American Wild Horse Preservati v. Sonny Perdue ( 2017 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued January 11, 2017                Decided August 4, 2017
    Reissued September 29, 2017
    No. 15-5332
    AMERICAN WILD HORSE PRESERVATION CAMPAIGN, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    SONNY PERDUE, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
    AGRICULTURE, ET AL.,
    APPELLEES
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:14-cv-00485)
    David Zaft argued the cause for appellants. With him on
    the briefs was William S. Eubanks II. Katherine A. Meyer
    entered an appearance.
    Mark R. Haag, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were
    John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General at the time the
    brief was filed, Meredith L. Flax and Stuart Gillespie,
    Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Steven F. Hirsch,
    Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
    2
    Caroline Lobdell was on the brief for defendants-
    intervenors-appellees.
    Before: TATEL, MILLETT, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
    MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Since 1975, the United States
    Forest Service has protected and managed wild horses in the
    Devil’s Garden section of the Modoc National Forest in
    Northern California. That wild horse territory originally
    consisted of two separate tracts of land of roughly 236,000
    acres. But at some point in the 1980s, a Forest Service map
    added in an approximately 23,000 acre tract of land known as
    the Middle Section and, in so doing, linked the two territories
    into a larger and unified wild horse territory of approximately
    258,000 acres. For more than two decades, the Service
    continued to describe the territory as a single contiguous area
    and to manage wild horses in the Middle Section.
    In 2013, the Forest Service publicly acknowledged the
    cartographic confusion, declared the expansion reflected in the
    1980s map to be an administrative error, and without further
    analysis redrew the wild horse territory’s lines to exclude the
    Middle Section and to revert to two disjoined tracts of land.
    The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign and other
    plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Service’s revamping of the
    territorial lines violated numerous federal laws. We agree. A
    23,000 acre tract of land and two decades of agency
    management cannot be swept under the rug as a mere
    administrative mistake. We accordingly reverse in part, vacate
    in part, and direct the district court to remand to the Service to
    address rather than to ignore the relevant history.
    3
    I
    The Modoc National Forest comprises approximately 1.6
    million acres of federally managed land in Northern California.
    Included within the Forest are several hundred thousand acres
    of protected wild horse land that make up the Devil’s Garden
    Wild Horse Territory. The Forest Service’s management of the
    Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory is subject to a
    Matryoshka doll of nesting federal statutes.
    First, the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
    of 1971 (“Wild Horses Act”), 
    16 U.S.C. § 1331
     et seq., charges
    the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture with “protect[ing]
    and manag[ing] wild free-roaming horses and burros” on
    federal lands, 
    id.
     § 1333(a). The Secretaries “may designate
    and maintain specific ranges on public lands as sanctuaries for
    their protection and preservation,” and “shall manage wild
    free-roaming horses and burros in a manner that is designed to
    achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance[.]”
    Id. The Secretaries also “shall maintain a current inventory”
    and set “appropriate management levels” for “wild free-
    roaming horses and burros,” to ensure a “thriving natural
    ecological balance” and to “protect the range from the
    deterioration associated with overpopulation.”              Id.
    § 1333(b)(1), (2). Wild horses are to be treated “in the area
    where presently found” as an integral component “of the
    natural system of the public lands.” Id. § 1331.
    The Service is responsible for implementing the Wild
    Horses Act within the National Forest System. 
    36 C.F.R. § 222.60
    (a). In 1980, the Service promulgated regulations
    providing that it “shall: * * * [e]stablish wild horse and burro
    territories” (“Wild Horse Territories”), and then “[a]nalyze,”
    “develop[,] and implement a management plan” for each Wild
    Horse Territory. 
    Id.
     § 222.61(a)(3)–(4). The Service may
    4
    “update[]” the Wild Horse Territory Plans “whenever needed,
    as determined by conditions on each territory.”             Id.
    § 222.61(a)(4). The Service must also “[m]aintain a current
    inventory of [wild horses] on each [Wild Horse Territory] to
    determine * * * where     excess     animals      exist[,]” id.
    § 222.61(a)(5), set “appropriate management levels” for those
    horses and burros, and “remov[e] or destr[oy] * * * excess
    animals,” id. § 222.61(a)(6); see also id. § 222.69.
    Service regulations further define “[w]ild free-roaming
    horses and burros” to mean “all unbranded and unclaimed
    horses and burros and their progeny that” either “have used
    lands of the National Forest System on or after December 15,
    1971,” or that “do hereafter use these lands as all or part of their
    habitat.” 
    36 C.F.R. § 222.60
    (b)(13). Those animals retain
    federal protection even if they “move to lands of other
    ownership or jurisdiction as a part of their annual territorial
    habitat pattern or for other reasons.” 
    Id.
     § 222.65.
    Second, the National Forest Management Act of 1976
    (“Forest Management Act”), 
    16 U.S.C. § 1600
     et seq.,
    “requires the Secretary of Agriculture to ‘develop, maintain,
    and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans
    for units of the National Forest System.’” Ohio Forestry Ass’n
    v. Sierra Club, 
    523 U.S. 726
    , 728 (1998) (quoting 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (a)). The Secretary has delegated his authority under the
    Act to the Service. 
    36 C.F.R. § 200.3
    (b).
    The Forest Management Act establishes a two-step
    procedure for managing National Forest System lands. The
    Service must (i) “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise
    land and resource management plans” for national forests
    (“Forest Plans”), and (ii) ensure that all “[r]esource plans and
    permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and
    occupancy of National Forest System lands,” including Wild
    5
    Horse Territory Plans, are “consistent with the [Forest Plans].”
    
