The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC v. SEC ( 2021 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued April 26, 2021                 Decided June 15, 2021
    No. 20-1181
    THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC, ET AL.,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
    RESPONDENT
    Consolidated with 20-1192, 20-1231
    On Petitions for Review of an Order
    of the Securities and Exchange Commission
    Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for petitioners. On
    the briefs were Paul S. Mishkin, Amir C. Tayrani, Joshua M.
    Wesneski, Paul E. Greenwalt III, and Michael K. Molzberger.
    Tracey A. Hardin, Assistant General Counsel, Securities
    and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for respondent.
    With her on the briefs were Michael A. Conley, Acting General
    Counsel, and Martin Totaro, Senior Counsel.
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    Keith Bradley and Jeffrey Walker were on the brief for
    amici curiae Securities Industry and Financial Markets
    Association, Inc., et al. in support of respondent.
    Robert A. Skinner, Douglas H. Hallward-Driemeier, and
    Jonathan R. Ference-Burke were on the brief for amicus curiae
    Investment Company Institute in support of respondent.
    Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
    TATEL, Circuit Judge: Modern stock exchanges transmit
    data about trades and prices at lightning-fast speeds. But as this
    case demonstrates, the administrative process demands
    considerably more patience.
    Several stock exchanges challenge a Securities and
    Exchange Commission (SEC) order directing them to submit a
    proposal to replace three plans that govern the dissemination of
    certain types of data with a single, consolidated plan.
    Specifically, they challenge provisions of the order requiring
    them to include three features relating to plan governance. The
    Commission, however, has yet to decide whether the
    challenged features will make it into the new plan, and section
    25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”) confers
    authority on the courts of appeals to review only “final
    order[s].” 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). Accordingly, we lack
    jurisdiction and so dismiss the petitions.
    I.
    Section 11A of the Exchange Act empowers the
    Commission to, “by rule or order, [] authorize or require self-
    regulatory organizations,” including stock exchanges, “to act
    3
    jointly with respect to matters as to which they share authority
    under this chapter in planning, developing, operating, or
    regulating a national market system,” known as an NMS. 15
    U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(3)(B); see also id. § 78c(a)(26) (“The term
    ‘self-regulatory organization’ means any national securities
    exchange, registered securities association, or registered
    clearing agency.”). Commission regulations further provide
    that “[e]very national securities exchange on which an NMS
    stock is traded and national securities association shall act
    jointly pursuant to one or more effective national market
    system plans to disseminate consolidated information,
    including a national best bid and national best offer, on
    quotations for and transactions in NMS stocks.” 
    17 C.F.R. § 242.603
    (b). And although “[a]ny two or more self-regulatory
    organizations, acting jointly, may file a national market system
    plan or may propose an amendment to an effective national
    market system plan,” no such proposal, subject to limited
    exceptions, “shall become effective unless approved by the
    Commission.” 
    Id.
     § 242.608(a)(1), (b)(1). Over the course of
    several decades, the Commission has exercised this authority
    to approve three Equity Data Plans that now govern the
    dissemination of certain types of quotation and transaction
    information for publicly traded equity securities.
    Setting the stage for the issue before us, on January 14,
    2020, the Commission published a notice soliciting comments
    on whether to issue a proposed order that “would require the
    participants in the [current] Equity Data Plans to propose a
    single, new equity data plan.” Notice of Proposed Order
    Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory
    Authority To Submit a New National Market System Plan
    Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, 
    85 Fed. Reg. 2164
    , 2165 (Jan. 14, 2020). The Commission explained that
    should it promulgate such an order, the new plan “would be
    published for public comment,” after which “the Commission
    4
    would consider whether to approve the New Consolidated Data
    Plan, with any changes or subject to such conditions as the
    Commission may deem necessary or appropriate.” 
    Id.
    Four months later, the Commission published a modified
    version of the proposed order, referred to as the Governance
    Order. See Order Directing the Exchanges and the Financial
    Industry Regulatory Authority To Submit a New National
    Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market
    Data (“Governance Order”), 
    85 Fed. Reg. 28,702
     (May 13,
    2020). Over the objections of several stock exchanges, the
    Commission required the forthcoming proposal to include,
    among other things, three specific features: (1) “voting
    representation” on the “New Consolidated Data Plan’s
    operating committee” for certain non-exchange stakeholders;
    (2) a “voting rights” allocation that treats a group of affiliated
    exchanges as if it were one exchange; and (3) an “independent
    plan administrator” neither “owned [n]or controlled by a
    corporate entity that, either directly or via another subsidiary,
    offers for sale its own proprietary market data product for NMS
    stocks.” 
    Id. at 28,712, 28,714, 28,730
    .
    Several stock exchanges filed petitions for review in our
    court, arguing that the Governance Order’s inclusion of these
    three features violated section 11A, contravened Commission
    regulations, or was arbitrary and capricious. A few days later,
    they filed a motion asking the Commission to stay the
    Governance Order, which it promptly denied for several
    reasons, including that “the Governance Order d[id] not
    establish a New Consolidated Data Plan.” Order Denying Stay,
    
    85 Fed. Reg. 36,921
    , 36,921 (June 18, 2020). The exchanges
    then filed the required proposal, and briefing on their petitions
    for review proceeded. On October 13, the Commission
    published the proposal for comment, see Notice of Filing of a
    5
    National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity
    Market Data, 
    85 Fed. Reg. 64,565
     (Oct. 13, 2020), and four
    months later, on January 15, 2021, it published an order
    “instituting proceedings . . . to determine whether to disapprove
    the [proposed plan],” Order Instituting Proceedings to
    Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove a National
    Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market
    Data (“Order Instituting Proceedings”), 
    86 Fed. Reg. 4142
    ,
    4142 (Jan. 15, 2021).
    II.
    Before considering the merits of the exchanges’ challenge
    to the Governance Order, we may “determine whether subject-
    matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.”
    Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 
    559 U.S. 77
    , 94 (2010). The only
    asserted basis for jurisdiction in this case, Exchange Act
    section 25(a), empowers courts “to review only final orders of
    the SEC.” Net Coalition v. SEC, 
    715 F.3d 342
    , 348 (D.C. Cir.
    2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 15 U.S.C.
    § 78y(a)(1) (“A person aggrieved by a final order of the
    Commission entered pursuant to this title may obtain review of
    the order . . . by filing . . . a written petition requesting that the
    order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.”). This
    requirement “allows the agency an opportunity to apply its
    expertise and correct its mistakes, [] avoids disrupting the
    agency’s processes, and [] relieves the courts from having to
    engage in piecemeal review which is at the least inefficient and
    upon completion of the agency process might prove to have
    been unnecessary.” DRG Funding Corp. v. Secretary of HUD,
    
    76 F.3d 1212
    , 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Concerned that the Governance Order may not be
    final, we instructed the parties to be prepared at oral argument
    to address our jurisdiction. See Watts v. SEC, 
    482 F.3d 501
    , 505
    (D.C. Cir. 2007) (raising sua sponte whether the agency
    6
    decision under review was an “order” for purposes of
    Exchange Act section 25). Both sides also filed supplemental
    briefs, each arguing that the Governance Order was final.
    In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court explained that to
    be “final,” an order must (1) “mark the consummation of the
    agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely
    tentative or interlocutory nature[;]” and (2) “be one by which
    rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
    consequences will flow.” 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 177–78 (1997)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). With
    respect to the first requirement, the exchanges argue that the
    three challenged plan elements “have not merely been
    proposed by the Commission[;]” rather, after a round of notice
    and comment, the Commission “ma[de] a final determination
    about the elements to be included in the New Consolidated
    Data Plan.” Pet’rs’ Suppl. Br. 2 (emphasis omitted). For its
    part, the Commission contends that the Governance Order
    represented the consummation of its decision-making process
    because it “determined that the challenged provisions . . . are
    reasonable and within [the Commission’s] authority.” Resp’t’s
    Suppl. Br. 2–3.
    The Commission’s notice and orders, however, are to the
    contrary. From the very outset, the Commission has made clear
    that the Governance Order was no more than a call for a
    proposal that would then be subject to further notice, comment,
    and revision.
    Take the Governance Order itself. Responding to a
    comment that criticized it for “rel[ying] on cherry-picked
    opinions of self-interested market participants,” the
    Commission stated that “the New Consolidated Data Plan
    submitted in response to this Order will itself be published for
    public comment prior to any Commission decision to
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    disapprove or to approve the plan with any changes or subject
    to any conditions the Commission deems necessary or
    appropriate after considering public comment.” Governance
    Order, 85 Fed. Reg. at 28,705 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). In other words, the Commission had committed to no
    particular plan features and promised to address any alleged
    defects in its analysis following the forthcoming round of
    notice and comment.
    The Commission made the same point in its order denying
    a stay. Calling the Governance Order the “first step toward
    establishing a new governance structure,” the Commission
    accused the exchanges of “overstat[ing] the harm that [would]
    result from their compliance with the Governance Order,”
    explaining that even after they submit the proposed plan,
    “interested parties will still be able to comment on [it], and the
    Commission will review the plan and may make changes or add
    conditions before issuing a subsequent order approving or
    disapproving a new plan.” Order Denying Stay, 85 Fed. Reg.
    at 36,921–22.
    Then, in its notice publishing the proposed plan, the
    Commission reiterated that whether it would include the
    challenged plan elements remained up for debate. It sought
    “comment on the proposed [] Plan” and expressly asked for
    feedback on “whether the proposal is consistent with the Act
    and the rules thereunder,” as well as “whether the proposed []
    Plan is appropriately structured[] and . . . appropriately
    drafted[] to support the [goals of section 11A].” Notice of
    Filing of a National Market System Plan Regarding
    Consolidated Equity Market Data, 85 Fed. Reg. at 64,567.
