Primitivo Rojas Gomez v. United States District Court ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 PRIMITIVO ROJAS GOMEZ, ) No. 2:21-cv-03431-JLS (JDE) ) 12 ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 13 ) ) 14 v. ) ) 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, ) ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On April 19, 2021, Primitivo Rojas Gomez (“Plaintiff”) an inmate at 21 California Men’s Colony, in San Luis Obispo, California, proceeding pro se, 22 filed a document titled “Notice of International Commercial Claim Within 23 Admiralty 28 USC §§ 1333, §§ 1337 / Private Between Parties / 24 Administrative Remedy / Civil Rights Violations / 42 USC §§ 1983,” that, on 25 the second page, identified the “United States District Court Central District of 26 California” as the sole “Respondent.” Dkt. 1 at 1-10 (“Complaint”) (CM/ECF 27 pagination is used herein for references to Plaintiff’s filings). 28 1 Plaintiff alleges that he, a “sentient being of flesh and blood,” on 2 October 4, 2020, presented a “Notice and Demand” to “the Superior Court of 3 Norwalk,” advising that “case No. VA 130399 had been discharged.” 4 Complaint at 3. Plaintiff then claims that on November 4, 2020, he presented a 5 “Notice of Default” to Judge Raul A. Sahagun advising that he had 14 days to 6 respond. Id. Plaintiff avers that, as no response was provided, “according to 7 the commercial and maxims law: ‘He who leaves the battlefield, loses by 8 default.’” Id. at 3-4. After listing rights allegedly violated by the California 9 Superior Court and describing, among other things, actions of President 10 Roosevelt in declaring a National Emergency making it “unlawful for any 11 citizen of the United States to own gold,” causing the federal government to 12 take “much of our lawful money out of general circulation in 1933” with a 13 promise that “the federal government will pay the debts, dollar for dollar,” 14 Plaintiff alleges “[b]ase[d] on this law, [he] has discharged his debts, the 15 charges of the case no. VA130399.” Id. at 5-8. Plaintiff asks this Court “to take 16 participation due to the negligence of the state courts to enforce the contract,” 17 seeking release from prison, and expungement of his record. Id. at 8-9. 18 Attached to the Complaint are several documents, including, records of 19 the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles in People of the 20 State of California v. Primitivo Rojas Gomez, Case No. VA130399, reflecting 21 Plaintiff was convicted on January 15, 2014 for attempted murder and assault 22 with a deadly weapon, with an enhancement, resulting in the imposition of a 23 16-year prison sentence. See Dkt. 1 at 14- 17. Also attached to the Complaint 24 are, among other things: (1) a handwritten “Notice and Demand” by Plaintiff 25 to “Respondent Paul A. Sahagun or his successor, Superior Court of 26 Norwalk,” dated October 4, 2020, demanding, among other things, Plaintiff’s 27 release from custody, expungement of his record, and $4,808,320,000.00 in 28 damages (Dkt. 1 at 20-28, Dkt. 1-1 at 1-2); (2) a handwritten “Notice of 1 Default,” dated November 4, 2020, declaring a default on the prior Demand, 2 now asserting “damages” of $4,901,800,000.00 (Dkt. 1-1 at 4-15); and (3) an 3 “Affidavit of Truth” relating to the Demand and Notice of Default, dated 4 December 30, 2020 (Dkt. 1-1 at 17-25). 5 As Plaintiff is a prisoner who has filed a civil action seeking redress from 6 a governmental entity, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must screen the 7 Complaint to determine if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 8 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 9 is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the 10 Complaint is subject to immediate dismissal. 11 II. 12 STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 As noted, the Court must screen any civil complaint filed by a prisoner 14 seeking redress against a governmental defendant, and, if it is frivolous, fails to 15 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 16 party immune from such relief, dismiss it. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). 17 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for: (1) lack of 18 a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 19 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (as 20 amended). When screening a complaint, the Court applies the same standard 21 as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 23 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). In determining whether the complaint states a 24 claim, its factual allegations must be taken as true and construed in the light 25 most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 26 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts construe the allegations of pro se complaints 27 liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also 28 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended). But, “a liberal 1 interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of 2 the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 3 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 4 III. 5 DISCUSSION 6 The Complaint, construed liberally, is frivolous, fails to state a claim 7 upon which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary relief from a party 8 immune from such relief. 9 As an initial matter, the only “respondent” listed in the Complaint is this 10 Court; yet, Plaintiff makes no allegation of any conduct by this Court that 11 would support any claim against it. Nor could Plaintiff make such a claim, as 12 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), the purported statutory basis for the 13 Complaint (see Complaint at 1), neither the United States government nor its 14 agencies are “persons” that can be sued under the statute. See District of 15 Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-425 (1973). 