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (a), (i).
    The Forest Management Act sets out several general
    conditions with which the development of Forest Plans must
    comply. See 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (f). For instance, the Service
    must “provide for public participation in the development,
    review, and revision of [Forest Plans].” 
    Id.
     § 1604(d). In
    addition, the Plans must “be embodied in appropriate written
    material, including maps and other descriptive documents,” id.
    § 1604(f)(2), and “be prepared by an interdisciplinary team,”
    id. § 1604(f)(3). The Forest Service may amend Forest Plans
    “in any manner whatsoever after final adoption[.]” Montanans
    for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 
    568 F.3d 225
    , 227 (D.C. Cir.
    2009) (quoting 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (f)(4)); see also 
    36 C.F.R. § 219.13
    (a). But if an “amendment” of a Forest Plan “would
    result in a significant change,” the amendment process must
    comply with heightened procedural requirements. See 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (f)(4). Regardless of whether an amendment is
    significant, however, the Forest Service must allow for public
    participation in the amendment process. 
    Id.
    Service regulations elaborate upon the procedures for
    developing and amending Forest Plans. 
    36 C.F.R. §§ 219.1
    –
    219.19. As relevant here, the Service must develop Forest
    Plans in coordination with the statutorily required
    interdisciplinary team, extensive public participation and
    comment, and related efforts of other federal agencies, state
    and local governments, and Indian tribes. 
    Id.
     §§ 219.4, 219.5.
    Formulation of such Plans must take into consideration, inter
    alia, “fish and wildlife species,” “grazing and rangelands,”
    “habitat and habitat connectivity,” “[h]abitat conditions,” and
    “[l]and status and ownership, use, and access patterns relevant
    to the [Forest Plan] area.” Id. § 219.10(a). The Plan must also
    “maintain the diversity of plant and animal communities”
    6
    within the forest. Id. § 219.9.
    Third, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
    
    42 U.S.C. § 4321
     et seq., obligates federal agencies to analyze
    the environmental consequences of proposed federal actions.
    See generally 
    id.
     § 4332. Under NEPA, federal agencies must
    conduct an Environmental Assessment to determine whether a
    proposed federal action will have a significant effect on the
    environment. 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9
    (a), 1508.13. If that
    Assessment indicates that the environmental impacts will not
    be significant, the agency must issue a “finding of no
    significant impact,” 
    id.
     § 1501.4(e), explaining why the agency
    action will not substantially affect the environment, id.
    § 1508.13. But if the Assessment indicates that the proposed
    action will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human
    environment,” the agency must prepare an Environmental
    Impact Statement detailing: “(i) the environmental impact of
    the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects
    which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
    (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
    between local short-term uses of [the] environment and the
    maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
    (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
    which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
    implemented.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C); see also 
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.2
    .
    Fourth, the Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 551
    et seq., prohibits arbitrary and capricious actions by federal
    agencies and mandates that they give reasoned explanation for
    the actions that they do take. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
    Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 42–52
    (1983); see also Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 
    988 F.2d 186
    , 197
    (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The requirement that agency action not be
    7
    arbitrary or capricious includes a requirement that the agency
    adequately explain its result[.]”).
    II
    While this dispute concerns a 2013 decision by the Service
    to change the boundaries of the Devil’s Garden Wild Horse
    Territory, the origins of the controversy reach back four
    decades.
    A
    In 1975, the Service issued its first Devil’s Garden Wild
    Horse Territory Plan. The Wild Horse Territory specified in
    that plan consisted of two separate areas of land totaling
    approximately 236,000 acres. The Territory did not include a
    parcel of land of approximately 23,000 acres, known as the
    Middle Section, which conjoined those two separate tracts.
    Sometime in the 1980s, a Forest Service map depicted the
    Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory as a single contiguous
    area of land that included the Middle Section. According to the
    Service, the map’s “revised boundary” “incorporated about
    another 23,631 acres of land,” resulting in a Wild Horse
    Territory of “approximately 258,000 acres in size.” J.A. 261.
    Then, in 1991, the Service issued a Forest Plan for the
    Modoc National Forest. While the Plan did not include a map
    of the Wild Horse Territory, the Forest Plan acknowledged that
    the Service “is legally obligated to manage horses within a
    258,000-acre wild horse territory,” J.A. 584, and announced
    that “[t]he Forest has one wild horse territory of about 258,000
    acres,” J.A. 585.
    The 1991 Forest Plan also stated that the Service “prepared
    the Wild Horse [Territory] Plan in 1985, which identifies a
    8
    population objective of 275–335 animals to manage.” J.A.
    585–586. 1 The interdisciplinary team that prepared the 1991
    Forest Plan expressly denominated the “Wild Horse [Territory]
    Plan” to be “consistent with, and still appropriate for, the
    [1991] Forest Plan.” J.A. 578. As a result, the Wild Horse
    Territory Plan, which the interdisciplinary team understood to
    include a single 258,000 acre territory, was expressly
    “incorporated by reference” into the 1991 Forest Plan. J.A.
    578; see also J.A. 588 (describing “Wild Horse [Territory]
    Plan” as an “[e]xisting [p]lan[] [r]etained and [i]ncorporated by
    [r]eference into the [1991] Forest Plan and [u]pdated to be
    [c]onsistent”) (emphasis added). When the 1991 Forest Plan
    was finally approved, it “supersede[d] most previous Forest
    resource management plans.” J.A. 578.
    Over the next two decades, the Service actively managed
    and recorded wild horses in the Middle Section, as evidenced
    by official Wild Horse Inventory Reports from that time period.
    B
    The Modoc National Forest is divided into grazing
    “allotments.” Generally speaking, the Wild Horse Territory
    boundaries do not hew precisely to those of the grazing
    allotments. Rather, the Wild Horse Territory covers portions
    of various allotments. The disputed Middle Section consists of
    portions of five allotments: the Triangle, Avanzino, Carr,
    Timbered Mountain, and Big Sage Allotments. In 1971, when
    the Wild Horses Act was adopted, two portions of allotments
    in the Middle Section were privately held: the Triangle
    portion, and the Avanzino portion. In total, those private lands
    covered approximately 5,923 acres. The other portions—the
    Carr, Timbered Mountain, and Big Sage portions—were
    1
    The Service denies that there was a 1985 Wild Horse Territory
    Plan.
    9
    publicly held in 1971. Consequently, as stipulated by the
    Service, the “majority of the lands in the [Middle Section] were
    publicly held in 1971[.]” J.A. 66.
    In 1976, the Service acquired the Triangle Allotment as
    public land. That means that, in 1991, when the Service
    adopted the Forest Plan that included the Middle Section in the
    Wild Horse Territory, only one portion of the Middle Section
    was privately held: the Avanzino portion. That private land
    covered approximately 10% of the Middle Section’s acreage.
    C
    In July 2011, the Service issued a scoping letter proposing
    to update the Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan. That
    letter indicated that the Wild Horse Territory was
    “approximately 268,750 acres in size,” J.A. 757, and included
    a map depicting the Wild Horse Territory as a single,
    contiguous area of land including the Middle Section.
    A year later, the Service turned its attention to the
    discrepancy between the Wild Horse Territory boundaries in
    the 1991 Forest Plan and the boundaries in the original 1975
    Wild Horse Territory Plan. The Forest Service issued a new
    scoping letter in December 2012 stating that, “[d]uring the mid-
    1980’s, the [Modoc National Forest’s Devil’s Garden and
    Doublehead Ranger Districts] appear[] to have adjusted the
    [Wild Horse Territory] boundary for administrative
    convenience” to “incorporate[] about [an additional] 23,631
    acres of land.” J.A. 731. The December 2012 scoping letter
    called this an “administrative error” and “propose[d] to return
    to the management of wild horses within the [Wild Horse
    Territory] boundary established in 1975.” J.A. 732.
    In August 2013, the Service released a Final
    Environmental Assessment to accompany its proposed
    10
    revisions to the size of the Wild Horse Territory. Like the
    scoping letter, the Final Environmental Assessment labeled the
    inclusion of the Middle Section “[a]n administrative error,”
    J.A. 264, 708, and “propose[d] to return to the management of
    wild horses within the [Wild Horse Territory] boundary” as
    originally established, J.A. 264, 710. The Service also issued
    a Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact,
    incorporating the Final Environmental Assessment by
    reference. That Decision formally adopted the proposed action
    set forth in the Final Environmental Assessment and concluded
    that contracting the Wild Horse Territory as proposed would
    not have a sufficiently significant environmental impact to
    necessitate an Environmental Impact Statement.
    Also in August 2013, the Service issued its new Devil’s
    Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan. The 2013 Wild Horse
    Territory Plan indicated that the boundaries of the Wild Horse
    Territory would mirror those of the 1975 Wild Horse Territory
    Plan, which did not include the disputed Middle Section.
    D
    After exhausting their administrative remedies, plaintiffs,
    the American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign, Return to
    Freedom, and Carla Bowers (collectively, “Campaign”), all of
    which advocate for the protection of wild horses, filed suit in
    the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
    They contend that the Service’s 2013 revision of the Devil’s
    Garden Wild Horse Territory violated the Administrative
    Procedure Act, the Wild Horses Act, the Forest Management
    Act, and NEPA. See American Wild Horse Preservation
    11
    Campaign v. Vilsack, No. 14-0485, Docket Entry No. 1
    (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2014) (Compl. ¶¶ 58–91). 2
    On September 30, 2015, the district court granted
    summary judgment for the Service. American Wild Horse
    Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack, 
    133 F. Supp. 3d 200
    (D.D.C. 2015). The court concluded that the Service
    permissibly found that the Middle Section was never
    incorporated into the Wild Horse Territory, and that any
    reference to a single, contiguous Wild Horse Territory was a
    mere “administrative error.” 
    Id. at 212
    ; see also 
    id.
     at 212–218.
    The district court also ruled that the Service’s redrawing of the
    boundaries of the Wild Horse Territory did not amount to a
    “significant” amendment warranting formal procedures under
    the Forest Management Act, as the Service was already
    managing the Wild Horse Territory as two noncontiguous
    units. 
    Id.
     at 219–220. The district court similarly reasoned
    that, because the Service’s “boundary adjustment simply
    corrected an administrative error and resulted in the continued
    management of the [Middle Section] as distinct from the [Wild
    Horse Territory],” the Service reasonably determined that its
    boundary correction would not significantly affect the quality
    of the human environment, within the meaning of NEPA. 
    Id. at 221
    .
    III
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar,
    
