United States v. Francisco Flores ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 10, 2020            Decided April 23, 2021
    No. 19-3100
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    FRANCISCO CARBAJAL FLORES, ALSO KNOWN AS DALMATA,
    APPELLANT
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:11-cr-00143-1)
    Richard K. Gilbert, appointed by the court, argued the
    cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Kristen Grim
    Hughes, appointed by the court.
    Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
    cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Elizabeth
    Trosman, Michael DiLorenzo, and Karen P. Seifert, Assistant
    U.S. Attorneys.
    Before: ROGERS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
    2
    Opinion dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    RANDOLPH.
    RAO, Circuit Judge: Mexican cartel member Francisco
    Carbajal Flores pled guilty to three counts. The first involved a
    racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (“RICO”)
    conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United
    States, and the second and third counts related to being an
    accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder in
    Mexico of two U.S. Special Agents. On appeal, Flores argues
    that the district court erred in sentencing him for the RICO
    conspiracy because it miscalculated his offense level under the
    U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, Flores argues that his
    other two convictions should be vacated because 
    18 U.S.C. § 1114
    , which criminalizes the killing or attempted killing of a
    U.S. officer, does not apply extraterritorially, as recognized by
    this court’s recent decision in United States v. Garcia Sota, 
    948 F.3d 356
     (D.C. Cir. 2020). We affirm the district court’s
    sentence for the RICO conspiracy and vacate Flores’ two
    convictions under Section 1114.
    I.
    The government charged Flores with various crimes
    related to his role with Los Zetas, a violent, transnational
    criminal organization that controls hundreds of miles of
    territory along the United States-Mexico border, as well as
    various drug trafficking routes. Los Zetas transports multi-ton
    quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Mexico to the United
    States each month.
    Los Zetas operates with a militaristic structure and protects
    its territory with force. A plaza boss controls a town with the
    cartel’s hit squads (“estacas”). Each hit squad is led by a
    commander (“comandante”) who manages the squad’s armed
    3
    hitmen (“sicarios”). Frequently patrolling by vehicle, the hit
    squads “provid[e] protection for the cartel’s illegal activity,
    including protection of its lucrative drug trafficking routes
    from Mexico to the United States, identification and
    elimination of rival cartel members, kidnap[p]ings,
    carjackings, human smuggling and assassinations.” App. 38.
    Los Zetas also employs lookouts (“halcones”) to monitor
    activity in the cartel’s territory.
    Flores joined Los Zetas in November 2009 as a lookout,
    became a hitman in May 2010, and was later promoted to a hit
    squad commander. Flores admitted that during his time with
    Los Zetas he “carried out various acts of violence and
    intimidation on behalf of the organization against Mexican law
    enforcement officers and rival drug cartel members for the
    purpose of maintaining control over the organization’s
    territory, to include its drug smuggling routes to the United
    States.” App. 38–39.
    As part of a plea agreement, Flores also provided
    information about an attack on two U.S. Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement Special Agents. On February 15, 2011,
    Special Agents Jaime Zapata and Victor Avila were returning
    to Mexico City in an armored SUV when two vehicles—each
    occupied by a Los Zetas hit squad—forced the SUV off the
    road near San Luis Potosi. Special Agent Avila stated they
    were diplomats from the U.S. Embassy, but the hit squad
    nonetheless fired at least eighty-eight rounds of ammunition at
    the agents, with several rounds entering the SUV through an
    open window. Special Agent Zapata was killed, and Special
    Agent Avila was seriously wounded. Both hit squads fled.
    Flores belonged to one of these hit squads, but he was not
    present at the attack because he was visiting his family that day.
    When Flores rejoined the squad, they told him what transpired
    4
    during the attack and made multiple inculpatory statements.
    Flores was tasked with protecting his fellow hit squad members
    from arrest. But about a week after the attack, Mexican
    authorities arrested Flores and his hit squad. Authorities also
    recovered various weapons, which ballistics testing linked to
    cartridge casings recovered from the scene of the attack.
    Following his arrest, Flores was charged in a four-count
    indictment. The government entered into a plea agreement with
    Flores that allowed him to plead to more limited charges and
    that included a detailed statement of facts. Pursuant to that
    agreement, he pled guilty to three counts: 1 (1) a RICO
    conspiracy, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (d); (2) accessory
    after the fact to the murder of an officer or employee of the
    United States, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3
    , 1111, 1114; and
    (3) accessory after the fact to the attempted murder of an officer
    or employee of the United States, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3
    , 1113, 1114.2
    Consistent with his plea agreement, Flores testified as a
    government witness in the trial of two individuals who
    1
    The three-count information included two of the four counts for
    which he was indicted and a RICO conspiracy charge that was not
    included in the indictment.
    2
    Section 1114 makes it illegal to “kill[] or attempt[] to kill any
    officer or employee of the United States … while such officer or
    employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official
    duties.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1114
    . Section 1114 incorporates Sections 1111
    and 1113 by reference: a person who violates 1114 “shall be
    punished … in the case of murder, as provided under section 1111”
    or “in the case of attempted murder or manslaughter, as provided in
    section 1113.” 
    Id.
     § 1114(1), (3). Section 3 provides the standard for
    being an “accessory after the fact” to these crimes. Id. § 3. For
    brevity, we refer to Counts 2 and 3 as convictions under Section
    1114.
    5
    participated in the attack on the Special Agents. The district
    court subsequently sentenced Flores to twelve years of
    incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release, a
    $300 special assessment, and restitution. Flores appealed,
    challenging the district court’s consideration of his murder of a
    Mexican national when it calculated his Sentencing Guidelines
    (“Guidelines”) range. We agreed with Flores that the district
    court erred and remanded for resentencing because Flores’
    murder of a Mexican national did not qualify as “underlying
    racketeering activity” and thus could not be used when
    calculating his base offense level for the RICO conspiracy. See
    United States v. Flores, 
    912 F.3d 613
    , 622–23 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
    (“Flores I”) (cleaned up).