16 Construing the Complaint broadly to seek relief against the California 17 Superior Court, it is similarly deficient. 18 To the extent the Complaint seeks monetary damages against the 19 California Superior Court under Section 1983, that court, an arm of the State 20 of California, is immune from such a suit. “The Eleventh Amendment 21 prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting 22 state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th 23 Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 24 100 (1984)). This jurisdictional bar includes “suits naming state agencies and 25 departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or 26 equitable in nature.” Id.; see also Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 27 Cir. 1999) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its 28 agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”). 1 California has not consented to suit against it in federal court. See BV Eng’g v. 2 Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Dittman v. 3 California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (“California has not waived 4 its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under 5 § 1983 in federal court”). Furthermore, Congress has not abrogated State 6 sovereign immunity for civil rights actions. See Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1026; 7 L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 8 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for damages under Section 1983 is barred 9 by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior 10 Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 To the extent Plaintiff seeks a finding that his conviction is invalid or 12 must be expunged, under the “favorable termination” rule of Heck v. 13 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), a Section 1983 action cannot proceed 14 “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief)” if “success in that 15 action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its 16 duration,” and the challenged conviction or sentence has not been invalidated. 17 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 18 (1997); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 19 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Heck applies both to actions for money damages 20 and to those, like this one, for injunctive relief.”). Here, as Plaintiff seeks 21 release and expungement of his underlying conviction as a remedy, success on 22 his claim would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his state court conviction, 23 which has not been invalidated. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81; France v. 24 Dewey, 2018 WL 6079232, *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018) (“The Ninth Circuit 25 has held that Heck generally bars claims challenging the validity of an arrest, 26 prosecution or conviction.”). As such, the claim is barred by Heck. 27 Separately, in general, a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement 28 may only proceed via a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Wilkinson, 544 1 U.S. at 79, 81. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973), the 2 Supreme Court held that a petition for habeas corpus is a prisoner’s sole 3 judicial remedy when attacking “the validity of the fact or length of . . . 4 confinement[.]” See also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) 5 (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its 6 duration are the province of habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)); Trimble v. 7 City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (plaintiff’s 8 claim seeking to be released from prison must be raised in a writ of habeas 9 corpus). “A prisoner in state custody simply may not use a § 1983 civil rights 10 action to challenge the ‘fact or duration of his confinement.’” Harris v. 11 California, 2008 WL 595880, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008) (quoting Preiser, 12 411 U.S. at 489); Tingley v. Nev. Dep’t of Public Safety, 2015 WL 2448818, at 13 *4 (D. Nev. May 21, 2015) (“§ 1983 is not a backdoor through which a federal 14 court may overturn a state court conviction or award relief related to the 15 duration of a sentence.”). Here, Plaintiff may not use a Section 1983 claim 16 here to seek early release from state custody. 17 Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff purports to base any claim against the 18 California Superior Court on some ground other than Section 1983, leaving 19 aside possible jurisdictional issues, any such basis is frivolous. For screening 20 purposes, a case is frivolous if it is “’of little weight or importance: having no 21 basis in law or fact.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) 22 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 913 (1993)). Having 23 reviewed the Complaint and supporting exhibits, the Court finds the case has 24 no basis in law or fact, is frivolous, and is subject to dismissal. 25 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the Complaint is frivolous, 26 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary 27 relief from a party immune from such relief. 28 1 V. 2 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 3 As the Complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief can 4 ||be granted, and seeks monetary relief from a party immune from such relief, it 5 ||must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). 6 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this action is 7 || DISMISSED with prejudice and Judgment shall be entered accordingly. 8 9 ||Dated: May 26, 2021 ~| ao —— 10 negli ob il J OSEPHIN L. STATON United States District Judge 12 || Presented by: a 14 D. EARLY 15 nited States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28