    661 F.3d 66
    , 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under the Administrative
    Procedure Act, we must set aside the Service’s actions if they
    are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
    2
    The Campaign also originally challenged the management
    level for horses set by the Service, but does not press that issue on
    appeal.
    12
    not in accordance with law.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A). That
    standard obligates the agency to examine all relevant factors
    and record evidence, and to articulate a reasoned explanation
    for its decision. See State Farm, 
    463 U.S. at 52
    . Generally, a
    rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency: “(1) ‘has relied
    on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,’ (2)
    ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,’
    (3) ‘offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
    the evidence before the agency,’ or (4) [offers an explanation
    that] ‘is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
    difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” United
    States Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 
    830 F.3d 579
    , 606 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
    (quoting State Farm, 
    463 U.S. at 43
    ).
    We hold that the Service’s decision to eliminate the
    Middle Section of the Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory
    Plan was arbitrary and capricious in two respects. First, the
    Service failed to acknowledge and adequately explain its
    change in policy regarding the management of wild horses in
    the Middle Section as part of a single, contiguous protected
    Wild Horse Territory. Second, the Service failed to consider
    adequately whether an Environmental Impact Statement was
    required under NEPA. Accordingly, we reverse the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment for the Service.
    A
    A central principle of administrative law is that, when an
    agency decides to depart from decades-long past practices and
    official policies, the agency must at a minimum acknowledge
    the change and offer a reasoned explanation for it. See Encino
    Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    136 S. Ct. 2117
    , 2126 (2016)
    (“[A]n ‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a
    reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and
    capricious change from agency practice[.]’”) (second alteration
    13
    in original) (quoting National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v.
    Brand X Internet Servs., 
    545 U.S. 967
    , 981 (2005)); Lone
    Mountain Processing, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 
    709 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[A]n agency changing its course
    must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies
    and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
    ignored. Failing to supply such analysis renders the agency’s
    action arbitrary and capricious.”) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted); United Mun. Distribs. Grp. v. FERC, 
    732 F.2d 202
    , 210 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A]gencies must give a
    reasoned analysis for departures from prior agency practice[.]”)
    (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 
    444 F.2d 841
    ,
    852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 3
    For that reason, we have long held that “[a]n agency may
    not * * * depart from a prior policy sub silentio[.]” United
    States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 
    825 F.3d 674
    , 707 (D.C. Cir.
    2016) (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 502
    , 515 (2009)); Verizon v. FCC, 
    740 F.3d 623
    , 636 (D.C. Cir.
    2014) (same); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 
    600 F.3d 642
    , 659 (D.C.
    Cir. 2010) (same).
    3
    See also Mistick PBT v. Chao, 
    440 F.3d 503
    , 512 (D.C. Cir.
    2006) (“Where an agency departs from established precedent without
    a reasoned explanation, its decision will be vacated as arbitrary and
    capricious.”) (quoting Ramaprakash v. FAA, 
    346 F.3d 1121
    , 1130
    (D.C. Cir. 2003)); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 
    373 F.3d 1251
    ,
    1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“If an agency decides to change course * * *
    we require it to supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior
    policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
    ignored.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); National
    Classification Comm. v. United States, 
    779 F.2d 687
    , 696 (D.C. Cir.
    1985) (“[A]n agency may depart from past policies or practices if the
    agency also provides a reasoned explanation for its actions.”)
    (emphasis added).
    14
    The Service’s main defense in this case, however, has been
    to insist that nothing changed in 2013. In the Service’s view,
    the Middle Section was never part of the Devil’s Garden Wild
    Horse Territory, and so there was nothing to change. That
    argument flatly defies the plain text of the official 1991 Forest
    Plan, repeated official agency statements, and two decades of
    agency practice. Blinders may work for horses, but they are no
    good for administrative agencies.
    The Service argues secondly that the inclusion of the
    Middle Section must be ignored because it lacked the legal
    authority to add it in the mid-1980s. That argument never even
    leaves the starting gate.
    1
    The Service tries to shrug off its inclusion of the Middle
    Section in the Wild Horse Territory as some sort of
    inconsequential and passing “administrative error,” as though
    that label nullifies any agency duty to reasonably explain its
    about-face. But there is no “oops” exception to the duty of
    federal agencies to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
    Accordingly, the Service’s decision runs aground on both the
    facts and the law.
    As a matter of factual reality, this case involves far more
    than an errant map. The Service’s inclusion of the Middle
    Section in the Wild Horse Territory is well documented in the
    administrative record, and it was reconfirmed repeatedly by
    two decades of agency practice and official pronouncements.
    Most significantly, the official 1991 Forest Plan formally
    documented that the Modoc National Forest “has one wild
    horse territory of about 258,000 acres,” J.A. 585, and that the
    Service “is legally obligated to manage horses within [that]
    258,000-acre wild horse territory,” J.A. 584. That language
    15
    was no divagation. The Forest Plan was the product of more
    than ten years of formal study by the Service involving
    participation by: (i) hundreds of members of the public who
    submitted numerous comments and gave 105 testimonials at
    almost 50 public meetings, (ii) five other federal government
    agencies, (iii) eleven state agencies, (iv) various local
    governments, agencies, and elected officials; (v) four tribal
    communities, and (vi) various industry and non-profit groups.
    Such extensive study and wide participation renders fanciful
    the notion that 23,000 acres of wild horse territory simply
    slipped in unnoticed.
    The Service notes that the record contains no affirmative
    indications that the Service “intended to expand the boundaries
    of the existing Territory when it adopted the [1991] Forest
    Plan.” Service’s Br. 16. True. But that is because the Forest
    Plan treated the determination of the Wild Horse Territory’s
    size as a decision that had already been made in an earlier
    Service plan. See J.A. 585–586 (“The [Modoc National] Forest
    has one wild horse territory of about 258,000 acres * * * *
    Fulfilling requirements of the [Wild Horse] Act the [Service]
    prepared the Wild Horse Management Plan in 1985[.]”). To be
    sure, the Service denies that there was such a 1985 plan.
    Service’s Br. 15 n.7. But that misses the point: The 1991
    Forest Plan that the Service drafted, and in the formulation of
    which it was the key player, described the Wild Horse
    Territory’s expanded 258,000 acreage as a fait accompli by
    1991. So the absence of expansion talk in the Forest Plan is no
    surprise.
    What the 1991 Forest Plan did do was formally document
    a single, contiguous, 258,000 acre Wild Horse Territory that
    could only exist through inclusion of the Middle Section,
    incorporate that status into the Plan through a notice-and-
    comment process, and set a herd management level within that
    16
    territory of “275–335 animals to manage,” J.A. 586. In
    addition, the Forest Plan’s explicit description of the size and
    management levels for the Wild Horse Territory largely
    repudiates the Service’s claims that the plan was “of no
    practical consequence for the management of the disputed area
    because the Forest Service never set appropriate management
    levels for horses on the [portions of allotments] within the
    disputed area.” Service’s Br. 44.
    The Service also argues that it did not intend to expand the
    territory. But after-the-fact claims about agency intentions do
    not work when agency actions evince the opposite. And the
    Service’s actions for at least twenty years corroborated the
    Middle Section’s inclusion in the Wild Horse Territory.
