Valanda Harville v. Richman Property Services, Inc. ( 2024 )

O 1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 11 VALANDA HARVILLE et al., Case № 2:24-cv-07832-ODW (SSCx) 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [25]; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 14 RICHMAN PROPERTY SERVICES, TO DISMISS [11] INC. et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 On August 8, 2024, Plaintiffs Valanda Harville and Kimberly Lee initiated this 20 action against Defendants Richman Property Services, Inc. (“Richman”) and DOES 1 21 through 10 for violation of California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies 22 Act (“ICRAA”) in the Superior Court of California. (Notice Removal (“NOR”) Ex. A 23 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) On September 13, 2024, Richman 24 removed this action to federal court based on alleged diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 25 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (NOR ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs now move to remand. (Mem. P. & A. 26 ISO Mot. Remand (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 25-1.) For the reasons below, the 27 28 1 Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion and REMANDS this action to Los Angeles 2 County Superior Court.1 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 In 2023, each Plaintiff completed and submitted a rental application 5 (“Application”) to apply for an apartment unit in a building operated by Richman. 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 14.) The Application notified applicants that Richman may screen for 7 criminal background and previous evictions. (Id. ¶ 16.) Richman did not provide a 8 process for Plaintiffs to indicate that they wished to receive a copy of any report 9 prepared in connection with their respective Applications, and it did not provide 10 Plaintiffs with “a consent form or disclosure with a box to check” in connection with 11 such reports. (Id. ¶ 22.) Richman later processed each Plaintiff’s Application and 12 requested investigative consumer reports about each Plaintiff, obtaining at least two 13 such reports about each Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Richman did not provide Plaintiffs a 14 copy of any such reports. (Id. ¶ 23.) At least one of the Plaintiffs is a resident of an 15 apartment building Richman operates. (See Decl. Theresa Eastwood Davis ISO 16 Opp’n Mot. (“Davis Decl.”) ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 28-1.)2 17 On August 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court of the 18 State of California, County of Los Angeles. (Compl.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs 19 assert one cause of action for violation of the ICRAA. (Id. ¶¶ 26–36.) As relief, 20 Plaintiffs request (1) general, compensatory, and punitive damages; (2) statutory 21 damages; (3) interest; (4) attorneys’ fees; (5) equitable relief and restitution; 22 (6) declaratory judgment that each Plaintiff’s Application and annual re-certification 23 violates the ICRAA; (6) an injunction enjoining Richman from violating the ICRAA 24 25 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 26 Therefore, the Court VACATES the hearing scheduled for November 4, 2024, and takes the Motion under submission. 27 2 Richman’s president declares that Richman “has no record of Plaintiff Kimberly Lee ever 28 completing an application for or residing at [its] properties.” (Decl. Davis ¶ 9.) For purposes of this Motion, the Court takes Plaintiffs’ allegation that Lee completed such an application as true. 1 or refusing to rent to Plaintiffs; and (7) a writ of mandate and injunction requiring 2 Richman to, among other things, comply with the ICRAA by including in its rental 3 application an option for prospective applicants to receive a copy of any investigative 4 consumer report and, if requested, providing the reports themselves. (Id., Prayer.) 5 “Plaintiffs expressly limit the total amount of recovery, including statutory damages, 6 attorneys’ fees and costs, and [the] cost of injunctive relief not to exceed $74,999.” 7 (Id., Prayer ¶ 3.) 8 Richman removed this action to federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction 9 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (NOR ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs now move to remand this action 10 back to Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Mot.) The Motion is fully briefed. 11 (Opp’n Mot. (“Opp’n” or “Opposition”), ECF No. 28; Reply ISO Mot. (“Reply”), 12 ECF No. 30.) Richman also moves to dismiss this case. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 11; 13 Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 21; Reply Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 27.) 14 III. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that 16 jurisdiction as authorized by the Constitution and federal statute. Kokkonen v. 17 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), 18 a party may remove a civil action brought in a state court to a district court only if the 19 plaintiff could have originally filed the action in federal court. Federal district courts 20 have original jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law, or where each 21 plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship (i.e., diversity is 22 “complete”), and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 23 1332(a). 