    The Probation Office prepared a revised presentence
    report, calculating Flores’ total offense level under the
    Guidelines at 43. After a hearing, the district court again
    sentenced Flores to twelve years’ imprisonment with credit for
    time served, followed by three years of supervised release, a
    $300 special assessment, and restitution.
    In this second appeal, Flores challenges the district court’s
    calculation of his sentence for the RICO conspiracy under the
    Guidelines. In addition, Flores argues his convictions for being
    an accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder
    of two Special Agents should be vacated because the statute
    under which he was convicted, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1114
    , does not
    apply extraterritorially, as we recently recognized in Garcia
    Sota, 948 F.3d at 357. We consider each claim in turn.
    II.
    Flores argues that the district court erred in sentencing him
    for the RICO conspiracy by miscalculating his offense level
    under the Guidelines. This court reviews a sentence imposed
    under the Guidelines to determine whether it is “reasonable.”
    6
    United States v. Blalock, 
    571 F.3d 1282
    , 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
    (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46 (2007)).
    Reasonableness review is a two-step process: First, this court
    ensures the district court did not procedurally err by, for
    instance, miscalculating the Guidelines. 
    Id.
     Second, the court
    reviews the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an
    abuse of discretion standard. 
    Id.
     Flores challenges only the
    accuracy of the district court’s Guidelines calculations, so our
    analysis focuses on the first step. We accept the district court’s
    findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and “give due
    deference to the district court’s application of the [G]uidelines
    to the facts.” United States v. McCants, 
    554 F.3d 155
    , 160
    (D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
    Flores contends that the district court erred in adopting a
    Guidelines total offense level of 43 by (1) attributing to Flores
    the total amount of drugs Los Zetas imported to the United
    States while he worked for the cartel; (2) applying an
    enhancement for a managerial role; and (3) applying
    enhancements related to Flores’ criminal conduct occurring in
    Mexico. We find no reversible error in the district court’s
    calculation of Flores’ sentence.
    A.
    Flores first argues the district court erred when it attributed
    to him the total amount of drugs Los Zetas trafficked to the
    United States during his roughly fifteen months working for the
    cartel.
    A court determines a defendant’s base offense level by
    examining his “[r]elevant [c]onduct.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3
    (2018). Where there is “jointly undertaken criminal activity”—
    such as a criminal enterprise—an individual defendant is
    accountable for the conduct of others that was “within the
    scope of,” “in furtherance of,” and “reasonably foreseeable in
    7
    connection with that criminal             activity.”    See    id.
    § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & app. n.3.
    Here, Flores pled guilty to participating in a drug
    trafficking conspiracy that spanned from November 2009
    through February 2011 and involved multiple acts of importing
    five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States. Flores
    admitted that when he began working for Los Zetas, he knew
    it was a criminal organization dedicated to drug trafficking and
    the transshipment of drugs. Likewise, in the statement of facts
    accompanying his guilty plea, Flores admitted knowing that
    Los Zetas imported massive quantities of cocaine into the
    United States, and that the cartel was responsible for
    transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana each
    month to the United States. Flores further admitted he engaged
    in acts of violence and intimidation to maintain the cartel’s
    territory—including its drug smuggling routes to the United
    States. Based on these admissions, the district court did not
    clearly err when determining the drug quantity attributable to
    Flores. See United States v. Santos, 
    357 F.3d 136
    , 141 (1st Cir.
    2004) (explaining the sentencing court was entitled to rely on
    concessions defendant made when pleading guilty in
    determining drug quantity attributable to him); see generally
    Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 74 (1977) (stating that facts
    acknowledged during guilty plea proceedings have a “strong
    presumption of verity”).
    In arguing that the district court erred in determining the
    drug quantity for which he was responsible, Flores focuses on
    the meaning of “jointly undertaken criminal activity” in
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). He maintains that he had no
    agreement relating to the importation of drugs and had no direct
    role in any of the drug trafficking transactions. Yet courts have
    often attributed to enforcers the entire drug quantity that passes
    through a conspiracy while they were participants in the
    8
    conspiracy. See United States v. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d 188
    , 214 (3d
    Cir. 1999) (collecting cases); see also United States v.
    Laureano-Pérez, 
    797 F.3d 45
    , 81 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that
    the organization’s enforcer could “reasonably have
    anticipated” the quantity of drugs involved and that there was
    no error in attributing the entire amount trafficked by the
    conspiracy to him) (cleaned up). Flores admitted using
    violence and intimidation to protect lucrative drug trafficking
    routes from Mexico to the United States in exchange for a
    monthly salary. The cartel earns money by trafficking drugs, so
    even if he did not personally traffic drugs to the United States,
    his argument that he did not receive proceeds from drug
    trafficking is unpersuasive.
    Undeterred, Flores argues that “[t]he law in this Circuit
    does not permit a district court, for sentencing purposes, to
    attribute to an individual defendant the quantity of drugs
    attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.” Flores Br. 41. Yet
    none of the cases Flores cites prohibits such an attribution when
    a district court determines it is warranted. See, e.g., United
    States v. Saro, 
    24 F.3d 283
    , 288–90 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gibbs,
    
    190 F.3d at
    214–15. In fact, in Saro, a case on which Flores
    heavily relies, this court explained that “[i]n some conspiracies,
    of course, each participant has joined (implicitly or explicitly)
    in the overall scheme, so that the scope of the conspiracy is
    identical for each,” 
    24 F.3d at 289
     (emphasis omitted), meaning
    the district court has authority to attribute the total amount of
    drugs involved in the conspiracy to each defendant. Here, the
    co-conspirators joined an “overall scheme” to traffic drugs into
    the United States. As a lookout, Flores reported on the
    movement of rival cartels and law enforcement, which
    facilitated drug trafficking. As a hitman and commander,
    Flores used violence and intimidation to keep the drug routes
    open for transport. It follows that Flores was part of the “overall
    scheme” of the conspiracy and that the district court reasonably
    9
    attributed to Flores the total amount of drugs he conceded Los
    Zetas trafficked into the United States during the time he served
    in those positions.3
    We find that the district court did not commit reversible
    error in determining the drug quantity for which Flores was
    responsible.4
    B.