    More specifically, Wild Horse Inventory Reports for the
    Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory documented the
    Service’s treatment of portions of the Middle Section as part of
    the Territory after the 1991 Forest Plan. In 1992 and 1993, the
    Wild Horse Inventory Reports counted the “total [number of]
    horses[,] mules & burros” in ten regions within the Modoc
    National Forest. J.A. 859, 861. Big Sage, which is partially
    contained within the Middle Section, and Boles Meadow,
    which is entirely within the Middle Section, were both
    excluded from the original 1975 Wild Horse Territory
    boundaries. But they are listed as two of the ten main regions
    that Service observers surveyed for wild horses in 1992 and
    1993. The 1992 Wild Horse Inventory Report documented 33
    horses in Big Sage and Boles Meadow combined—more than
    ten percent of the total headcount of 321 horses for the entire
    Wild Horse Territory. The 1993 Wild Horse Inventory Report
    documented five horses in Big Sage and Boles Meadow
    combined, out of 58 horses in total.
    17
    In addition, statements accompanying the 1992 and 1993
    Wild Horse Inventory Reports implicitly treated Big Sage and
    Boles Meadow as within the Wild Horse Territory. For
    example, in the 1992 Wild Horse Inventory Report, the Service
    noted that some of the wild horses spotted were located outside
    the Wild Horse Territory. See, e.g., J.A. 862 (1992 Wild Horse
    Inventory Report: “Ten horses were observed in the West
    Grizzlie * * * Allotment. This area is outside of the wild horse
    territory. Every effort should be made to return these animals
    to the territory and/or [have them] removed.”). By implication,
    the remaining wild horses that the Service counted—including
    those wild horses in Big Sage and Boles Meadow—were
    considered to be inside the Wild Horse Territory. Moreover,
    the 1993 Wild Horse Inventory Report recommended that
    certain wild horses found outside the Wild Horse Territory be
    relocated to Boles Meadow. J.A. 860 (1993 Wild Horse
    Inventory Report: “There are 3 [wild horses] in the Blue Mtn.
    Allotment that need to be relocated to the Boles [Meadow].
    The Blue Mtn. Allotment is outside of the Territory.”)
    (emphasis added). That has to mean that the Service
    considered Boles Meadow (in the Middle Section) to be within
    the Wild Horse Territory. Why else would the Service devote
    scarce resources to shuffling horses from one location outside
    the Territory to another one also outside the Territory?
    Starting in 1994, the Wild Horse Inventory Reports began
    not only reporting the number of wild horses identified in
    specific areas, but also listing “designated management herd
    minimum size[s]” (which appear to be analogous to what the
    Service now terms “appropriate management levels”) for each
    region. Those post-1994 reports continued to treat portions of
    the Middle Section as part of the Wild Horse Territory by
    designating a management herd minimum size for “Big Sage”
    and “Boles [Meadow].” J.A. 857.
    18
    All subsequent Wild Horse Inventory Reports in the
    record—for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2004, and
    2010—also established “designated management herd
    minimum sizes” for Big Sage and Boles Meadow. See, e.g.,
    J.A. 851. 4 On top of that, the 2002 and 2010 Wild Horse
    Inventory Reports listed “Avanzino”—also contained in the
    Middle Section—as one of the regions surveyed.
    The pattern continues in the post-1994 Wild Horse
    Inventory Reports. For instance, the 1998 Wild Horse
    Territory Report recommended the relocation of wild horses
    found in Boles Meadow. See J.A. 852 (1998 Wild Horse
    Inventory Report: “Our plans in 1999 are to capture and
    relocate 100 adult horses on the Emigrant Spring, Boles, Pine
    Springs, [and] Surveyor’s Valley allotments.”) (emphasis
    added). Other Wild Horse Inventory Reports recommended
    that wild horses found outside the Wild Horse Territory be
    relocated to Boles Meadow. See, e.g., J.A. 856 (1996 Wild
    Horse Inventory Report: “Horse sign has been observed in the
    Garden Tank and Lower Fletcher Creek areas. Th[ese] area[s]
    [are] outside of the Wild Horse Territory and these horses
    should be moved back over to the Timbered Ridge Area (Boles
    [Meadow]).”) (emphasis added); J.A. 858 (same for 1994 Wild
    Horse Inventory Report).
    Further, the 1997 Wild Horse Inventory Report
    inventoried 289 wild horses in total, but noted that 40 of those
    wild horses were found in the “Mtn. Dome Area,” which was
    “outside * * * the * * * Devil’s   Garden      Wild     [H]orse
    Territor[y].” J.A. 854. The remaining 249 wild horses—
    including 17 wild horses in Big Sage and 36 wild horses in
    4
    If, as it appears, “designated management heard minimum
    sizes” are synonymous with “appropriate management levels,” the
    presence of those figures contradicts the Service’s claim that levels
    were never set.
    19
    Boles Meadow—were deemed to be “within the territory.”
    Compare J.A. 853 (inventory chart), with J.A. 854 (“Actual
    horses counted were 249 head within the territory.”).
    Similarly, in the 2002 Wild Horse Inventory Report, the
    Service stated that the “[a]ctual horses counted were 500 head
    within the wild horse territory.” J.A. 850 (emphasis added).
    The inventory report shows that this 500 figure included 88
    wild horses in Big Sage, 11 wild horses in Avanzino, and 64
    wild horses in Boles Meadow. J.A. 850. Further, to reduce this
    500 figure, the Service planned “to capture and adopt 160 adult
    horses on the Emigrant Spring, Big Sage, and Avanzino
    allotments.” J.A. 850. And “additional * * * horses [would]
    need to be removed to be compliant with the Devil’s Garden
    [Wild Horse Territory Plan].” J.A. 850 (emphasis added). 5
    The Service does not deny what the Inventory Reports say
    or their treatment of wild horses in the Middle Section. Instead,
    the Service says we should pay no mind to those reports
    because those horses were “included solely for administrative
    convenience.” Service’s Br. 36–37. For that proposition, the
    Service points to a 2014 e-mail from a retired Service employee
    who purportedly was responsible for creating the 1980s-era
    Service map that first depicted the single, contiguous Wild
    Horse Territory. The email states that the retired employee
    “assigned Administrative [Appropriate Management Levels] to
    the Grazing Allotments for ease of managing the existing
    horses & the areas they were inhabiting.” J.A. 767 (emphasis
    omitted). The email further states that “[t]he Administrative
    5
    The Wild Horse Inventory Reports also consistently surveyed,
    and set appropriate management levels for, wild horses in the
    Timbered Mountain Allotment. Most of the Timbered Mountain
    Allotment is part of the original two-part Wild Horse Territory, but
    part of it is in the Middle Section. The pasture within the Timbered
    Mountain Allotment that is most heavily used by wild horses
    includes area within the Middle Section.
    20
    map & [Appropriate Management Levels] were never intended
    to change the [Wild Horse Territory] Plan,” and were only
    made “for ease of managing the existing situation within the
    [Wild Horse Territory].” J.A. 767.
    That email is at best a post hoc rationalization that was not
    part of the record before the Service when it issued its 2013
    decision, and thus cannot help the Service here. See District
    Hosp. Partners v. Burwell, 
    786 F.3d 46
    , 55 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
    (“To ensure that we review only those documents that were
    before the agency, we do not allow parties to supplement the
    record unless they can demonstrate unusual circumstances
    justifying a departure from this general rule.”) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted); American Wildlands v.
    Kempthorne, 
    530 F.3d 991
    , 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
    On top of that, the email explanation makes little sense.
    What administrative ease or convenience is there for counting
    in an inventory horses that should not count? Clearly the
    Service understood the relevant boundaries of Big Sage and
    Boles Meadow; otherwise, it could not have counted the wild
    horses in those areas when preparing the Wild Horse Inventory
    Reports. So if Big Sage and Boles Meadow were simply not
    part of the Wild Horse Territory, all the Service had to do was
    not include those wild horses in the Wild Horse Inventory
    Reports, or note that Big Sage and Boles Meadow were not part
    of the Wild Horse Territory. That was not hard to do; the
    Service repeatedly did it for other wild horses found outside the
    Wild Horse Territory. Convenience alone, then, does not
    explain why the Service not only monitored and managed wild
    horses in the Middle Section, but did so at the same time it
    21
    refused to count all of the other horses that it deemed to be
    outside of the Wild Horse Territory. 6
    In sum, the formal and published 1991 Forest Plan along
    with at least two decades of official Wild Horse Inventory
    Reports and the management activities they document together
    demonstrate that for twenty years the Service officially treated
    portions of the Middle Section as part of a single, contiguous
    Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory. Given that longstanding
    practice, it is unsurprising that the Service’s 2011 scoping letter
    for the revision at issue here treated the Middle Section as part
    of the Wild Horse Territory. While the agency tries to whistle
    past that factual graveyard, the established pattern of agency
    conduct and formalized positions cannot be evaded. The
    Service’s failure even to acknowledge its past practice and
    formal policies regarding the Middle Section, let alone to
    explain its reversal of course in the 2013 decision, was arbitrary
    and capricious. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at
    2126; West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 
    766 F.3d 10
    , 12
    (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating agency action because, inter alia,
    the agency “provided no reasoned explanation for how its
    decision comports with * * * prior agency practice”); accord
    Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 
    477 F.3d 668
    , 687, 690 (9th Cir. 2007) (invalidating an agency
    action because the agency “depart[ed] from its long-standing
    6
    That is just the beginning of the e-mail’s credibility problems.
    For instance, the email states that the retired employee “developed
    the Administrative map lumping the [Wild Horse] [T]erritory into
    one in the early 1990’s.” J.A. 767 (emphasis omitted). But the
    parties agree that the map in question actually originated in the
    1980s. The email further asserts that, “[i]n the early 1980’s Triangle
    was acquired through a land exchange,” and “[b]ecause we had
    horses in the areas,” he “lump[ed] them in with [the Wild Horse
    Territory].” J.A. 767. But there is no dispute that the Service
    acquired the Triangle lands in 1976.
    22
    practice” and “two-decade-old precedent without supplying a
    reasoned analysis for its change of course”).
    2
    The Service also trots out would-be legal impediments to
    the Forest Plan’s inclusion of the Middle Section in the Wild
    Horse Territory, insisting that it lacked the legal authority to
    incorporate the Middle Section and failed to comply with the
    procedural requirements for such a measure. But the Service’s
    supposed failure to comply with all of the applicable laws for
    amending the boundaries of a Wild Horse Territory a quarter
    century ago does not mean that the expansion never happened.
    A failure to comply with the requirements of the Wild Horses
    Act or Administrative Procedure Act would not render the
    change to the territory void from its inception.
    The Service’s assumption that a purported past mistake
    would excuse the agency’s current missteps is wrong. In
    administrative law, as elsewhere, two wrongs do not make a
    right. In addition, regardless of whether the Service’s original
    decision was lawful, the Service never grappled with the 1991
    Forest Plan’s formal recognition of the unitary wild horse
    territory, the inventory reports, or its actions monitoring and
    regulating wild horses in the Middle Section for twenty years.
    Accordingly, whatever the Service’s past transgressions, “we
    cannot condone the ‘correction’ of one error by the
    commitment of another.” Gray v. Mississippi, 
    481 U.S. 648
    ,
    663 (1987); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 
    805 F.2d 410
    , 435 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
    3
    Of course, the Service is free to change its policies going
    forward if doing so is reasonable. But the agency first must at
    least “display awareness that it is changing position” and
    23
    “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Fox
    Television, 
    556 U.S. at 515
    . If instead “an agency glosses over
    or swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may
    cross the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.”
    Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 852, quoted in State Farm, 
    463 U.S. at 57
    ; see also Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125
    (“Agencies are free to change their existing policies so long as
    they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.”). 7
    Accordingly, if the Service wishes now to formally revert
    to the 1975 territorial lines, it must acknowledge that it is
    actually changing course and explain its reasons for doing so.
    Whatever the cause of the initial incorporation of the Middle
    Section into the Wild Horse Territory, that action morphed into
    a multi-decade agency policy—formalized in part by the 1991
    Forest Plan—that cannot be abandoned without some reasoned
    explanation. The Service’s attempt to slam shut the barn door
    after the horse already bolted is not sufficient.
    B
    The Campaign next challenges the Service’s
    determination that the removal of the Middle Section did not
    constitute a significant amendment under the Forest
    Management Act. The Forest Management Act provides that,
    if “amendment” of a Forest Plan “would result in a significant
    change in such [Forest Plan],” the Service must comply with
    heightened procedural requirements including public
    participation through a three-month study, public meetings,
    7
    See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd.
    of Trade, 
    412 U.S. 800
    , 808 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever
    the ground for the departure from prior norms, however, it must be
    clearly set forth [by the agency] so that the reviewing court may
    understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the
    consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate.”).
    24
    and compliance with the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
    1960, 
    16 U.S.C. §§ 528
    –531. See 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (d), (e),
    (f)(4) (emphasis added).
    In its Final Environmental Assessment, the Service
    concluded that amending the 1991 Forest Plan to redraw the
    Wild Horse Territory boundary was a “non-significant” action,
    and thus did not trigger the formal amendment process. The
    Service instead complied with the Act’s less rigorous
    procedural requirements for alterations to a Forest
    Management Plan, 
    16 U.S.C. § 1604
    (d); see 
    id.
     § 1604(f)(4).
    The Campaign argues that excision of the Middle Section
    from the Wild Horse Territory made a “significant” change to
    the Forest Plan itself, and thus triggered the Forest
    Management Act’s more formal and elaborate review process.
    That is not correct. While elimination of the Middle Section
    worked an important and consequential change in the Wild
    Horse Territory itself, the removal of those 23,000 acres had no
    material impact on the 1991 Forest Plan governing 1.6 million
    acres of the Modoc National Forest.
    In interpreting the Forest Management Act, the Forest
    Service has explained that non-significant changes include
    “[a]djustments of management area boundaries or management
    prescriptions resulting from further on-site analysis when the
    adjustments do not cause significant changes in the multiple-
    use goals and objectives for long-term land and resource
    management.” FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE,
    FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 1926.51 (2015). By contrast, to
    constitute a “significant change” to a Forest Plan, the change
    would have to “significantly alter the long-term relationship
    between levels of multiple-use goods and services originally
    projected,” “have an important effect on the entire [Forest
    Plan],” or “affect land and resources throughout a large portion
    25
    of the planning area during the planning period.”                   Id.
    § 1926.52. 8
    Viewed against the comprehensive scope and operation of
    the 1991 Forest Plan, the Service’s reworking of the Wild
    Horse Territory boundaries was not a significant change. The
    1991 Forest Plan governs the entire Modoc National Forest. In
    formulating the plan, the Service balanced a panoply of
    considerations, including air quality, cultural resources,
    biodiversity, fire management, mineral leasing, pest control,
    range conditions, range management, livestock grazing,
    recreational uses, riparian resources, soil and water quality,
    timber clearance, and wildlife protection.
    Within the Forest Plan, wild horse management is just one
    consideration, among a multitude of others, that fall within the
    broader consideration of the Plan’s range-management sub-
    component. Other factors that the Service considers in
    developing a range management program are livestock
    management and diversity of ecological conditions. For
    instance, one objective of range management is “to produce
    desired expressions of” “herbaceous, shrub, and forest
    vegetation” through livestock grazing. J.A. 585. And even
    within the subject of wild horse management, the physical
    dimensions of the wild horse territory are just one element.
    In other words, wild horse management is a factor of a
    factor of a factor that the Service considered when developing
    the Modoc Forest Plan. In addition, the Service’s proposed
    reduction of the Wild Horse Territory by approximately 23,000
    8
    The Forest Service Manual is a compendium of “legal
    authorities, responsibilities, delegations, and general instruction[s],”
    
