‘to the extent that the allegations in the 5 || complaint inadvertently omit sufficient jurisdictional allegations.” (Opp’n 10.) 6 || However, Plaintiff argues that the complaint already includes facts sufficient to 7 || establish subject matter jurisdiction, which the Court finds insufficient, and Plaintiff 8 | fails to suggest what more he would add in amendment. (See Opp’n 3, 8-9.) As such, 9 || the Court finds amendment would be futile, and the case is DISMISSED without 10 || leave to amend. 1] 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 December 9, 2019 15 □ @ 7 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II ig UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28