    Second, Flores argues the district court erred in enhancing
    his offense level by two points based on his role in the RICO
    conspiracy. We disagree. This two-point enhancement applies
    if the defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or
    supervisor” of the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
    “[P]ersons receiving an enhancement under § 3B1.1 must
    exercise some control over others.” United States v. Wilson,
    
    605 F.3d 985
    , 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
    3
    “[T]he role of enforcer is often central to the viability of the drug
    conspiracy, which perforce exists in a dangerous environment,” but
    “there may be different types of enforcers in a conspiracy” to whom
    different amounts of drugs may be attributed. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d at 214
    .
    Thus, although the entire drug quantity that passed through a
    conspiracy may not be attributable to every enforcer, based on
    Flores’ admissions in the statement of facts accompanying his guilty
    plea, the district court did not clearly err in attributing such a quantity
    to him for the duration of his participation in the conspiracy.
    4
    Flores also cursorily argues the district court erred by imposing a
    two-point enhancement for methamphetamine importation because
    Flores “did not … have anything to do with that.” Flores Br. 33. But
    in the statement of facts supporting his guilty plea, Flores admitted
    he was aware the cartel imported methamphetamines into the United
    States, and—as discussed—that his role was to keep the Mexico-
    United States drug smuggling routes open. The district court did not
    err in imposing the two-point enhancement.
    10
    Although “[a]n enhancement under § 3B1.1 must be supported
    by the preponderance of the evidence, … such evidence may
    be circumstantial.” United States v. Graham, 
    162 F.3d 1180
    ,
    1183 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (cleaned up).
    Flores argues that the presentence report focuses on his
    role as a hitman—which is generally not a supervisory role—
    and that the report did not describe whom he allegedly
    supervised. Although Flores admits the report recognizes that
    he served as the commander of a hit squad, he argues this was
    not the district court’s stated reason for the role enhancement.
    At the resentencing hearing, however, the district court
    made clear that the two-point enhancement for a supervisory
    role was imposed based on Flores’ role as a commander. The
    district court adopted the presentence report without much
    additional explanation. When discussing the enhancement, the
    district court referred to Flores’ role as a hitman and a
    commander, but ultimately focused on Flores’ position of
    authority vis-à-vis other members of his hit squad, thus tying
    the enhancement to Flores’ role as a commander.
    Moreover, a preponderance of the evidence shows Flores
    had a supervisory role in which he exercised some control over
    others. For instance, Flores acknowledges he served as a
    commander. Flores described the role of a commander in detail
    in his testimony at the Garcia Sota trial, explaining that
    commanders decided what vehicles to hijack for Los Zetas to
    use; determined when hit squad members could leave and
    return to their squads; and summoned hit squad members for
    cartel meetings. In addition, Flores acknowledged that, during
    his time as a commander, his hit squad collected “taxes” from
    Los Zetas controlled junk yards and drug houses. These facts
    11
    demonstrate that Flores—even if for a brief time 5 —held a
    supervisory role with the authority to direct others, which
    distinguishes his role from less-culpable participants. See, e.g.,
    Wilson, 
    605 F.3d at 1038
     (upholding application of an
    enhancement in a drug conspiracy case where the defendant
    directed the activity of “foot soldiers” and was considered a
    leader by crew members).6 We conclude the district court did
    not commit reversible error in applying the two-point
    supervisory role enhancement.
    C.
    Finally, Flores argues the district court erred by
    considering his criminal conduct in Mexico when imposing a
    two-point enhancement for his use of “threats and violence,”
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2), and a two-point enhancement for
    physical restraint of a victim, id. § 3A1.3. Because his acts of
    violence were all committed in Mexico against Mexican
    victims, Flores asserts they did not relate to Los Zetas’
    5
    Flores relies on the fact he was demoted to a hitman after his arrest,
    but that does not negate his service as a commander for a couple of
    weeks. The Guidelines provide no minimum amount of time a
    defendant must serve in a supervisory role to qualify for the
    enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
    6
    To support his argument that the district court erred in applying this
    two-point enhancement, Flores also points to seemingly
    contradictory language in the revised presentence report suggesting
    the enhancement was imposed based on his non-supervisory role as
    a hitman. But Flores did not raise this argument in the district court
    at resentencing, so it is forfeited. In any event, although the district
    court adopted the presentence report “as written,” Supp. App. 76,
    during resentencing the district court also adopted the government’s
    argument that the enhancement was appropriate based on Flores’ role
    as a commander. The defense made no objection that such a finding
    would be inconsistent with the presentence report.
    12
    conspiracy to traffic drugs into the United States, and therefore
    the district court cannot consider them as “relevant conduct”
    for the RICO conspiracy. Relying on the reasoning of Flores I,
    in which the court held that the murder of a Mexican national
    in Mexico could not be used when calculating Flores’ base
    offense level, 912 F.3d at 621–22, Flores maintains that the
    district court erred in considering his other criminal conduct
    perpetrated in Mexico when it recalculated his sentence.
