In re: NTE Connecticut, LLC ( 2022 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Decided February 24, 2022
    No. 22-1011
    IN RE: NTE CONNECTICUT, LLC,
    PETITIONER
    ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.,
    INTERVENOR
    On Petition for an Emergency Stay Pursuant to the All Writs
    Act
    David W. DeBruin, Suedeen G. Kelly, and Zachary B.
    Cohen were on the petition and the reply.
    Matthew R. Christiansen, General Counsel, Federal
    Energy Regulatory Commission, Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor,
    Beth G. Pacella, Deputy Solicitor, and Matthew W.S. Estes,
    Attorney, were on the response to the petition.
    Before: WILKINS, RAO and JACKSON, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
    RAO, Circuit Judge: Petitioner NTE Connecticut, LLC
    (“NTE”) acquired valuable authorization to sell electricity
    2
    from its new power plant. The Federal Energy Regulatory
    Commission (“FERC”) revoked that authorization and, in so
    doing, very likely fell short of its obligation under the
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to explain the reason
    for its decision. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
    Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983). Absent emergency
    relief from this court, FERC’s order would have irreparably
    harmed NTE, preventing it from participating in a February 7,
    2022, auction to sell future electricity capacity to New England
    consumers. On February 4, 2022, we granted NTE’s petition
    for an emergency stay of FERC’s order, with an opinion to
    follow. This is that opinion.
    I.
    A.
    For the past seven years, NTE has been working to build a
    new natural gas fueled power plant in Killingly, Connecticut.
    In order to sell electricity on the New England grid, NTE had
    to work with ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”) to have the
    project “qualified.” ISO-NE is the independent system operator
    authorized by FERC to manage the regional grid. ISO-NE
    oversees annual “forward capacity auctions” at which the
    owners of generation facilities bid for the right to sell electricity
    on the grid in the future. See NextEra Energy Res., LLC v.
    FERC, 
    898 F.3d 14
    , 17 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing this
    process). The right to provide “capacity” (i.e., the ability to
    produce electricity), in the quantity and at the price fixed at
    auction, is called a facility’s “capacity supply obligation”
    (“CSO”). The CSO is tied to a one-year “capacity commitment
    period” that begins three years after the auction. In concrete
    terms, a generation facility awarded a CSO at the 2022 auction
    gains the right to sell electricity for one year beginning June 1,
    3
    2025. A facility with a CSO is automatically “qualified” to
    participate in future ISO-NE auctions.
    After locating a suitable parcel of land, designing the
    facility, and preparing a timeline for the project’s financing and
    construction, NTE applied to have the Killingly plant
    “qualified.” ISO-NE approved the application, and in the 2019
    auction NTE secured a CSO for the 2022 commitment period.
    Under ISO-NE’s rules at the time, a newly qualified facility
    was permitted to “lock in” the terms of its initial CSO for six
    subsequent capacity commitment periods (i.e., for seven years
    total). See ISO New England Inc., 
    173 FERC ¶ 61,198
     at PP 2–
    4 (2020). NTE exercised this option, giving it a guaranteed
    income stream for the first seven years of the Killingly plant’s
    operation, which in turn made it more attractive to potential
    investors. NTE thereafter participated in the 2020 and 2021
    auctions, securing contract rights to supply electricity for the
    2023 and 2024 commitment periods.
    Initially, NTE had planned for the Killingly facility to
    come online in early 2022. But soon after securing its first CSO
    in 2019, NTE encountered a series of setbacks that prevented
    it from meeting its financing and construction goals. First, just
    after the 2019 auction, incumbent energy generators in New
    England asked FERC to review ISO-NE’s qualification of the
    Killingly plant, placing NTE’s CSO in jeopardy. FERC
    eventually upheld NTE’s rights, but the results of the 2019
    auction did not become final until September 2019. Second,
    while the incumbent competitors’ challenge was pending
    before FERC, several environmental groups sued in state court
    to block the Connecticut Siting Council’s decision to approve
    the Killingly plant. One of them, a nonprofit called Not
    Another Power Plant, appealed the case to the Connecticut
    Supreme Court, which did not issue a decision in NTE’s favor
    until September 2021—some thirty-one months after the 2019
    4
    auction. See Not Another Power Plant v. Conn. Siting Council,
    
    265 A.3d 900
     (Conn. 2021). In the interim, NTE had located a
    potential investor for the Killingly plant. But because the
    project’s viability depended on a favorable legal ruling, NTE
    was unable to finalize financing while the case was under
    review. Third, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in early
    2020 caused further complications. Disruptions to supply
    chains and labor markets required NTE and its potential
    investor to frequently recalculate the project’s shifting costs,
    while pandemic related delays slowed NTE’s ability to secure
    necessary construction permits. Because of these obstacles,
    NTE was repeatedly forced to revise its timeline for the
    Killingly plant’s construction.