24 There is a strong presumption that a court is without jurisdiction until 25 affirmatively proven otherwise. Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 26 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970); see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 27 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 28 in the first instance.”). When an action is removed from state court, the removing 1 party bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. Corral v. Select 2 Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017). Removal is strictly 3 construed, and any doubt as to removal is to be resolved in favor of remand. Id. 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 Plaintiffs seek to remand the case to state court, asserting that the amount in 6 controversy does not exceed $75,000. (Mot. 8–15.) “Plaintiffs, who are the masters 7 of their complaints,” may “stipulat[e] to amounts at issue” “to avoid removal to 8 federal court, and to obtain a remand to state court.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 9 Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013); see St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab 10 Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (“If [a plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the 11 federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional 12 amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant cannot 13 remove.”). 14 Richman agrees that while a plaintiff “can limit the damages and attorney’s 15 fees [that plaintiff] seek[s] to $74,999,” a plaintiff cannot so limit the cost for a 16 defendant to comply with injunctive relief. (Opp’n 15 (collecting cases).) Here, 17 “Plaintiffs expressly limit the total amount of recovery, including statutory damages, 18 attorneys’ fees and costs, and [the] cost of injunctive relief not to exceed $74,999.” 19 (Compl., Prayer ¶ 3.) The Court need not decide whether a plaintiff can limit the cost 20 of injunctive and declaratory relief to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction. Even 21 assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff cannot place these limits on such relief, Richman 22 has failed to meet its burden to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 23 A. Monetary Damages 24 Plaintiffs limit the “total amount of recovery” alleged in the Complaint to “not 25 exceed $74,999.” (Id.) Therefore, at most, Plaintiffs’ monetary damages are limited 26 to $74,999 for purposes of the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. See, e.g., Standard Fire 27 Ins. Co, 568 U.S. at 595; St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 303 U.S. at 294; 28 1 (Opp’n 15). However, after careful analysis, the Court finds that Richman has shown 2 that Plaintiffs allege, at most, $20,000 in monetary damages. 3 1. Statutory Damages 4 The ICRAA, requires, among other things, any person requesting an 5 “investigative consumer report” to “[p]rovide the consumer a means by which the 6 consumer may indicate on a written form, by means of a box to check, that the 7 consumer wishes to receive a copy” of such report. Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.16(b). The 8 ICRAA provides for a minimum of $10,000 in damages for violations of the statute. 9 Id. § 1786.50(a)(1). Richman asserts that Plaintiffs ask for $20,000 in statutory 10 damages for each of the two Plaintiffs, and, therefore, those damages must be 11 aggregated and the amount in controversy is $40,000, (Opp’n 9–10, 19).3 12 “[A]s a general rule, multiple plaintiffs who assert ‘separate and distinct’ claims 13 in a lawsuit may not aggregate their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.” 14 Bockrath v. Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co., No. 2:20-cv-04179-CJC (PJWx), 2020 WL 15 3469265, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2020); see Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 16 726 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The traditional rule is that multiple plaintiffs 17 who assert separate and distinct claims are precluded from aggregating them to satisfy 18 the amount in controversy requirement.”). This anti-aggregation principal “applies to 19 any civil case,” including representative suits, not just class actions. Jaimes v. Am. 20 First Fin. LLC, No. 23-cv-00978-SK, 2023 WL 6783774, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 21 2023) (collecting cases) (quoting Phipps v. Praxair, Inc., No. 99-CV-1848 TW (LAB), 22 1999 WL 1095331, at *5 (S.D Cal. Nov. 12, 1999)). 23 24 25 3 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they “are each entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $10,000 per investigative consumer report” and that Richman “obtained at least two . . . reports 26 about each of the Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 33.) However, in their Prayer for Relief, Plaintiffs seek “statutory damages . . . on each cause of action . . . in the amount of $10,000 to each Plaintiff.” (Id., 27 Prayer ¶ 3.) Because it would not change this Court’s ruling if Plaintiffs were seeking $10,000 per 28 report or $10,000 per Plaintiff, the Court uses the higher amount—$10,000 per report and $20,000 per Plaintiff—in its analysis. 