Jailen Parks v. Chacano Christian ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAILEN PARKS, ) Case No. CV 19-4346-GW (JPR) 12 ) Plaintiff, ) 13 ) ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S v. ) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 14 ) LEAVE TO AMEND CHOCANO CHRISTIAN, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 ) 17 18 On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro 19 se, filed a civil-rights action against Defendant Chocano 20 Christian in his official capacity, seeking compensatory damages 21 and possibly “plasti[c] surgery” and “therap[]y.” (Compl. at 3, 22 6.) He was subsequently granted leave to proceed in forma 23 pauperis. Plaintiff’s claims arise from his arrest on 24 unspecified charges, during which Defendant, an Inglewood Police 25 Department police officer, allegedly deployed a police dog 26 against him after he had surrendered. 27 On August 28, 2019, the Court dismissed the Complaint with 28 leave to amend, finding that its allegations failed to state any 1 1 claim on which relief might be granted. The Court identified the 2 deficiencies in the Complaint and explained what Plaintiff could 3 do to cure at least some of them. Specifically, the Court noted 4 that to sue Defendant in his official capacity, he had to 5 identify an “official policy or longstanding custom” of the IPD — 6 Defendant’s municipal employer — that caused his injuries. (Aug. 7 28 Order at 6-7.) It also explained that although Plaintiff 8 could potentially press an individual-capacity excessive-force 9 claim under the Fourth Amendment based on the alleged seizure, to 10 do so he had to allege what preceded it in order to show that the 11 alleged force used against him was unreasonable. (Id. at 9-10.) 12 Further, it warned that the Complaint’s sparse allegations did 13 not demonstrate that an excessive-force claim, if successful, 14 would not invalidate the conviction for which he was incarcerated 15 and therefore be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 16 (1994). (Aug. 28 Order at 10-11 n.1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff 17 was instructed that if he wanted to pursue an excessive-force 18 claim in any amended pleading, he should allege specific facts 19 showing that the Heck doctrine did not foreclose it. (Id.) The 20 Court also explained that to assert an equal-protection claim 21 under the 14th Amendment, Plaintiff had to state facts sufficient 22 to support an inference that he was a member of a protected class 23 and that he was discriminated against on that basis. (Id. at 8.) 24 The Court ordered Plaintiff to file a first amended 25 complaint, remedying the deficiencies discussed, and stressed 26 that the FAC must be complete in and of itself, without reference 27 to the Complaint or any other pleading, attachment, or document. 28 It advised him that if he believed the order erroneously disposed 2 1 of any of the claims, he could file objections with the District 2 Judge. (Id. at 11.) 3 Plaintiff did not file objections with the District Judge. 4 Instead, on October 28, 2019, he filed a “First Amendment [sic] 5 Complaint Order,” which the Court construes as a FAC. The four- 6 page handwritten document, some of which is illegible, fails to 7 remedy most of the deficiencies identified in the dismissal 8 order. For instance, Plaintiff maintains that he wishes to sue 9 the IPD (FAC at 4) but still fails to identify an official 10 municipal custom or policy that resulted in his injury. And 11 although he apparently still wishes to press an excessive-force 12 claim (id. at 1-2), he does not allege any facts about the events 13 preceding his altercation with Defendant to support an inference 14 that Defendant’s use of force was unreasonable. Nor does he 15 provide any information to enable the Court to discern whether 16 his excessive-force claim is Heck barred, instead suggesting that 17 the Heck doctrine runs afoul of the First Amendment. (Id. at 3.) 18 And although he does remedy one deficiency identified in the 19 August 28 Order by alleging that he is an African American (id.) 20 — and therefore a member of a protected class — he still fails to 21 allege any facts to suggest he was discriminated against because 22 he was a member of that class. Indeed, despite the Court’s 23 warning that the FAC must be “complete in and of itself, without 24 reference to the Complaint” (Aug. 28 Order at 11), the FAC 25 alleges far fewer facts than the deficient Complaint, barely 26 mentioning the assault that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims. 27 28 3 1 If Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his claims, he is 2 || ORDERED to file a second amended complaint within 28 days of the 3 || date of this order, remedying the deficiencies identified herein 4 || and in the August 28 Order. The SAC should bear the docket 5 || number assigned to this case, be labeled “Second Amended 6 Complaint,” and be complete in and of itself, without reference 7 || to the Complaint or any other pleading, attachment, or document. g || The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a Central 9 District of California Civil Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to 10 facilitate his filing of an organized and coherent SAC if he 11 || elects to proceed with this action. He is warned that if he 12 || fails to timely file a sufficient SAC, the Court may dismiss this 13 action on the grounds set forth above and in the August 28 Order 14 || ox for failure to diligently prosecute.’ 15 16 oh, if, 17 || DATED: December 16, 2019 JE P. ROSENBLUTH 18 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 If Plaintiff believes this order or the August 28 Order 25 erroneously disposes of any of his claims, he may file objections with the district judge within 20 days of the date of this order. 26 || See Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a magistrate judge believes she is issuing a nondispositive 27 || order, she may warn the litigants that, if they disagree and think the matter dispositive, they have the right to file an objection to 28 |! that determination with the district judge.”).