    If the Killingly plant was not operational by May 31, 2024,
    ISO-NE had the right to request that FERC terminate NTE’s
    existing CSO, disqualifying it from participating in future
    auctions. ISO-NE Tariff § III.13.3.4A.1 By September 2021,
    ISO-NE was concerned that NTE was running out of time to
    meet that deadline. As revised, NTE’s timetable required it to
    finalize equity financing for the Killingly plant in mid-January
    2022, to finalize debt financing in early March 2022, and to
    begin commercial operation of the plant on May 31, 2024. NTE
    also planned to issue full notices to proceed to its contractors
    by January 1, 2022, before financing was finalized.
    ISO-NE hired a consultant to assess whether these plans
    were feasible. After reviewing NTE’s timeline and conferring
    with the parties, the consultant concluded that if NTE issued
    full notices to proceed by January 1, 2022, “commercial
    1
    “[I]f, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a
    resource will have achieved [operations] is more than two years after
    the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the
    resource first received a [CSO],” ISO-NE may request that FERC
    terminate the resource’s CSO. ISO-NE Tariff § III.13.3.4A.
    5
    operation of [the Killingly plant] could occur on or about the
    stated proposed commercial operation date of May 31, 2024.”
    Issuing full notices on January 1, 2022, would give NTE
    twenty-nine months to build the Killingly facility—“an
    aggressive, but achievable schedule for a project of this scope.”
    However, according to the consultant, full notices to proceed
    typically cannot be issued before financing is secured. NTE’s
    “assumption” that it would be able to issue full notices by
    January 1, 2022, was therefore “unlikely.” Under a more
    “realistic scenario,” the consultant concluded, NTE would be
    able to issue full notices only after securing financing in mid-
    January, resulting in a “likely commercial operation date”
    beyond the deadline of May 31, 2024.
    On November 4, 2021, shortly after receiving the
    consultant’s report, ISO-NE met with NTE to review its plans
    for the Killingly plant. At the meeting, NTE told ISO-NE that
    it remained confident it could complete construction on time.
    It also produced a letter from its equity investor, indicating that
    the investor would soon be ready to issue full notices to
    proceed to major contractors and that those notices did not
    depend on finalizing the project’s financing details with NTE.
    B.
    Later that same day, ISO-NE asked FERC to terminate the
    Killingly plant’s CSO. Such a termination would have voided
    NTE’s rights to collect revenues for the 2022, 2023, and 2024
    commitment periods. It would also have made NTE ineligible
    to participate in the 2022 capacity auction, depriving NTE of
    the “locked in” CSO for the 2025 commitment period.
    ISO-NE claimed that because of NTE’s timeline changes,
    the Killingly facility would not achieve commercial operation
    by the May 31, 2024, deadline. In support of this claim, ISO-
    NE provided FERC with NTE’s most recent construction
    6
    timeline, ISO-NE’s consultant’s report, and the letter from
    NTE’s equity investor. NTE’s timeline, ISO-NE observed,
    “indicates that NTE will issue full notices to proceed on
    January 1, 2022[,] … [which] assumes that those notices can
    be issued without financing in place”—an assumption that
    ISO-NE, relying on its consultant, rejected. Because “it is
    unlikely that these notices to proceed will be executed without
    financing in place,” ISO-NE argued, NTE “will be unable to
    achieve commercial operation of Killingly” by the deadline.
    In response, NTE explained that the assumption on which
    ISO-NE and its consultant relied—that NTE would not be able
    to issue full notices to proceed until its equity financing was in
    place in mid-January—was erroneous. At the time of ISO-NE’s
    filing, NTE’s investor had expected to approve the transaction
    in December 2021 and was willing to issue full notices to
    contractors before financing was finalized, allowing NTE to
    meet the January 1, 2022, target. ISO-NE had failed to
    recognize, in other words, that NTE’s project had a unique
    financing structure. NTE provided FERC with a declaration
    from the Killingly plant’s lead developer, explaining that NTE
    and its investor had agreed to issue full notices before financing
    closed and that the parties had been on track to do so by January
    1, 2022. NTE also submitted a declaration from the project’s
    lead contractor, indicating that if full notices to proceed had
    been issued on schedule, “it would have been feasible to
    complete the project by May 31, 2024.” NTE further argued
    that ISO-NE had not “met its burden … to show that Killingly
    will not enter service by June 1, 2024,” but had “only
    speculate[d] that Killingly will not meet the … deadline, which
    is not the objective standard required by the Tariff.” ISO New
    England Inc., 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     at P 19 (2022) (describing
    NTE’s argument).