    In Flores I, this court held that “the relevant conduct
    Guidelines cannot be used to calculate the base offense level of
    an act that does not qualify as ‘racketeering activity.’” 912 F.3d
    at 621. We therefore consider whether Flores’ underlying
    conduct qualifies as “racketeering activity.” Id. (citing
    U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2)); see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
    European Cmty., 
    136 S. Ct. 2090
    , 2096 (2016) (“[RICO]
    predicates include any act ‘indictable’ under specified federal
    statutes, … and any offense involving … drug-related activity
    that is ‘punishable’ under federal law.”). In resentencing
    Flores, the district court focused on activity that qualifies as
    “racketeering activity.” Specifically, Flores’ sentence was
    based on his guilty plea to a RICO conspiracy charge where the
    pattern of racketeering activities included conspiracy to import
    into the United States substantial quantities of cocaine and
    marijuana in violation of federal law. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 952
    (prohibiting importation of controlled substances into the
    United States); 
    id.
     § 963 (applying the same punishment for
    conspiracy to commit the same). Flores admitted to
    “kidnap[p]ing, assault, attempted murder, and murder as a
    means of protecting the … lucrative drug distribution routes
    from Mexico to the United States.” App. 57. Flores also
    admitted he “carried out various acts of violence and
    intimidation on behalf of [Los Zetas] against Mexican law
    enforcement officers and rival drug cartel members for the
    purpose of maintaining control over the … drug smuggling
    13
    routes to the United States.” App. 38–39. Thus, Flores’ guilty
    plea effectively concedes that his violent conduct was related
    to the drug smuggling conspiracy and therefore was
    racketeering activity.
    The grounds for finding error in Flores I are not present
    here because the relevant conduct used to calculate Flores’ base
    offense level was racketeering activity. In light of Flores’
    admission that he committed kidnappings, murders, and
    numerous other violent crimes to protect Los Zetas’ Mexico-
    United States drug trafficking routes, the district court did not
    commit reversible error in imposing a two-point enhancement
    for the use of threats and violence and a two-point enhancement
    for the use of physical restraints. See id. § 1B1.3(a), (a)(1)(A)
    (explaining that “specific offense characteristics” and
    “adjustments” “shall be determined on the basis of … all acts
    and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
    commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
    defendant”).
    In sum, we affirm the district court’s calculation of Flores’
    sentence for the RICO conspiracy.
    III.
    Flores also argues that we should vacate his convictions
    for accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder
    of U.S. officials under Section 1114. Because Section 1114
    does not apply extraterritorially, as Garcia Sota recognized,
    Flores maintains that the district court erred in convicting him
    under that statute for crimes committed in Mexico. The
    government responds that Flores forfeited this argument by
    failing to raise it on direct appeal. Because we find plain error
    in this case, we conclude that Flores’ convictions under Section
    1114 must be vacated.
    14
    In general, an appellant who fails to raise an available issue
    in an initial appeal may not raise that claim in a second appeal
    after remand because such claims are forfeited. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Saani, 
    794 F.3d 44
    , 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
    Absent plain error, we will not vacate or reverse in a second
    appeal based on an argument that could have been, but was not,
    raised in a first appeal. 
    Id.
     Under Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 52(b), “a court of appeals may correct [a forfeited]
    error” “only if it is plain and affects substantial rights.” United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993) (cleaned up). “[A]nd
    the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up).
    As a threshold matter, for Rule 52(b) to apply, there must
    be an “error.” “Deviation from a legal rule is ‘error’ unless the
    rule has been waived.” 
    Id.
     at 732–33. In this case, there was an
    error: Flores was convicted on two counts under Section 1114
    for conduct that occurred in Mexico, though this court
    subsequently held that the statute does not apply
    extraterritorially. See Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d at 357. Although
    Flores pled guilty to these charges, his plea does not constitute
    a waiver of the legal rule under the reasoning in Class v. United
    States, 
    138 S. Ct. 798
    , 805–06 (2018). In Class, the Supreme
    Court held that “a guilty plea by itself [does not] bar[] a federal
    criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the
    statute of conviction on direct appeal.” 
    Id. at 803
    . The
    underlying rationale of the Menna-Blackledge doctrine—
    which the Court applied in Class—also applies here. See 
    id.
     at
    803–04 (citing Menna v. New York, 
    423 U.S. 61
    , 63 & n.2
    (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 
    417 U.S. 21
    , 30
    (1974)). That doctrine provides “that a guilty plea does not bar
    a claim on appeal where on the face of the record the court had
    no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.”
    Class, 
    138 S. Ct. at 804
     (cleaned up). In light of this court’s
    15
    decision in Garcia Sota, it is now clear that the court had no
    power to convict and sentence Flores under Section 1114
    because the underlying conduct occurred in Mexico. Because
    extraterritorial application of Section 1114 was an error, and
    Flores’ guilty plea does not bar his claim on appeal, we proceed
    under the Rule 52(b) plain error framework.
    We next consider whether the error was “plain,” which
    may be apparent only on appeal. See Henderson v. United
    States, 
    568 U.S. 266
    , 279 (2013) (concluding that “whether a
    legal question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, it is
    enough that an error be plain at the time of appellate
    consideration”) (cleaned up). At the time of Flores’ trial and
    first appeal, the extraterritorial application of Section 1114 was
    an unsettled question in this circuit. After Garcia Sota,
    however, it is now clear that Section 1114 has no
    extraterritorial application, so the district court’s error is plain.
    Third, the error must “affect[] substantial rights.” FED. R.
    CRIM. P. 52(b). The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n
    most cases,” affecting the defendant’s substantial rights
    “means that the error must have been prejudicial,” and also that
    some errors may be “presumed prejudicial.” Olano, 
    507 U.S. at
    734–35. Prejudice exists where the error “affected the
    outcome of the district court proceedings.” 