1 In Snyder v. Harris, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]ggregation has been 2 permitted only” in two circumstances: “(1) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to 3 aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single defendant and (2) in cases in 4 which two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have 5 a common and undivided interest.” 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969). To determine the 6 second exception’s character of interest, “courts look to the source of plaintiffs’ 7 claims. If the claims are derived from rights that they hold in group status, then the 8 claims are common and undivided. If not, the claims are separate and distinct.” 9 Urbino, 726 F.3d at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted). “But simply because 10 claims may have questions of fact and law common to the group does not mean they 11 have a common and undivided interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert they are pursuing this action “acting for 13 themselves and also as . . . private attorney general[s] seeking to redress wrongs and 14 protect the rights of other building tenants so that the continuing illegal practices in 15 violation of the Civil Code permanently cease.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) Richman relies on this 16 assertion to argue that damages should be aggregated. (Opp’n 19.) 17 However, Plaintiffs also allege that “each” Plaintiff is “entitled to statutory 18 damages” in connection with Defendant obtaining “investigat[iv]e consumer reports 19 about each of the Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 33 (emphasis added).) Thus, while Plaintiffs 20 may be seeking injunctive relief on behalf of others, the monetary relief Plaintiffs 21 seek—$10,000 per report per Plaintiff—are separate and distinct claims for each 22 Plaintiff. 23 Richman asserts that Plaintiffs’ purported strategy to file multiple suits with 24 fewer plaintiffs instead of one suit with all plaintiffs “demonstrates an understanding 25 that the claims will be aggregated.” (Opp’n 19 n.8.) Even if true, at most, this 26 demonstrates Plaintiffs’ view of the law, not the state of the law. Moreover, the fact 27 that multiple consumers have filed separate lawsuits, and each has alleged violations 28 in connection with each consumer’s respective reports, supports that these claims are 1 distinct and not undivided. See, e.g., Completo v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., 2 No. 2:24-cv-04233-ODW (SSCx) (fourteen plaintiffs); Calloway v. Richman Prop. 3 Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-04232-ODW (SSCx) (seven plaintiffs); Alvarado v. Richman 4 Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 8:24-cv-02008-ODW (SSCx) (two plaintiffs); Ruffins v. 5 Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08288-ODW (SSCx) (two plaintiffs); Lee v. 6 Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08286-ODW (SSCx) (two plaintiffs); Murph 7 v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08545-ODW (SSCx) (two plaintiffs); 8 Hernandez v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08242-ODW (SSCx) (two 9 plaintiffs). 10 Richman also fails to cite even one case that supports aggregation here. (See 11 Opp’n 6, 19.) Therefore, Richman fails to meet its burden to show that Plaintiffs’ 12 claims should be aggregated. Because each Plaintiff seeks $10,000 of statutory 13 damages per investigative consumer report, and each Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 14 “obtained at least two” such reports per Plaintiff, (Compl. ¶ 33), Plaintiffs’ claim for 15 statutory damages supports only $20,000 amount in controversy. 16 2. Attorneys’ Fees 17 Under the ICRAA, a plaintiff may recover “the costs of the action together 18 with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.” Cal. Civ. Code 19 § 1786.50(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that attorneys’ fees awarded under fee- 20 shifting statutes can be considered in assessing the jurisdictional threshold. Gonzales 21 v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2016). However, “a 22 removing defendant” must “prove that the amount in controversy (including attorneys’ 23 fees) exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by a preponderance of the evidence,” and 24 must “make this showing with summary-judgment-type evidence.” Fritsch v. Swift 25 Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2018). As such, a “district court 26 may reject the defendant’s attempts to include future attorneys’ fees in the amount in 27 controversy if the defendant fails to satisfy this burden of proof.” Id. Although a 28 defendant can “meet its burden to establish a reasonable estimate of attorneys’ fees by 1 identifying awards in other cases, those cases must be similar enough to the case at 2 hand that the court can conclude that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff may 3 incur a similar fee award.” Kaplan v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 21-cv-857 TWR 4 (AGS), 2021 WL 4352340, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021). 5 Here, Richman fails to meet its burden with respect to attorneys’ fees. Richman 6 cites two cases to support its contention that attorneys’ fees should be included in the 7 amount in controversy calculation. (See Opp’n 12–13.) First, Richman cites Elmi v. 8 Related Mgmt. Co., L.P., No. G061379, 2023 WL 6210756 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 9 2023), as an example of an ICRAA case where a plaintiff sought more than $300,000 10 in attorneys’ fees. (See Opp’n 12.) However, there, the appellate court did not award 11 $300,000 in attorneys’ fees, but instead affirmed the trial court’s $19,440 award. 