    7
    On January 3, 2022, FERC issued an order terminating
    Killingly’s CSO, which stripped NTE of its existing right to
    provide electricity generation capacity for the 2022, 2023, and
    2024 commitment periods, and which barred it from
    participating in the 2022 auction—effectively nullifying
    NTE’s vested right to generation revenues for the 2025
    commitment period. See 
    id.
     P 23. After recounting some of the
    parties’ arguments, FERC concluded that, “[b]ased on a review
    of the record, including the confidential information provided
    by ISO-NE and NTE, … the relevant condition for termination
    set forth in [ISO-NE’s] Tariff … has been met.” 
    Id.
     P 25.
    FERC’s only reason for this conclusion was that it was
    “persuaded by the evidence provided by ISO-NE that, the
    milestone date revisions indicate that Killingly will not have
    achieved … commercial operation[] until after June 1, 2024.”
    
    Id.
     P 26. In a footnote, FERC asserted that “[b]ecause much of
    the pertinent information has been filed on a non-public basis,
    this public order cannot go into detail regarding the specifics of
    the triggering event or the basis for ISO-NE’s judgment that
    Killingly will not be able to achieve … commercial operations
    by June 1, 2024 as required by the tariff. Our review of these
    non-public materials, however, satisfies us that this is the case.”
    
    Id.
     P 26 n.39.
    NTE filed a combined emergency motion for a stay and
    application for rehearing before FERC on January 10, 2022.
    NTE argued that it would be irreparably injured without a stay
    of FERC’s termination order: it would lose its right to future
    revenues under Killingly’s existing CSO and would be
    ineligible to participate in the upcoming 2022 auction.
    Together, it alleged, these penalties would effectively kill the
    project. FERC denied NTE’s motion for a stay on January 28,
    2022. See ISO New England Inc., 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,063
     (2022).
    FERC reasoned that, because “economic loss does not
    constitute irreparable harm,” the “[l]oss of potential capacity
    8
    market revenues … [was] insufficient” to warrant a stay. 
    Id.
    PP 14, 16. It further found that NTE’s assertion that its order
    had “effectively killed” the Killingly project was too
    speculative to support a finding of irreparable harm. 
    Id.
     PP 5,
    16. FERC did not respond to NTE’s request for rehearing and
    had not done so at the time of our decision in this case.
    NTE filed a petition for emergency relief in this court,
    asking us to stay FERC’s order until thirty days after FERC
    addresses NTE’s application for rehearing. It requested that we
    decide its petition in time for NTE to participate in the 2022
    auction, to be held on February 7, 2022. For the reasons
    outlined below, we granted that petition on February 4.
    II.
    The All Writs Act gives this court the power to “issue all
    writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] … jurisdiction[].”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a). In an ordinary FERC case, we have
    jurisdiction only after the agency issues a final order on
    rehearing, see 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b), or after thirty days have
    lapsed from a party’s application for rehearing, see id.
    § 825l(a). But this court has an “inherent” power under the All
    Writs Act to stay agency action in order to preserve its
    prospective jurisdiction. See Nken v. Holder, 
    556 U.S. 418
    , 427
    (2009) (explaining that this authority is “firmly imbedded in
    our judicial system, consonant with the historic procedures of
    federal appellate courts, and a power as old as the judicial
    system of the nation”) (cleaned up); see also Reynolds Metals
    Co. v. FERC, 
    777 F.2d 760
    , 762 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
    At the time NTE petitioned this court for relief, FERC had
    not acted on NTE’s application for rehearing, nor had the
    requisite thirty days lapsed since NTE’s application for
    rehearing. All parties agreed, therefore, that we could not stay
    FERC’s order under the Federal Power Act’s ordinary
    9
    provisions for judicial review. At the time we granted NTE’s
    request for a stay, however, our prospective jurisdiction was
    certain: if FERC did not publish a rehearing order addressing
    NTE’s objections, we would have jurisdiction after thirty days
    to review a petition from NTE. We therefore had the authority
    to consider NTE’s petition for emergency relief. See Am. Pub.
    Gas Ass’n v. Fed’l Power Comm’n, 
    543 F.2d 356
    , 357–58
    (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he authority of the appellate
    court is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a
    jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but extends to those
    cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no
    appeal has been perfected.”) (cleaned up).
    “[R]elief under the All Writs Act is an extraordinary
    remedy that may be invoked only if the statutorily prescribed
    remedy is clearly inadequate.” Reynolds, 
    777 F.2d at 762
    (cleaned up). When an agency’s order is “not yet final, [such
    that] no direct appeal from it yet [lies], and a stay pending
    appeal [is] not available to prevent irreparable injury,” the
    aggrieved party lacks an adequate statutory remedy. 