    Id. at 734
    . Flores
    argues the Section 1114 convictions affect his substantial rights
    because he “stands convicted of two crimes for which the
    government lacked the power to constitutionally prosecute
    him.” Flores Br. 39. The district court’s error of applying
    Section 1114 extraterritorially “affected the outcome of the
    district court proceedings” because Flores would not have been
    convicted under Section 1114. Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 734
    .
    16
    Although vacating the Section 1114 convictions would not
    directly reduce Flores’ prison sentence,7 the convictions have
    other consequences, including that Flores remains responsible
    for a $100 special assessment for each of the two Section 1114
    convictions. The dissent dismisses these special assessments as
    mere “trifles,” Dissenting Op. 3, but the modest sums
    nonetheless constitute punishments. See Rutledge v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 292
    , 301 (1996) (holding that a second
    conviction that carries with it a special assessment “amount[s]
    to a second punishment”).
    Furthermore, the erroneous convictions also affect Flores’
    substantial rights because they have “potential adverse
    collateral consequences that may not be ignored.” Ball v.
    United States, 
    470 U.S. 856
    , 865 (1985); see also Rutledge, 
    517 U.S. at
    302–03 (reaffirming Ball). For example, Flores would
    continue to have two very serious convictions on his record
    (accessory to murder and to attempted murder), which would
    affect his criminal history category and thus his sentence if he
    is convicted of any future offenses. See Ball, 
    470 U.S. at 865
    .
    Even if Flores is charged but not convicted of a future offense,
    a judge may consider his criminal history when deciding
    whether to grant bail pending trial, which would affect his
    liberty. The convictions may also “be used to impeach [Flores’]
    credibility and certainly carr[y] the societal stigma
    accompanying any criminal conviction.” 
    Id.
    Thus, even though the convictions do not affect the length
    of the current sentence, they infringe Flores’ liberty and
    constitute “an impermissible punishment.” Id.; see also United
    7
    Flores concedes that “if this Court affirms the district court’s
    determination [of] the offense level for the RICO conspiracy,” which
    we do, see supra Part II, then the other two convictions “add nothing
    to the sentence.” Flores Reply Br. 6.
    17
    States v. Tann, 
    577 F.3d 533
    , 539–40 (3d Cir. 2009)
    (“Following Ball and Rutledge, numerous courts of
    appeals … have concluded that a defendant’s substantial rights
    are affected by the additional, unauthorized conviction, even
    when the immediate practical effect may not increase the
    defendant’s prison term, or may only be a negligible
    assessment.”); 
    id.
     at 539 n.7 (collecting cases).8 The erroneous
    convictions affect Flores’ substantial rights by leaving in place
    the special assessments and subjecting him to the collateral
    consequences of two serious criminal convictions.9
    Finally, because Rule 52 is “permissive, not mandatory,”
    we must consider “whether the error seriously affects the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
    Henderson, 
    568 U.S. at 272
     (cleaned up). “An error may
    seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s
    innocence.” Olano, 
    507 U.S. at
    736–37 (cleaned up). As
    8
    Contrary to the dissent’s implication, we have never held that a
    reduction in sentence is the only way to demonstrate that an error
    affects substantial rights. While it is true that Flores does not
    elaborate on the specific prejudicial effects of his erroneous
    conviction, the dissent correctly notes that this court “indisputably”
    has authority to identify and correct plain error sua sponte.
    Dissenting Op. 8 n.10 (citing cases).
    9
    The dissent focuses on the counterfactual that Flores would have
    pled guilty to other equally serious crimes and thus, as with errors
    under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, Flores must satisfy the
    “special requirement” of showing “a reasonable probability that, but
    for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Dissenting Op. 4
    (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83
    (2004)). The plain error in this case, however, relates not to the Rule
    11 procedures for accepting a plea, but rather the distinct error of
    convicting a person under a statute that does not apply to the
    underlying conduct.
    18
    discussed, vacatur will not decrease Flores’ sentence, but the
    erroneous convictions have the type of potential adverse
    consequences recognized by the Supreme Court as additional
    punishments, which in turn seriously affect the fairness of the
    judicial proceedings. In addition, because it is now plain that
    courts in this circuit lack the power to convict and punish
    Flores under Section 1114 for extraterritorial conduct, it would
    seriously affect the integrity and public reputation of the courts
    to nonetheless affirm such convictions and punishments.
    When determining whether to exercise our discretion to
    address an issue that could have been raised in an initial appeal,
    we have considered whether there is an “exceptional
    circumstance[], where injustice might otherwise result.” See
    United States v. Henry, 
    472 F.3d 910
    , 913 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per
    curiam) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Brice, 
    748 F.3d 1288
    , 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2014). And “we have suggested that an
    intervening change in the law can constitute an exceptional
    circumstance.” Henry, 
    472 F.3d at 914
     (cleaned up). Here,
    there was an intervening change in the law—this court decided
    Garcia Sota after the district court had resentenced Flores.
    “[I]njustice might otherwise result” if Flores continues to be
    punished for conduct that does not constitute a crime pursuant
    to the law under which he was convicted. 
    Id. at 913
     (cleaned
    up). Placing our imprimatur on an erroneous conviction would
    cause a “reasonable citizen” to take a “diminished view of the
    judicial process and its integrity.” Rosales-Mireles v. United
    States, 
    138 S. Ct. 1897
    , 1908 (2018) (cleaned up).10
    10
    The dissent’s reliance on an unpublished decision involving
    another Los Zetas cartel member involved in the same attack is
    misplaced. Dissenting Op. 8 (citing United States v. Zapata
    Espinoza, 830 F. App’x 324 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam)). Plain
    error review must be “case-specific” and “fact-intensive.” Puckett v.