    36 C.F.R. § 216.2
    (a), that “establish[es] the general framework for
    the management and conduct of Forest Service programs,” 
    id.
    § 216.2(c).
    26
    acres represents at most a 1.5% change in the status of an area
    that will still remain within the federally managed Modoc
    National Forest. Even then, the Service will continue to
    superintend the remaining Wild Horse Territory, balancing
    wild horse management against livestock management and
    range biodiversity, and then balancing all of those range-
    management considerations against such concerns as air, soil,
    and water quality, and all of the other aspects of forest
    management.
    When viewed in that context, the Service reasonably
    concluded that its proposed modification of the Wild Horse
    Territory’s boundaries would likely have at most a slight effect
    on the “multiple-use” goals of the Forest Plan in the “long-
    term,” and will not affect the “entire” Forest Plan or a “large
    portion” of the planning area. 9
    Finally, because we hold that the boundary change was not
    a “significant” change for purposes of the Forest Management
    Act, we need not address the Campaign’s argument that NEPA
    requires an Environmental Assessment for significant changes
    under the Forest Management Act.
    C
    The Campaign’s final argument arises under NEPA and
    the APA. Specifically, the Campaign argues that the Service’s
    failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
    addressing the boundary changes violated NEPA and was the
    product of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. We agree.
    9
    The Campaign does not challenge the criteria set forth in the
    Forest Service Manual for a “significant” change. Accordingly, we
    need not determine what level of deference is properly afforded to
    the Service’s interpretation of the Act. Cf. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-
    Golden Triangle v. Sebelius, 
    566 F.3d 226
    , 228 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    27
    In finding no significant environmental impact that would
    warrant an Environmental Impact Statement, the Service’s
    NEPA analysis never came to grips with its departure from past
    practice, and thus never analyzed the potential environmental
    significance of its 2013 decision to contract the boundaries of
    the Wild Horse Territory by approximately ten percent.
    Our “role in reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare
    an [Environmental Impact Statement] is a ‘limited’ one,
    ‘designed primarily to ensure that no arguably significant
    consequences have been ignored.’” Myersville Citizens for a
    Rural Community, Inc. v. FERC, 
    783 F.3d 1301
    , 1322 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015) (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 
    433 F.3d 852
    , 860
    (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Our task in particular is to ensure that the
    Service, in finding no significant impact, (i) “accurately
    identified the relevant environmental concern,” (ii) took a
    “hard look at the problem” in making its decision, (iii) has
    made “a convincing case for its finding of no significant
    impact,” and (iv) “has shown that even if there is an impact of
    true significance, an [Environmental Impact Statement] is
    unnecessary because changes and safeguards in the project
    sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.” Sierra Club v.
    Van Antwerp, 
    661 F.3d 1147
    , 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting
    TOMAC, 
    433 F.3d at 861
    ); see also Sierra Club v. Department
    of Transp., 
    753 F.2d 120
    , 127 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
    The Service failed that task because its environmental
    analysis did not “accurately identif[y] the relevant
    environmental concern.” Van Antwerp, 
    661 F.3d at 1154
    (emphases added; internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Here, the relevant environmental concern was the
    effect of the boundary modification on the wild horse
    population in the Devil’s Garden area. The Service not only
    failed to address that concern, it denied its very existence. The
    Service insisted that the redrawn boundary lines would have
    28
    “no effect” on the ground because it was only “correct[ing] a
    boundary established for administrative convenience.” J.A.
    372. That is, the only sense in which the Service “identified”
    the effect of the boundary modification on wild horses was by
    insisting that there was “no effect” and that nothing had ever
    really changed. That head-in-the-sand approach to past agency
    practice is the antithesis of NEPA’s requirement that an
    agency’s environmental analysis candidly confront the relevant
    environmental concerns. 10
    More to the point, because the Service actually managed
    wild horses within portions of the Middle Section for two
    decades as though they were within the Wild Horse Territory,
    the 2013 boundary change entailed far more than scratching out
    a few lines in the 1991 Forest Plan. Yet the Service refused to
    even consider the possibility of that broader, real-world impact.
    Thus, while the Service “identifie[d]” some effects on wild
    horses as an environmental concern, the Service did not
    forthrightly and “accurately identif[y] the relevant
    environmental concern”—the actual effects of the boundary
    modification on wild horses in the Devil’s Garden area. Van
    Antwerp, 661 F.3d at 1154 (emphases added; internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    Likewise, the Service’s Finding of No Significant Impact
    not only failed to take a “hard look” at the consequences of the
    boundary change, it averted its eyes altogether. Van Antwerp,
    