    Finally, in its most recent order, the one in which it
    “institut[ed] proceedings” on whether to approve the proposed
    plan, Order Instituting Proceedings, 86 Fed. Reg. at 4142, the
    8
    Commission gave perhaps the clearest indication of the
    Governance Order’s “tentative” nature, Bennett, 
    520 U.S. at 178
    . It “request[ed] that interested persons provide written
    submissions of their views, data, and arguments with respect
    to” a specific list of issues, “as well as any other concerns they
    may have with the proposals.” Order Instituting Proceedings,
    86 Fed. Reg. at 4143 (emphasis added). The Commission left
    absolutely no doubt about the tentative nature of its actions to
    date, stating that “[i]nstitution of proceedings does not indicate
    that the Commission has reached any conclusions with respect
    to any of the issues involved.” Order Instituting Proceedings,
    86 Fed. Reg. at 4142 (emphasis added).
    Thus, at every critical turn, the Commission made clear
    that its decision making regarding the three challenged features
    remained unconsummated. Or in the words of Bennett, the
    Governance Order did not “mark the consummation of the
    agency’s decisionmaking process[;]” rather, it was “merely
    tentative” and “interlocutory.” 
    520 U.S. at 178
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). To be sure, Commission counsel
    now argues that the Governance Order is final, but “[p]ost hoc
    explanation by appellate counsel . . . is not an acceptable
    foundation for review of agency action.” American Trading
    Transportation Co. v. United States, 
    841 F.2d 421
    , 424 (D.C.
    Cir. 1988). Critical for our purposes is what the Commission
    has said, and the Commission has repeatedly signaled that its
    thinking about the three challenged features is not final. This
    should come as no surprise to lead petitioner Nasdaq, which
    attached the exchanges’ opening brief in this case to its
    comment on the proposed plan, writing that “[a]ll of the
    statements set forth in . . . the opening brief filed on behalf of
    Nasdaq and the other petitioners in the Court of Appeals . . .
    are incorporated herein by reference,” and that “[f]or all of the
    reasons stated therein, the Commission should disapprove the
    proposed Plan.” The Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC, Comment
    9
    Letter on the Notice of filing of a National Market System Plan
    Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data (Nov. 12, 2020),
    http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-757/4757-8011769-
    225419.pdf. Why would Nasdaq have done that unless it
    believed, contrary to what it asserts here, that the Governance
    Order was not final?
    The exchanges rely on Domestic Securities, Inc. v. SEC,
    where we found that an order stating that a new trade execution
    system called SuperMontage “be and hereby is approved” was
    final despite the fact that the order also “delayed the
    implementation of SuperMontage” until approval of an
    “Alternative Display Facility.” 
    333 F.3d 239
    , 244, 246 (D.C.
    Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
    acknowledging “[t]he existence of this condition to
    SuperMontage’s implementation,” we explained that after the
    order’s promulgation, the only remaining issue was “the timing
    of SuperMontage’s implementation,” and that “[t]here was no
    question that the substance of SuperMontage’s trade execution
    rules . . . would remain the same and would ultimately be
    implemented.” 
    Id. at 246
    . Here, by contrast, the Commission
    never said anything remotely like “the three challenged
    features are hereby approved” or that they will “remain the
    same and ultimately be implemented.” Quite to the contrary,
    the Commission has declared time and again that it has yet to
    make up its mind about any of the challenged provisions and
    that they all remain subject to notice, comment, and final
    resolution by the Commission.
    The exchanges argue that the Governance Order is final
    because it required them “to file a proposed plan with the
    particular terms and conditions challenged by petitioners.”
    Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. 3 (emphasis added); see also Pet’rs’ Suppl.
    Br. 3 (arguing that the Governance Order was final because it
    “eliminated any discretion on behalf of petitioners as to
    10
    whether to include these features in a proposed NMS plan”).
    The Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt to redefine the
    scope of the finality inquiry in FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
    California, 
    449 U.S. 232
     (1980). In that case, an oil company
    sought review of an order finding “reason to believe” that the
    company was violating the Federal Trade Commission Act and
    instituting an adjudication against it. 
    Id. at 241
    .
    Acknowledging that “the issuance of the complaint is definitive
    on the question whether the Commission avers reason to
    believe that the respondent to the complaint is violating the
    Act,” the Court nonetheless concluded that the order was not
    final because it was not a “definitive statement of position” on
    the actual question before the agency, “whether [the oil
    company] violated the Act.” 
    Id.
     Standard Oil teaches that
    finality must be measured in relation to the agency’s entire
    process, not just “one phase of the process.” Resp’t’s Suppl.
    Br. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the
    Governance Order was definitive on the question whether the
    three challenged plan elements had to be included in the
    proposal, it was not a “definitive statement of position” on the
    question the Commission had initiated proceedings to
    answer—whether the three features should be included in the
    eventual plan.
    Because the Governance Order flunks the first element of
    the Bennett test, we need not address the second.
    III.
    The exchanges are concerned that had they “waited until
    the Commission’s approval of the New Consolidated Data Plan
    to file petitions for review,” those petitions would have been
    “untimely.” Pet’rs’ Suppl. Br. 5. Given our conclusion that the
    Governance Order is not “final” within the meaning of
    Exchange Act section 25, the exchanges no longer face that
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    risk. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). The petitions for review are
    dismissed.
    So ordered.