    United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 142 (2009). While Zapata Espinoza was
    19
    With no mention of the plain error analysis, the
    government maintains that Flores forfeited his argument by
    failing to raise it in the district court and therefore we cannot
    consider his claims here. Instead, the government states that
    Flores must first bring his claim in the district court pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     and show “he is innocent of both the charges
    related to [Section] 1114 and other, more or equally serious
    charges that the government forewent during the course of plea
    negotiations.” Gov’t Br. 32. The government relies on Bousley
    v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
     (1998), which established that,
    in the context of habeas proceedings, “where the [g]overnment
    has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea
    bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also
    extend to those charges.” 
    Id. at 624
    . But this is not a habeas
    proceeding, and the government does not address why the plain
    error framework should not apply to Flores’ appeal of the
    district court’s resentencing. Under the plain error analysis,
    Flores is not required to show actual innocence to secure a
    remedy. See Olano, 
    507 U.S. at
    736–37 (“[W]e have never held
    that a Rule 52(b) remedy is only warranted in cases of actual
    innocence. Rather, … [a]n error may ‘seriously affect the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’
    independent of the defendant’s innocence.”). Nothing in Olano
    requires that we consider foregone charges when determining
    whether an error is plain and affects substantial rights.
    Because we find a plain error occurred, we consider
    Flores’ forfeited argument challenging his convictions under
    Section 1114. Addressing the merits of that argument is
    involved in the same attack on U.S. agents and was convicted under,
    inter alia, Section 1114, he brought a different procedural challenge
    to his sentence and did not raise the extraterritorial reach of Section
    1114. The failure of the court to sua sponte identify and correct the
    potential Garcia-Sota error in Zapata Espinoza does not undercut the
    identification of error in this case.
    20
    straightforward: We vacate Flores’ two convictions under
    Section 1114 because that statute does not apply
    extraterritorially.
    ***
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s
    sentencing with respect to Flores’ conviction for RICO
    conspiracy and vacate Flores’ two convictions under
    Section 1114. We remand for a limited resentencing in which
    the district court may determine whether to modify its sentence
    in light of our vacatur.
    So ordered.
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting in part,
    Pursuant to a negotiated agreement in 2011, Flores pled
    guilty to a three-count information. He is now before our court
    for the second time. The court affirms his sentence on count 1
    (RICO), a result with which I agree. But I do not agree with the
    court’s decision to vacate his convictions on count 2 (accessory
    after the fact to the murder of a U.S. officer) and count 3
    (accessory after the fact to the attempted murder of a U.S.
    officer).
    The majority opinion speaks of “injustice,” of the “integrity
    and public reputation of judicial proceedings,” of “fairness.”
    Majority Op. 14, 18. I speak not only of Flores’ failure to raise
    any of the legal points my colleagues now find persuasive, but
    also of the murders he committed, of the people he tortured, and
    of the other atrocities he committed while working for a
    Mexican cartel that smuggled illegal drugs into the United
    States. An Addendum to this opinion, consisting of an excerpt
    of Flores’ testimony, gives a general description of his
    activities. Other parts of the record contain details, but they are
    unnecessary to recount. This case is not an academic exercise.
    The murder and the attempted murder mentioned in the
    information occurred in Mexico, as did Flores’ participation.
    The officers who were ambushed were Special Agents of U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The original indictment
    — superseded by the information to which Flores pled guilty —
    contained four counts.
    The original indictment’s first two counts were the same as
    counts 2 and 3 of the superseding information. Those counts
    charged Flores under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3
     (accessory) and § 1114
    (murder and attempted murder of a U.S. officer). The other two
    counts in the indictment charged Flores as an accessory after the
    fact to the attempted murder of one of the officers, in violation
    2
    of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3
    , 1116(a),1 and as an accessory after the fact to
    the use of a firearm during the murder and attempted murder of
    the officers, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3
     and 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 924
    (c)2 and 924(j)(1).3
    After Flores pled guilty to the information and the district
    court sentenced him, he appealed to this court. Our court
    vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.4 The
    district court sentenced him again, and then, in a separate case,
    another panel of our court heard the appeal of two of the
    triggermen in the murder and attempted murder. That panel,
    disagreeing with other circuits, ruled that § 1114 does not apply
    outside U.S. territory. United States v. Garcia Sota, 
    948 F.3d 356
    , 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
    Flores then perfected his second appeal to this court,
    arguing that his convictions on counts 2 and 3 for violating §
    1114 should be vacated. Flores never raised this issue before
    the district court on sentencing or resentencing, or in our court
    in his first appeal.
    1
    This section makes it a criminal offense to “kill[] or attempt to
    kill a[n] . . . internationally protected person[.]” One of the officers
    fit that designation.
    2
    This provision applies to “crime[s] of violence or drug
    trafficking[,]” including murder and attempted murder.
    3
    This provision makes it a criminal offense to kill a person with
    a firearm while committing a crime of violence. The murdered officer
    was shot by Flores’ fellow members of the cartel’s hit squad.
    4
    Flores’ first appeal dealt with how the district court calculated
    his sentence. United States v. Flores, 
    912 F.3d 613
     (D.C. Cir. 2019).
    3
    My colleagues therefore rest their decision to vacate his
    convictions on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) — the
    “plain error” rule.
    Under this rule, Flores had “the burden of persuasion with
    respect to prejudice.” United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734
    (1993). He did not carry that burden. In neither his opening
    brief nor his reply brief did he even make the attempt. Yet for
    some unstated reason, the court steps in and tries to cure his
    omission. The court’s effort on his behalf is of doubtful
    propriety. It is also unpersuasive.
    Flores admits, and the court acknowledges, that vacating
    his § 1114 convictions would have no effect whatsoever on his
    sentence. As to any other possible prejudicial effect of these
    two convictions, Flores is — as I have said — silent.