    Id.
     NTE
    and FERC agreed that, absent relief from this court, NTE
    would have been unable to participate in the 2022 capacity
    auction. NTE alleged that such a result would have led to an
    irreparable injury: its Killingly plant would have been deprived
    of a CSO for the 2025 commitment period that is worth
    “millions of dollars” and that could not be recovered after the
    auction. Further, because FERC had not acted on NTE’s
    application for rehearing before the February 7 auction, NTE
    was precluded from petitioning for direct judicial review of the
    order or a judicial stay pending such review. NTE therefore
    satisfied the “preliminary condition distinctive to All Writs
    relief.” 
    Id.
    Accordingly, we must next decide whether NTE has
    satisfied the “well established requirements that we routinely
    10
    apply to motions for stay pending appeal.” 
    Id.
     We must
    consider “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
    showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
    the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
    whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
    parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
    interest lies.” Nken, 
    556 U.S. at 434
     (cleaned up).2
    A.
    We begin with NTE’s likelihood of success on the merits.
    NTE alleged that the termination order was arbitrary and
    capricious because FERC did not explain why it adopted ISO-
    NE’s argument for termination and ignored NTE’s arguments
    to the contrary. FERC’s orders will be “set aside” if they are
    “arbitrary [or] capricious.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A); see United
    Airlines, Inc. v. FERC, 
    827 F.3d 122
    , 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    While FERC’s order need not be “a model of analytic precision
    to survive a challenge,” Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 
    68 F.3d 1396
    ,
    1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995), it must be “reasonable and reasonably
    2
    This court has characterized various requests for relief under the
    All Writs Act as petitions for mandamus, and our order granting
    NTE’s petition reflected that practice. Strictly speaking, however,
    NTE has not asked for a writ of mandamus—it does not ask us to
    compel FERC to take some action—but for a stay of FERC’s order
    to preserve the status quo. See Nken, 
    556 U.S. at
    426–27
    (distinguishing a stay pending further agency review from an
    affirmative order to the Executive Branch to act). As explained
    above, when a party requests a stay under the All Writs Act and “the
    statutorily prescribed remedy is clearly inadequate,” we evaluate the
    petition for relief like an ordinary application for a stay. Reynolds,
    
    777 F.2d at 762
     (cleaned up). To avoid confusion, with the
    publication of this opinion we also revise the February 4 order to
    remove the reference to mandamus and to clarify that we granted an
    emergency petition for a stay pursuant to the All Writs Act.
    11
    explained,” Nw. Corp. v. FERC, 
    884 F.3d 1176
    , 1179 (D.C.
    Cir. 2018). Because FERC’s termination order almost certainly
    fell short of these requirements, NTE had a substantial
    likelihood of success on the merits.
    First, FERC’s order did not provide a “reasoned
    explanation” of the decision to terminate Killingly’s CSO.
    FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 502
    , 516 (2009).
    Indeed, FERC hardly provided any reason at all. Its termination
    order simply summarized some of the parties’ arguments in
    broad strokes and then announced, without elaboration, that
    FERC was “persuaded by the evidence provided by ISO-NE
    that … Killingly will not [become operable] until after June 1,
    2024.” ISO New England, 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     at P 26. The
    order gives no explanation of why FERC found ISO-NE’s
    evidence persuasive. FERC was entitled to reach that
    conclusion (if the record supported it, of course, see 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(E)). But it could not simply rubberstamp ISO-NE’s
    analysis, especially since ISO-NE bore the burden below. As
    we held in a similar case, an agency’s “unquestioning reliance”
    on a third party’s “defense of its own actions is not enough” to
    survive an arbitrary and capricious challenge. Susquehanna
    Int’l Grp., LLP v. SEC, 
    866 F.3d 442
    , 447 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
    (considering agency reliance on a self-regulatory
    organization). An agency must either “critically review[]” the
    third party’s analysis or “perform[] its own.” 
    Id.
     Here, FERC
    did neither.
    In place of such reasons, FERC cryptically asserted that it
    could not explain its decision because “much of the pertinent
    information [was] filed on a non-public basis.” ISO New
    England, 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     at P 26 n.39. In the first instance,
    it is unclear why, if confidentiality concerns prevented FERC
    from publishing a more complete analysis, it could not simply
    redact its order before public release, as federal courts routinely
    12
    do, and as FERC has done in the past. See, e.g., White Cliffs
    Pipeline, LLC, 
    168 FERC ¶ 63,033
     (2019), aff’d, 
    173 FERC ¶ 61,155
     (2020). More fundamentally, we reject the premise
    that if a matter implicates confidential information an agency
    is somehow absolved of its responsibility to explain its
    decision. It is “inherent in the doctrine of judicial review” that
    an agency must “articulate with clarity and precision its
    findings and the reasons for its decisions.” WAIT Radio v. FCC,
    
    418 F.2d 1153
    , 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969). We see no reason here
    to depart from the bedrock principle that, “in all cases, the
    Commission must explain its reasoning.” Emera Me. v. FERC,
    
    854 F.3d 9
    , 23 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The APA does
    not contain a confidentiality loophole.