    661 F.3d at 1154
    . As a result, the Service’s analysis entirely
    omitted a “discussion of the relevant issues and opposing
    viewpoints,” Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotation
    10
    In its August 2013 Environmental Assessment, the Service
    also referred to the inclusion of the Middle Section as an
    “administrative error.” J.A. 264. Saying something was both done
    for “administrative convenience” and because of “an administrative
    error” is incoherent. The former is purposeful; the latter is not.
    29
    marks and citation omitted), because the Service refused even
    to entertain the opposing premise that the boundary
    modification did more than correct a few stray lines of text in
    the 1991 Forest Plan. The Service’s decision thus failed to
    “make a convincing case for its finding of no significant
    impact.” Van Antwerp, 
    661 F.3d at 1154
     (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    For those reasons, the Service’s environmental analysis
    and Finding of No Significant Impact were arbitrary and
    capricious. 11
    *****
    “Facts are stubborn things.” 12 But record facts are the grist
    of reasoned agency decisionmaking. In this case, the Service
    brushed aside critical facts about its past treatment of and
    11
    The Campaign, in a footnote, also lobs an accusation of
    prejudgment and bad-faith at the Service, charging it with acting at
    the behest of the Farm Bureau. The Campaign has not come close to
    meeting the high bar necessary to prove such allegations. See, e.g.,
    Air Transp. Ass’n of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 
    663 F.3d 476
    , 487–488 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Regardless, its footnoted
    allegation is insufficient to preserve this argument on appeal. See
    CTS Corp. v. EPA, 
    759 F.3d 52
    , 64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“A footnote is
    no place to make a substantive legal argument on appeal; hiding an
    argument there and then articulating it in only a conclusory fashion
    results in forfeiture.”).
    12
    See Statement of John Adams Made When Defending the
    Accused British Regulars at the Boston Massacre Trial, quoted in
    WILLIAM GORDON, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND
    ESTABLISHMENT, OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
    AMERICA: INCLUDING AN ACCOUNT OF THE LATE WAR; AND OF
    THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, FROM THEIR ORIGIN TO THAT PERIOD,
    Vol. 1, p. 296 (1788).
    30
    official statements about the boundaries of the Devil’s Garden
    Wild Horse Territory. As a result, the Service failed: (i) to
    acknowledge and adequately explain its change in course
    regarding the size of the Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory
    and its management of wild horses within the Middle Section,
    and (ii) to consider or to adequately analyze the environmental
    consequences of those changes. Accordingly, we reverse the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment in part, vacate the
    Service’s exclusion of the Middle Section territory and the
    related Finding of No Significant Impact, and direct the district
    court to remand to the Service for further consideration
    consistent with this decision.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-5332