    In its effort to fill the gap, the court offers two
    considerations. The first is that Flores was subject to a pair of
    $100 special assessments on the two § 1114 counts. Flores
    agreed to pay the $200 before he was even sentenced. Whether
    he ever paid them is unclear. But it hardly matters. There is a
    legal doctrine that takes care of a situation such as this: “de
    minimis non curat lex” — the law does not concern itself with
    trifles. No wonder Flores did not bother to mention the special
    assessments.5
    The court’s other idea, again not one Flores endorsed, is
    that his § 1114 convictions would “affect his criminal history
    category” when “he is convicted of any future offenses.”
    5
    It also comes as no surprise that Flores did not allege a possible
    effect on his parole eligibility. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
    Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, eliminated parole for federal defendants
    convicted of crimes committed after November 1, 1987.
    4
    Majority Op. 16. Is Flores planning “any future offenses”? We
    certainly hope not. So where does the court come up with this
    notion? Nowhere. It is fiction. To the extent anything in the
    record bears on the court’s speculation, it is this: when Flores
    finishes his sentence, he will be immediately deported to
    Mexico. App. 32; see 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1226
    (c)(1)(B),
    1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1228(a). It is not apparent why, if Flores
    commits future offenses in his home country, his “criminal
    history category” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would
    matter.
    More important still, the Supreme Court has laid down a
    special requirement for plain error–guilty plea cases such as this
    one: “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a
    guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain
    error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that but
    for the error, he would not have entered the plea.”6 United
    States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004); accord
    Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 1897
    , 1904-05
    (2018); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1338
    , 1343
    (2016).
    Neither Flores nor my colleagues make any effort to satisfy
    the Dominguez Benitez requirement. That is understandable.
    6
    The court claims that there was no error in “the Rule 11
    procedures for accepting a plea, but rather the distinct error of
    convicting a person under a statute that does not apply[.]” Majority
    Op. 17 n.9. Those are one and the same. As settled long ago, Rule 11
    “is designed ‘to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading
    voluntarily . . . but without realizing that his conduct does not actually
    fall within the charge.’” McCarthy v. United States, 
    394 U.S. 459
    ,
    467 (1969) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to
    1966 amendments); see also United States v. Melgar-Hernandez, 
    832 F.3d 261
    , 264–66 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    5
    Flores could not possibly meet the Supreme Court’s test. In
    pleading guilty to the § 1114 charges, Flores established beyond
    any doubt that he was guilty of the equally serious § 924 and §
    1116 charges in the original indictment.7 The government
    forewent those charges as part of the negotiated plea agreement.
    Cf. Bousley v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    , 624 (1998); see also
    United States v. Baxter, 
    761 F.3d 17
    , 28 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
    United States v. Caso, 
    723 F.3d 215
    , 219 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
    United States v. Knight, 
    981 F.3d 1095
    , 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
    (Katsas, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
    
    434 U.S. 357
    , 362 (1978)); Lewis v. Peterson, 
    329 F.3d 934
    ,
    936 (7th Cir. 2003).
    It follows that even if the § 1114 charges were taken off the
    table, Flores has not shown, indeed has not even attempted to
    show, a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pled
    guilty to being an accessory to the murder and attempted
    murder. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. at 83
    . All indications
    point in the opposite direction. If he could not have pleaded to
    § 1114 with respect to the murder and attempted murder, he
    would have pleaded to the other two, equally serious charges
    stemming from his actions as an accessory in the gunning down
    of the ICE officers.
    But assume that Flores had carried his burden of showing
    prejudice and that he had established that but for the error
    regarding § 1114, he would not have pled guilty to accessory
    charges involving the murder and the attempted murder. Even
    7
    The government’s brief, 32–33, explains this point in detail.
    Flores, in his reply brief, did not dispute the government’s contention
    that his factual admissions made out violations of the other two
    charges in the indictment. Both of these other charges applied beyond
    U.S. territory. United States v. Garcia Sota, 
    948 F.3d 356
    , 358, 362
    (D.C. Cir. 2020).
    6
    so, the court still had to decide whether to exercise its Rule
    52(b) discretion in his favor. See Henderson v. United States,
    
    568 U.S. 266
    , 272 (2013); Johnson v. United States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 469–70 (1997). Yet the court fails to give any satisfactory
    explanation about why Flores is entitled to its dispensation.
    “This is said to be a motion to the discretion of the court.
    This is true. But a motion to its discretion is a motion, not to its
    inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided
    by sound legal principles.” United States v. Burr, 
    25 F. Cas. 30
    ,
    35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14692D) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis
    added).
    One such legal principle, ignored here by the court and
    Flores, is this: “the fact that a defendant did not object, despite
    unsettled law, may well count against the grant of Rule 52(b)
    relief.” Henderson, 
    568 U.S. at
    278–79.
    Our circuit had not decided the territorial scope of § 1114
    until Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d at 357. So one may say, as the
    court did here, that the issue was until then “unsettled” — at
    least in this circuit. Majority Op. 15.8 Flores must have made
    a deliberate and calculated decision not to contest the
    8
    Even after the Garcia Sota decision, the § 1114 issue remains
    “unsettled.” The Supreme Court in Henderson, 
    568 U.S. at
    278–79,
    ruled that Rule 52(b) may apply when the law became “settled” while
    the case was on appeal. By “settled” the Henderson Court meant that
    an intervening Supreme Court decision rendered the district court’s
    ruling retroactively erroneous. 
    Id. at 270
    . With respect to the reach
    of § 1114 there has been no such Supreme Court decision and federal
    law on the issue is by no means “settled.” Two circuits disagree with
    this court’s decision in Garcia Sota and hold that § 1114 applies
    beyond the sovereign territory of the United States. United States v.
    Al Kassar, 
    660 F.3d 108
    , 118 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Benitez,
    
    741 F.2d 1312
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 1984).
    7
    applicability of § 1114. The defendants in Garcia Sota were
    two of the triggermen in the crimes to which Flores was an
    accessory. They argued unsuccessfully in the district and
    successfully in our court that § 1114 does not apply in Mexico.
    Flores testified against them at their trial. And yet Flores did
    not present this argument until his second appeal.9
    A second omitted principle is the doctrine of invited error.
    “If a defendant invites error by the district court, he is ‘barred
    from complaining about it on appeal.’” United States v.
    Ginyard, 
    215 F.3d 83
    , 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting United
    States v. Harrison, 
    103 F.3d 986
    , 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). The
    court seems to rest the error with the district court’s acceptance
    of the plea. But it was Flores who negotiated this guilty plea
    with the advice of counsel. He affirmed that “[he] fully
    [understood] this Plea Agreement and voluntarily agree[d] to
    it.” App. 34. Flores, at least partially, invited this error.
    Yet another principle results from the fact that this is
    Flores’ second appeal. The principle is this: “absent exceptional
    circumstances,” the court will not address an argument that
    could have been raised during the initial appeal. United States
    v. Brice, 
    748 F.3d 1288
    , 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v.
    Henry, 
    472 F.3d 910
    , 913 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Laffey v. Nw.
    9
    Garcia Sota first challenged the extraterritoriality of § 1114 in
    April 2017, six months before Flores filed his first sentencing
    memorandum. Dkt. 23, United States v. Garcia Sota, 1:13-cr-00142-
    RCL-1 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2017). Garcia Sota raised the issue again on
    appeal in June 2019, six months before Flores filed his second
    sentencing memorandum on remand. Appellant Br., Garcia Sota
    (June 11, 2019). And even four years before that, another defendant
    raised the question in United States v. Abu Khatallah, 
    151 F. Supp. 3d 116
    , 130–31 (D.D.C. 2015). Whereas Garcia Sota sought “to preserve
    [his] rights with respect to this issue,” Flores did nothing. Dkt. 23,
    United States v. Garcia Sota, 1:13-cr-00142-RCL-1 at *1.
    8
    Airlines, Inc., 
    740 F.2d 1071
    , 1089–90 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
    (quoting Fogel v. Chestnutt, 
    668 F.2d 100
    , 109 (2d Cir. 1981)
    (Friendly, J.)). There are no “exceptional circumstances” here.
    As previously mentioned, Flores made a strategic decision to
    not raise this issue. This is not a case “where injustice might
    otherwise result[.]” Henry, 
    472 F.3d at 913
     (quoting Crocker
    v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 
    49 F.3d 735
    , 740 (D.C. Cir. 1995))
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Consider how our court handled the appeal of another
    member of Flores’ cartel hit squad. A week after oral argument
    in this case, a different panel of this court — a panel that
    included a member of today’s majority — denied the appeal of
    one of the triggermen who pled guilty to two counts under §
    1114. United States v. Zapata Espinoza, 830 F. App’x 324
    (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Zapata Espinoza is serving a
    thirty-five-year sentence for those convictions. Id. at 325. As
    that panel noted: “[t]here is no question that a thirty-five-year
    sentence is long, but the acknowledged crime was also
    indisputably heinous. Under the law and in context of sentences
    imposed on other defendants for similar crimes, the sentence is
    not ‘fundamentally unfair’” Id. at 326 (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). And the panel stated that its “own
    review of the record in its entirety [does not] reveal any error
    committed here that amounts to a miscarriage of justice
    requiring nonenforcement of the appeal waiver.”10 Id.
    10
    Almost a year earlier, Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d at 357, held that
    § 1114 does not apply outside U.S. territory. Despite its “review of
    the record in its entirety[,]” which plainly reveals the extraterritorial
    nature of Zapata Espinoza’s convictions, the panel did not exercise its
    discretion to vacate the § 1114 convictions for plain error —
    something the panel indisputably had the authority to do sua sponte.
    Zapata Espinoza, 830 F. App’x at 326; see Silber v. United States,
    
    370 U.S. 717
    , 717–18 (1962) (per curiam); United States v. Atkinson,
    9
    To sum up, Flores did not carry his burden of showing
    prejudice, and he gave no reason for the court to exercise its
    discretion. By any measure, he was an accessory after the fact
    to the murder and attempted murder of two U.S. officers in
    Mexico. If § 1114 did not apply, § 924 and § 1116 did. Garcia
    Sota, 948 F.3d at 358, 362, so held with respect to two of the
    trigger men. For that reason and others, there should be no
    hand-wringing about Flores’ pleas of guilty to § 1114.
    
    297 U.S. 157
    , 160 (1936); United States v. Baugham, 
    449 F.3d 167
    ,
    170 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
    10
    ADDENDUM
    Transcript of Flores’ Testimony, Supp. App. 17–18:
    Q: You previously told us about some violent crimes that
    Sicarios commit on behalf of the cartel. Did you, while you
    were a Sicarios [sic], personally take part in some of those
    violent crimes?
    A: Yes, that’s right.
    Q: Let me ask you some specific questions.           Have you
    participated in and conducted kidnappings?
    A: Yes, ma’am.
    Q: Have you abused or tortured any of the individuals that you
    had kidnapped or had in your custody?
    A: Yes, that’s right.
    Q: Have you personally committed executions on behalf of the
    cartel?
    A: Yes, I did that.
    Q: And have you also participated in destroying and hiding the
    remains of victims who have been killed by the cartel?
    A: I did not understand your question fully. Can you please
    repeat it?
    Q: Have you personally participated in hiding or destroying the
    remains of bodies of people who have been killed by the cartel?
    11
    A: Yes, that’s right.