    Nor did FERC acknowledge, let alone reasonably reject,
    NTE’s central argument against termination—namely, that its
    plan to issue full notices to proceed by January 1, 2022, was
    viable, and that ISO-NE’s assertion to the contrary was
    unsupported by the record. ISO-NE’s argument for termination
    was expressly predicated on the very assumption that NTE
    contested. Moreover, NTE submitted additional evidence to
    FERC supporting the viability of its construction timeline and
    explaining its project’s unique financing structure, which
    allowed full notices to be issued before the financing was
    finalized. Again, FERC was entitled to conclude that NTE’s
    evidence was unpersuasive or that its timeline was unfeasible
    for other reasons. But it could not simply ignore NTE’s central
    objection to ISO-NE’s analysis.3 “An agency’s failure to
    3
    The dissent faults NTE for submitting new evidence to FERC that
    was not previously considered by ISO-NE. But there is no dispute
    that the evidence was properly before FERC. The fact that evidence
    on a key point of dispute was previously unaddressed by ISO-NE
    only accentuates FERC’s obligation to provide independent analysis.
    The dissent denigrates NTE’s submissions as “eleventh hour, self-
    13
    respond meaningfully to objections raised by a party renders its
    decision arbitrary and capricious. We have stressed that unless
    the agency answers objections that on their face seem
    legitimate, its decision can hardly be classified as
    reasoned.” PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 
    419 F.3d 1194
    , 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). FERC’s failure to
    address NTE’s facially legitimate arguments was especially
    concerning given that its decision upended the status quo ante,
    threatening to deprive NTE of “millions of dollars” of future
    revenues to which it had been entitled.
    Second, FERC failed to articulate a discernable legal
    standard under ISO-NE’s Tariff to govern the termination of
    NTE’s valuable right to a CSO for the 2025 commitment
    period. As the party moving to terminate the CSO, ISO-NE
    bore the burden of showing why the Tariff’s conditions for
    termination were met. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 556
    (d) (“Except as
    otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order
    has the burden of proof.”); cf. Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 
    993 F.2d 1557
    , 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he party filing a rate
    serving, uncorroborated hearsay.” Even if the dissent’s criticisms
    were fair, FERC did not make them but merely ignored NTE’s
    submissions. And although we are permitted and indeed required to
    look at the administrative record when evaluating APA challenges,
    that does not excuse FERC from its duty to explain the reasons for
    its actions. Nor does it justify this court making what are effectively
    de novo evidentiary determinations about the credibility or weight of
    the evidence. See, e.g., Phoenix Herpetological Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S.
    Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
    998 F.3d 999
    , 1006 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
    (“We hesitate … to endorse the district court’s rejection of the …
    affidavit as ‘uncorroborated hearsay,’ particularly since the agency
    did not offer this rationale during the adjudication.”).
    We further note that FERC has not been ambushed by
    arguments it did not have a chance to consider. The agency had
    weeks to respond to NTE’s application for rehearing, which raised
    the same arguments considered by the court in granting this stay.
    14
    adjustment with the Commission under [Section] 205 bears the
    burden of proving the adjustment is lawful.”). In addition, ISO-
    NE bore the burden of showing that termination of NTE’s CSO
    was “just and reasonable.” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), (e); see, e.g.,
    ISO New England Inc., 
    165 FERC ¶ 61,137
     at P 31 (2018).
    The Tariff, however, does not explicitly state the standard
    that ISO-NE must satisfy to justify termination. The Tariff
    permits ISO-NE to request termination “if, as a result of
    milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have
    achieved [commercial operation] is more than two years after
    the beginning of [its first] Capacity Commitment Period.” ISO-
    NE Tariff § III.13.3.4A (emphasis added). Under these terms,
    must ISO-NE show that, “as a result of milestone date
    revisions,” it will be impossible for NTE to meet its deadline?
    Do the new milestone dates have to make timely completion
    unlikely? Is there some other standard? FERC’s failure to
    identify the burden that ISO-NE was required to carry further
    supports the conclusion that FERC did not adequately explain
    why it was satisfied in this case.
    ISO-NE’s consultant found that NTE’s construction
    timeline was “aggressive, but achievable.” In other words, if
    NTE had issued full notices to proceed by January 1, 2022,
    commercial operation of the plant by May 1, 2024, was at least
    possible. FERC’s laconic order gives no indication of how
    ISO-NE could meet its burden under the Tariff given the
    consultant’s finding. Perhaps FERC simply did not believe
    NTE would meet its own deadlines, but even if FERC relied on
    that credibility finding, it needed to explain its conclusion. The
    Tariff does not expressly give ISO-NE the right to terminate a
    CSO simply because it believes the facility’s developer will not
    meet its otherwise acceptable milestone dates. Rather, the CSO
    is a valuable allocation of rights to provide electricity, and ISO-
    NE must request that FERC terminate it. FERC, in turn, must
    15
    comply with the APA’s rationality requirements and find the
    termination of such rights “just and reasonable.”
    Were this order before us on direct review, we would very
    likely find it unreasoned, and therefore unlawful. Indeed,
    FERC concedes that it provided an “admittedly limited
    explanation in the Termination Order.” Without further
    explanation, we had no reason to believe that FERC reasonably
    exercised its discretion. We therefore found that NTE is almost
    certain to succeed in its challenge to FERC’s termination order.
    B.
    We next consider whether NTE faced irreparable harm in
    the absence of a stay. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. As a result of
    FERC’s termination order, NTE would have been ineligible to
    participate in the 2022 capacity auction. But before FERC
    issued its order, NTE was guaranteed to secure a CSO at the
    2022 auction, entitling it to provide the same amount of
    capacity, at the same price, that it secured in the 2019 auction.
    This future revenue stream is worth “millions of dollars,” and
    FERC does not dispute that it is significant.
    Ordinarily, “economic loss does not, in and of itself,
    constitute irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 
    758 F.2d 669
    , 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). That is because in most
    circumstances financial harms can be remedied through
    subsequent legal action. See 
    id.
     Nonetheless, we have
    recognized that “financial injury [can be] irreparable where no
    ‘adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be
    available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
    litigation.’” Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 
    787 F.3d 544
    , 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 
    758 F.2d at 674
    ).
    16
    This is such a case. If NTE had been barred from the 2022
    auction, the capacity rights to which it was formerly entitled
    would have been allocated to other generators on the New
    England grid. Given the reliance interests involved, FERC does
    not generally direct entities like ISO-NE to vacate the results
    of earlier auctions and rerun them to include new entrants. See
    PJM Interconnection, LLC, 
    161 FERC ¶ 61,252
     at P 55 (2017)
    (“The Commission generally does not order a remedy that
    requires rerunning a market [auction] because market
    participants … expect[] that the rules in place and the outcomes
    will not change after the results are set.”). If NTE had been
    excluded from the auction and FERC’s order were later found
    to be unlawful, the capacity that NTE would have received at
    the 2022 auction could not later be clawed back. Without the
    capacity allocation, it is unlikely that NTE would have had a
    claim to lost revenue streams. FERC has made no
    representation to the contrary, and we are aware of no other
    mechanism through which NTE could have recovered these
    losses.
    The circumstances and timing here are unusual because, in
    order to realize its vested contractual rights, NTE had to take
    part in a regulatory auction with other participants. Absent
    emergency relief, FERC’s termination order would have
    irreparably and permanently stripped NTE of very significant
    future revenues to which it was entitled before FERC issued its
    (likely unlawful) order.
    C.
    Next we consider “whether issuance of the stay will
    substantially injure the other parties interested in the
    proceeding” and balance the equities. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434
    (cleaned up). As explained above, our emergency stay
    permitted NTE to participate in the 2022 ISO-NE auction and
    17
    to acquire a CSO for the Killingly plant for the 2025
    commitment period. The stay also paused FERC’s termination
    of NTE’s already acquired CSO for the commitment periods
    running from June 1, 2022, to May 31, 2025.
    FERC pointed to possible third-party harms that may
    befall incumbent electricity generators. Specifically, it asserts
    that NTE’s participation in the 2022 auction would provide
    additional energy supply in the region, driving down electricity
    costs on the New England grid in the 2025 commitment period.
    Because of our stay, incumbent generators would accordingly
    be paid less for the electricity they generate and would be able
    to sell less overall capacity. Such third-party harm, however,
    will be short-lived if FERC’s order is sustained in the future,
    because the capacity NTE secured at the 2022 auction can be
    reallocated     among       existing    facilities  through     a
    “reconfiguration auction.” FERC does not contest the
    feasibility of such a limited reauction.
    Finally, we must decide “where the public interest lies.”