12 Elmi, 2023 WL 6210756, at 1, 4. Second, Richman cites Smith v. Abode Cmtys., LLC, 13 No. 20STCV11372, 2022 WL 17752962 (Cal. Super. Oct. 11, 2022), in which a court 14 awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel $147,690 in an ICRAA case it won after a jury trial. (See 15 Opp’n 11–12.) However, despite that case concerning an ICRAA claim litigated by 16 Plaintiffs’ counsel, Richman makes no effort to explain how that case is comparable to 17 this one such that the Court “can conclude that it is more likely than not that the 18 plaintiff may incur a similar fee award.” Kaplan, 2021 WL 4352340, at *6. 19 Richman also submitted a declaration from one of its attorneys stating that 20 “[s]ignificant fees have been incurred so far” and “based on [his] experience, it is 21 unlikely this case will settle quickly.” (Decl. Benjamin E. Strauss ¶ 2, ECF No. 28-4.) 22 This is not enough for Richman to meet its burden. In fact, attorneys’ fees may be less 23 here than the typical case—including Smith—because Plaintiffs’ counsel is 24 representing numerous Plaintiffs in nearly identical cases against Richman where the 25 parties have filed nearly identical motions.4 This duplication of work would more 26 likely than not lead to a reduced attorneys’ fees award on a per-Plaintiff basis. 27 4 See, e.g., Mot. Remand, Completo v. Richman Prop. Servs., No. 2:24-cv-04233-ODW (SSCx), 28 ECF No. 16; Mot. Remand, Calloway v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-04232-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 20; Mot. Remand, Alvarado v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 8:24-cv-02008- 1 Because the removal statute is strictly construed, and all doubts are resolved in 2 favor of remand, the Court finds that Richman fails to submit adequate evidence 3 substantiating any attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the Court does not consider attorneys’ 4 fees in its amount in controversy calculation. 5 3. Other Damages 6 Richman references the alleged punitive damages. (Opp’n 5–7, 11, 17.) 7 Richman’s bare assertion that the Court should consider these damages “provides the 8 Court with no factual or legal basis by which to determine the likelihood” of such an 9 award in this case. Banuelos v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-08955-JHN 10 (AGRx), 2011 WL 6106518, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011); Dressler v. Hartford Fin. 11 Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-02134-MMM (MANx), 2014 WL 12560796, at *7 12 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (“The mere fact that a plaintiff seeks punitive damages, 13 however, is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that the amount in controversy 14 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.”). Therefore, inclusion of these damages “in the 15 amount in controversy would be improper.” Hulse v. Bethesda Lutheran Cmtys., Inc., 16 No. 5:18-cv-00262-FMO (KKx), 2018 WL 1033223, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018). 17 For the same reasons, the Court cannot consider the other purported monetary 18 damages, including compensatory, general, emotional distress damages, and invasion 19 of privacy damages. (See Opp’n 7, 10.) 20 B. Non-Monetary Relief 21 Having found that Richman has shown that the amount in controversy for 22 Plaintiffs’ pleaded monetary relief is $20,000, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ requested 23 non-monetary relief. 24 25 26 ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 19; Mot. Dismiss, Ruffins v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv- 08288-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 9; Mot. Dismiss, Lee v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv- 27 08286-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 11; Mot. Dismiss, Murph v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv- 28 08545-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 10; Mot. Dismiss, Hernandez v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08242-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 9. 1 1. Injunctive Relief 2 Richman asserts that the cost of Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief “would be 3 significant,” because it would require it to “overhaul” the “entire application and 4 leasing processes for all 19 buildings that it operates in California.” (Opp’n 14.) In a 5 declaration, Richman’s president states that she “cannot yet determine the cost of the 6 requested injunction,” but provides “one data point for assessing the vast cost”— 7 Richman’s leasing and application software contract costs more than $42,000 per year. 8 (Davis Decl. ¶ 4.) Richman’s president also asserts that Richman will “need to create 9 training materials and deliver training to over 40 California employees on these new 10 systems.” (Id.) 11 These assertions do not support an amount in controversy for compliance with 12 injunctive relief. First, Richman does not clarify how the cost of its leasing and 13 application software relates to the costs that would be incurred to comply with a 14 hypothetical injunction requiring changes to its rental applications. Second, Richman 15 fails to explain why such compliance would require training for its employees or what 16 “these new systems” entail. In its motion to dismiss, Richman characterizes its 17 purported violation as “allegedly omitting a checkbox.” (Mot. Dismiss 21.) The 18 evidence submitted in support of its Opposition does not suggest that adding a simple 19 “checkbox” to its rental application would cost Richman significant sums of money. 