Filed Date: 9/29/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2017

Authorities (23)

northwest-environmental-defense-center-public-employees-for-environmental , 477 F.3d 668 ( 2007 )

TOMAC v. Norton, Gale A. , 433 F.3d 852 ( 2006 )

American Wildlands v. Kempthorne , 530 F.3d 991 ( 2008 )

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership v. Salazar , 661 F.3d 66 ( 2011 )

natural-resources-defense-council-v-lee-m-thomas-administrator , 805 F.2d 410 ( 1986 )

Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp , 661 F.3d 1147 ( 2011 )

Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle v. Sebelius , 566 F.3d 226 ( 2009 )

Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. v. National Mediation ... , 663 F.3d 476 ( 2011 )

Public Citizen, Inc., Aviation Consumer Action Project, and ... , 988 F.2d 186 ( 1993 )

Mistick PBT v. Chao, Elaine , 440 F.3d 503 ( 2006 )

Ramaprakash v. Federal Aviation Administration , 346 F.3d 1121 ( 2003 )

Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos , 568 F.3d 225 ( 2009 )

sierra-club-a-nonprofit-california-corporation-v-the-united-states , 753 F.2d 120 ( 1985 )

Comcast Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission , 600 F.3d 642 ( 2010 )

United Municipal Distributors Group v. Federal Energy ... , 732 F.2d 202 ( 1984 )

National Classification Committee and National Motor ... , 779 F.2d 687 ( 1985 )

Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection ... , 373 F.3d 1251 ( 2004 )

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State ... , 103 S. Ct. 2856 ( 1983 )

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of ... , 93 S. Ct. 2367 ( 1973 )

Gray v. Mississippi , 107 S. Ct. 2045 ( 1987 )

View All Authorities »