    Id. NTE’s participation in the 2022 auction was expected to
    lower energy costs for New England consumers by generating
    more supply and competition in the electricity market. One
    goal of a forward capacity auction is to “incentivize and
    account for new entry by more efficient generators, while
    ensuring a price both adequate to support reliability and fair to
    consumers.” NextEra, 898 F.3d at 20 (cleaned up). Our
    temporary stay pending agency rehearing simply ensured that
    FERC did not impose unrecoverable losses of millions of
    dollars and potentially jeopardize a new facility without
    fulfilling the basic requirements of reasoned explanation.
    FERC protested that to permit NTE to participate in the
    2022 auction, even though the Killingly facility will not be able
    to provide electricity in the relevant commitment period, would
    18
    distort market competition and “undermine the basic
    functioning of [ISO-NE’s] capacity market, including its
    ability to send accurate price signals to guide entry and exit.”
    As the facts here demonstrate, however, entry and exit into the
    electricity market hardly moves at a rapid pace. And entities
    like ISO-NE regularly reallocate capacity if a facility is unable
    to fulfill its commitments, allowing for a correction of any
    market distortion. More to the point, nothing in FERC’s
    reasoning suggests the risk that incumbents may have to
    reallocate electricity capacity amongst themselves outweighs
    the harm of delaying NTE’s years-long electricity
    infrastructure project that could benefit consumers in the region
    through more efficient (i.e., less expensive) electricity.
    ***
    For the foregoing reasons, we granted NTE’s petition to
    stay FERC’s termination order until thirty days after FERC
    resolves the pending application for agency rehearing.
    WILKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Because I believe that
    the petition for relief should have been denied, I dissent.
    To demonstrate entitlement to relief, the first and foremost
    consideration is “‘whether the stay applicant has made a strong
    showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits[.]’” Nken v.
    Holder, 
    556 U.S. 418
    , 434 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting
    Hilton v. Braunskill, 
    481 U.S. 770
    , 776 (1987)). In addition,
    we must consider whether NTE has shown that it will suffer
    irreparable harm absent a stay, whether a stay will substantially
    injure other parties and whether a stay is in the public interest.
    Nken, 
    556 U.S. at 434
    . The public interest and balance of
    equities factors merge when, as here, the government is the
    opposing party. 
    Id. at 435
    . In my view, NTE failed to meet its
    burden of making a “strong showing” that it is likely to succeed
    on the merits, which in turn undermines its showing that the
    public interest and balance of equities support a stay. See
    Hilton, 
    481 U.S. at 776
    ; cf. Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin, 
    984 F.3d 94
    , 102 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“A party’s likelihood of success
    on the merits ‘is a strong indicator that a preliminary injunction
    would serve the public interest’ because ‘[t]here is generally no
    public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.’”)
    (quoting League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby,
    
    838 F.3d 1
    , 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
    Prior to the agency action under review, NTE had delayed
    the date for Killingly’s financing milestone fourteen times,
    resulting in multiple delays of the expected commercial
    operating date of the power plant. In January of 2021, FERC
    warned NTE that ISO-NE had a duty under the Tariff “to
    monitor Killingly’s critical path schedule,” and that further
    delays in financing milestones could result in ISO-NE
    exercising its right to seek termination of NTE’s CSO. ISO
    New England, Inc., 
    174 FERC ¶ 61,046
     P 40 & n.63 (2021).
    As FERC explained, the Tariff permits ISO-NE to seek
    termination of NTE’s CSO if, as a result of milestone date
    revisions, “the date by which [NTE] will achieve all critical
    2
    path schedule milestones is more than two years after the
    beginning of the first Capacity Commitment Period for which
    it acquired a CSO.” Id. at n.63.
    Because NTE’s subsequent reports indicated further
    financing delays, ISO-NE hired an expert consultant “to assist
    in reviewing Killingly’s critical path schedule.” ISO-NE Term.
    Filing 6. The consultant’s report was not favorable for NTE.
    As ISO-NE explained, “[the consultant’s] review supports that
    the date by which Killingly will achieve all its critical path
    schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning
    of the Capacity Commitment Period for which Killingly first
    received a CSO.” Id. ISO-NE therefore asked FERC to accept
    its request to terminate NTE’s CSO.
    FERC accepted ISO-NE’s termination filing. FERC
    explained that it agreed with ISO-NE’s assessment of the
    evidence:
    We are persuaded by the evidence provided by
    ISO-NE that, the milestone date revisions
    indicate that Killingly will not have achieved all
    of its critical path schedule milestones,
    including commercial operation, until after June
    1, 2024, i.e., more than two years after June 1,
    2022—the beginning of the 2022-2023
    Capacity Commitment Period.
    ISO New England, Inc., 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     P 26 (2022). As
    FERC explained, the consultant’s report, which is in the record,
    supported ISO-NE’s conclusion. 
    Id.
     at PP 25–26.
    FERC’s explanation was sufficient. “Our only task is to
    determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant
    factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts
    3
    found and the choice made.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
    Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    462 U.S. 87
    , 105 (1983). This is
    a “‘narrow’ standard of review[.]” FCC v. Fox Television
    Stations, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 502
    , 513 (2009) (quoting Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983)). The instances where we have set aside agency
    action for insufficient explanation are where the explanation
    was “neither logical nor rational,” “[in]coherent,”
    “incomprehensible,” or where the agency completely failed to
    explain inconsistencies with the governing statute, its prior
    precedent, or the evidence. NBCUniversal Media, LLC v.
    NLRB, 
    815 F.3d 821
    , 823 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see CSI Aviation
    Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    637 F.3d 408
    , 416 (D.C.
    Cir. 2011).
    None of those circumstances are present here. NTE does
    not seriously contend that the expert consultant’s report did not
    constitute substantial evidence to support FERC’s Order, nor
    could it. The best argument that NTE can muster is that FERC
    did not set forth in detail why it accepted the consultant’s report
    over NTE’s interpretation of the evidence. But that argument
    hardly presents a “strong showing” of success. See Hilton, 
    481 U.S. at 776
    . First, the FERC Order explained the competing
    arguments made by NTE and ISO-NE in some detail, 
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     at PP 12–19, so there is no question here that
    FERC considered NTE's arguments and all the record
    evidence. Furthermore, FERC’s Order need not be “a model
    of analytic precision to survive a challenge,” Dickson v. Sec’y
    of Def., 
    68 F.3d 1396
    , 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and we may
    “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path
    may reasonably be discerned.” State Farm, 
    463 U.S. at 43
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    FERC’s reasoning is discernible because FERC explained
    that     it agreed with ISO-NE’s analysis of the
    4
    evidence. Furthermore, we can look at the reasoning appearing
    in the text of the ISO-NE Order to help us discern FERC’s
    path. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 420 (1971) (directing the lower court to examine the
    record that was before the agency at the time of decision to
    determine whether it “disclose[d] the factors that were
    considered”); Tourus Recs., Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 
    259 F.3d 731
    , 738 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (considering contemporaneous
    agenda memoranda in the record because they illuminate the
    “agency’s decisionmaking rationale”). ISO-NE rejected
    NTE’s reliance on a November 4, 2021 letter from its equity
    investor, because the letter said that full notices to proceed with
    construction would not issue until financing was approved by
    the investor’s board of directors, but the letter did not specify a
    date by which such board approval was expected to occur. ISO-
    NE Term. Filing 7 & n.19. NTE later proffered a declaration
    stating that “[i]n conversations with NTE, [the equity investor]
    specified that it expected to obtain Board approval and to issue
    Final Notices [to proceed] in December[.]” NTE Pet. Attach.
    B ¶ 15. But NTE did not provide this declaration to ISO-NE
    before ISO-NE decided to terminate Killingly’s capacity
    supply obligation, nor did NTE provide FERC any
    corroborating evidence from the equity investor.
    As the majority concedes, NTE proffered a “unique”
    financing structure where NTE claimed it could fully proceed
    with construction prior to having funds in hand. ISO-NE’s
    expert consultant explained, and FERC credited, that “on most
    projects,” a full notice to proceed does not issue until “after
    financing has closed with the lending institutions that are
    providing the funds, often on the same day and part of the
    closing proceedings.” NTE Pet. Attach. F at 3. It stands to
    reason that on a project costing hundreds of millions of dollars,
    contractors would require proof of financing and the actual
    payment of deposits prior to starting work and ordering
    5
    equipment, rather than promises that financing and funds will
    be forthcoming soon. FERC acted well within its discretion to
    find it was “persuaded by the evidence provided by ISO-NE,”
    
    178 FERC ¶ 61,001
     at P 26, and to reject NTE’s eleventh-hour,
    self-serving uncorroborated hearsay that construction would
    proceed in a manner contrary to ordinary industry practice. See
    Phoenix Herpetological Soc’y, Inc. v. United States Fish &
    Wildlife Serv., 
    998 F.3d 999
    , 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
    When rejecting a similar challenge to FERC’s predecessor
    many decades ago, the Supreme Court observed:
    The findings of the Commission in this regard
    leave much to be desired since they are quite
    summary and incorporate by reference the
    Commission’s staff’s exhibits on allocation of
    cost. But the path which it followed can be
    discerned. And we do not believe its findings
    are so vague and obscure as to make the judicial
    review contemplated by the Act a perfunctory
    process.
    Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
    324 U.S. 581
    , 595 (1945). The Court’s reasoning has been followed in
    State Farm, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, and countless
    times since. We are duty bound to follow it here. I respectfully
    dissent.