20 Even if it did, Richman provides no basis for the Court to determine what that amount 21 should be for purposes of the jurisdictional analysis. 22 2. Declaratory Relief 23 Richman contends that the cost of complying with Plaintiffs’ requested 24 declaratory relief satisfies the amount in controversy. (See Opp’n 6–7.) “In actions 25 seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in 26 controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Corral, 878 F.3d 27 at 775; accord Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). 28 The “object of the litigation” in this case is a declaration that rental applications and 1 annual re-certifications violate the ICRAA. (See Compl. ¶ 59, Prayer ¶¶ 7–8). 2 Richman asserts that declaratory relief, in conjunction with equitable relief and 3 restitution, could cost it $33,090 for Plaintiff Harville (the rent due throughout 4 Harville’s lease).5 (Opp’n 16; see Davis Decl. ¶ 10.) The Court cannot credit this 5 amount because the rental agreements are not the “object of the litigation.” 6 Plaintiffs seek a declaration that their “Rental Application and the annual 7 re-certification . . . violate the ICRAA.” (Compl., Prayer ¶ 8.) Richman asserts that, 8 in the Complaint, Plaintiffs “seek to declare illegal and void the” Applications and re- 9 certifications. (Opp’n 16.) Plaintiffs seek no such relief. (See generally Compl.) 10 Instead, they ask for “declaratory judgment that the” Plaintiffs’ Applications and re- 11 certifications “violate the ICRAA.”6 (Id., Prayer ¶ 8.) In any event, nowhere in the 12 Complaint do Plaintiffs request a declaration that their rental agreements are void. 13 (See generally Compl.) Richman has not shown how voiding the rental applications, 14 but not the rental agreements, would cost it any money or lead to voidance of the 15 rental agreements themselves. 16 For the same reasons, the Court cannot credit Richman’s speculative claim that 17 voiding the rental agreements for units “supplemented by tax credits and other 18 financial benefits provided by the State of California and [the] federal 19 government . . . . would cause a chain reaction resulting in millions of dollars in harm 20 to Defendant.”7 (Opp’n 17–18.) Moreover, the amount in controversy “is determined 21 by the amount involved in the particular case, and not by any contingent loss either 22 23 5 As noted, Richman’s president declares that Richman “has no record of Plaintiff Kimberly Lee ever completing an application for or residing at [its] properties.” (Decl. Davis ¶ 9.) 24 6 Other plaintiffs in separate cases filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel asked for a declaration that those 25 plaintiffs’ rental applications are illegal and wholly void. See, e.g., Complaint, Prayer ¶ 8, Completo v. Richman Prop. Servs., No. 2:24-cv-04233-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 1-1; Complaint, Prayer ¶ 8, 26 Calloway v. Richman Prop. Servs., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-04232-ODW (SSCx), ECF No. 1-1. Richman appears to have failed to adjust its Opposition to reflect the Complaint filed in this case. 27 7 Once again, Richman appears to have failed to tailor its Opposition to the Complaint filed in this 28 case. Richman does not allege either Plaintiff rents an affordable house unit from Richman. (See Opp’n 17–18.) 1 || one of the parties may sustain by the probative effect of the judgment.” New England 2 || Mortg. Sec. Co. v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123, 130 (1892); see WBI, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. 3 | Co., No. 2:15-cv-04852-MWEF (AFMx), 2016 WL 4528956, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016) (“[W]hatever the collateral effects a decree or judgment might have... on the 5 || rights or interests of the parties to this action or third parties, these effects cannot be 6 || taken into account in calculating the amount in controversy. (internal quotation marks 7 || omitted)).” Even if voiding certain rental agreements could possibly lead to Richman 8 | losing tax credits, Plaintiffs do not request this relief and it is therefore not the “object 9 || of the litigation.” 10 Therefore, for purposes of the jurisdictional analysis, Richman has proven 11 | $20,000 in controversy. Even assuming the requested monetary relief is $74,999, 12 | Richman fails prove that Plaintiffs’ requested non-monetary relief should be credited 13 | to the amount in controversy. Therefore, the amount in controversy is below the 14 || $75,000 threshold required for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 15 Vv. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, 17 | (ECF No. 25), and REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County 18 || of Los Angeles, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Case 19 | No. 24STCV20064. Consequently, the Court DENIES Richman’s Motion to Dismiss, 20 || (ECF No. 11), as moot. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 October 22, 2024 25 “yg 26 GEM: Lik 7 OTIS WRIGHT, I 08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE